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Preface and Acknowledgments 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was an extraordinary achievement of law, 
politics, and human rights. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Act's pas-
sage, it is appropriate to reflect on the successes and failures of the civil 
rights project reflected in the statute, as well as on its future directions. 
This volume represents an attempt to assess the Civil Rights Act's legacy. 
On October 11, 2013, a diverse group of civil rights scholars met at the 
University of Michigan Law School in Ann Arbor to assess the interpre-
tation, development, and administration of civil rights law in the five 
decades since President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the Civil Rights 
Act. In the volume that follows, readers will find edited versions of the 
papers that these scholars presented, enriched by our lively discussions 
at and after the conference. We hope that the essays in this volume will 
contribute to the continuing debates regarding the civil rights project in 
the United States and the world. 
This volume, and the conference from which it emerged, would not 
have existed without the generous financial support of the Anti-
Discrimination Center. We thank the Anti-Discrimination Center and its 
executive director, Craig Gurian, for their tremendous assistance. The 
current and former deans of the University of Michigan Law School, 
Mark West and Evan Caminker, also were especially supportive of this 
project. We thank Jenny Rickard, Jenny Whalen, and Jessica Hanes for 
their tireless staff work to make the conference and volume a success. 
And last but not least, we very much appreciate the editorial assistance 
of two terrific students, Cali Cope-Kasten and Rachel Goldberg. 
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Performative Citizenship in the Civil 
Rights and Immigrant Rights Movements 
Kathryn Abrams 
In August 2013, Maria Teresa Kumar, the executive director of Voto 
Latino, spoke alongside civil rights leaders at the fiftieth anniversary of 
the March on Washington. A month earlier, immigrant activists invited 
the Reverend AI Sharpton to join a press conference outside the federal 
court building as they celebrated a legal victory over Joe Arpaio, the 
anti -immigrant sheriff of Maricopa County. Undocumented youth orga-
nizing for immigration reform explained their persistence with Manin 
Luther King's statement that "the arc of the moral universe is long, but it 
bends towardjustice."1 
The civil rights movement remains a potent reminder that politically 
marginalized groups can shape the law through mobilization and col-
lective action. This has made the movement a crucial source of sym-
bolism for those activists who have come after. But it has also been a 
source of what sociologist Doug McAdam has called "cultural innova-
tions"2: transformative strategies and tactics that can be embraced and 
modified by later movements. This chapter examines the legacy of the 
Civil Rights Act by revisiting the social movement that produced it and 
comparing that movement to a recent and galvanizing successor, the 
movement for immigrant rights.3 This movement has not simply used 
the storied tactics of the civil rights movement; it has modified them 
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in ways that render them more performative: undocumented activists 
implement the familiar tactics that enact, in daring and surprising ways, 
the public belonging to which they aspire.4 This performative dimen-
sion would seem to distinguish the immigrant rights movement, at the 
level of organizational strategy, from its civil rights counterpart, whose 
participants were constitutionally acknowledged as citizens. However, 
focusing instead on the legal consciousness and self-conception of indi-
vidual activists may unveil greater similarities between participants in 
the two movements. As the individual narratives elicited by sociologists 
and historians of the civil rights movement demonstrate, participants in 
many civil rights campaigns were asserting a citizenship in which they 
did not feel secure, notwithstanding its formal recognition in law. In this 
respect, both movements relied on what Patricia Williams has called the 
"alchemy" of claiming rights that may be emergent or precarious as a 
means of securing their formal recognition. 
Part I of this chapter examines the civil rights movement and the 
immigrant rights movement from the standpoint of organizational 
strategy and tactics. It focuses on two "cultural innovations" that have 
become hallmarks of the civil rights movement: the use of direct action, 
particularly civil disobedience, to protest Jim Crow laws in Southern 
states, and the campaigns that sought to prepare and register black res-
idents for the franchise in rural communities of the Deep South, such 
as Mississippi. Both direct action and civic engagement campaigns have 
been central to the emerging movement for immigrant rights. But they 
have been implemented with distinctive variations, which enable the 
assertion of belonging by one visible and compelling segment of the 
immigrant population-undocumented youth. Part II reconsiders the 
claim advanced in Part I, that the immigrant rights movement is distinct 
in its performative dimension, by focusing on the individual legal con-
sciousness of participants. This analysis suggests that early civil rights 
activists also performed a citizenship they did not experience as secure 
in order to bring it more fully into being. The work of social scien-
tists such as Francesca Polletta and Charles Payne, who have studied 
the civil rights movement at the level of individual legal conscious-
ness, demonstrates that the sense of belonging experienced by grass-
roots activists in the movement was shaped as much by the pervasive 
threat of state-sanctioned violence as by the formal rights of citizenship 
they were seeking to enforce. The role of "first-class citizens," which 
activists undertook to secure the enforcement of their rights, may have 
felt to them as uncertain or aspirational as the civic roles embraced by 
undocumented immigrants. 
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I. Organizational Tactics: Adoption and Adaptation 
A. Direct Action and Civil Disobedience 
The civil rights movement deployed a range of direct action tactics, 
whose moral impetus and visual imagery became synonymous with the 
movement in the public mind. Boycotts brought coordinated economic 
pressure to bear on those who followed segregationist laws or practices.5 
Sit-ins violated Jim Crow laws, which protesters viewed as inconsistent 
with federal guarantees of equal protection.6 Freedom riders exercised 
the federal right to integrated public accommodations in state contexts 
where that act of integration sparked violent resistance? These actions 
made visible to the public that constitutional guarantees of equal protec-
tion and full citizenship were being flouted by Jim Crow laws and South-
ern resistance. Direct action tactics also highlighted the moral resolve of 
protesters and their willingness to endure hardship in order to commu-
nicate their message. 8 
But these tactics served an additional purpose: they exposed the 
regime of often-violent enforcement that held segregative practices in 
place.9 The dogs and firehoses that Bull Connor loosed on student pro-
testers in Birmingham and the angry mobs who attacked Freedom Rid-
ers as they debarked at interstate bus terminals set in motion several 
responses that were critical to movement strategy. These repressive 
responses often triggered court challenges, which enabled federaljudges 
to articulate the federal guarantees applicable to African Americans.10 
Moreover, where state officials targeted protesters with violence, or 
failed to restrain the violent response of their citizens, protesters could 
demand-and occasionally received-federal intervention and protec-
tion.11 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, confrontations between 
nonviolent protesters and violent state officials or citizens elicited broad 
media coverage, which could incite empathy, indignation, and outrage 
across broad swaths of the American public.12 Campaigns targeting 
communities that combined Jim Crow laws with volatile law enforce-
ment were particularly effective in influencing a legislative response.13 
The meetings, trainings in nonviolent protest, and mass arrests that sur-
rounded direct action events also built deep solidarity among protest-
ers.14 
The immigrant justice movement has deployed many of these tactics 
with a full awareness of the expressive value of their legacy. Protests 
over the enactment of Arizona's S.B. 1070, the first in a spate of anti-
immigrant state laws, utilized many of the direct action tactics that 
had helped civil rights activism to gain purchase. The enactment of 
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the law was swiftly followed by the announcement of an economic 
boycott of the state, organized by coalition of immigrant groups and 
endorsed by Rep. Raul Grijalva, a proimmigrant member of Congress.15 
A cascade of protests, including a one-hundred-day vigil at the state 
capital, followed.16 Protesters held sit-ins on public streets and at state 
and federal buildings; they occasionally blocked the vehicles of anti-
immigrant Sherriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County. A group of undocu-
mented activists boarded the Undocubus for an interstate journey to the 
2012 Democratic National Convention (DNC)F However, the contexts 
in which movement activists utilized these tactics, and the ways in which 
they were executed, often diverged from those of the civil rights move-
ment. 
First, the appeal to the federal government implicit in these tactics 
was a more ambivalent undertaking. While the Obama administration 
ultimately challenged S.B. 1070 on the grounds that it was preempted 
by federal authority over immigration, a complex array of laws and 
programs, such as section 287(g) of the immigration and National Act 
(287(g)) and Secure Communities, created partnerships between state 
and local officials and the federal government in the enforcement of 
immigration law. This meant the federal government was often directly 
implicated in the very patterns of enforcement to which protesters 
objected. Second, although direct action tactics have been similar, they 
have been directed toward different targets and have reflected different 
kinds of strategies. Because enforcement of federal immigration law 
rests substantially in the discretion of state and federal law enforcement 
agents, it is more difficult to stage a protest that targets a particular law, 
or captures its symbolism, in the way that the lunch counter sit-ins, 
for example, captured the quotidian yet corrosive character of segrega-
tion. Early examples of direct action by immigrants were often staged 
to manifest generalized resistance, with protesters sitting on a banner 
in the middle of a busy street or in a courtyard in front of a state or 
federal building. More recently, activists have sought to target the oper-
ation of immigration enforcement by chaining themselves to buses car-
rying immigrants toward deportation or buildings where the detention 
or processing of those subject to deportation occurs.18 Moreover, direct 
action tactics by immigrant groups have not predictably provoked the 
repressive response that sparked widespread publicity during the civil 
rights movement. Although a sea of cell phones has been raised to cap-
ture each encounter between police and protesters, 19 there have been 
few incidents of brutality in the confrontation or arrests of those prac-
ticing civil disobedience. This may be partly because law enforcement 
officials have learned the lessons of the civil rights protests. But it may be 
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because officials have had a different weapon to wield against protesters, 
particularly as undocumented activists began to join in acts of protest 
and civil disobedience. The fact that undocumented activists taken into 
custody in connection with civil disobedience or other acts of protest 
could be subject to detention or deportation on the basis of their immi-
gralion status has introduced a new dynamic into direct action events. 
The fear of deportation and family separation is present for undoc-
umented protesters, as the fear of violence had been for civil rights 
demonstrators. But it is a less visible fear, and when realized in the con-
text of an "off-camera" administrative process, it has not subjected law 
enforcement to publicity or to comparably widespread moral judgment. 
Consequently, activists have been required to develop additional tactics 
to turn direct action protests to their strategic advantage. 
One particularly powerful tactic was introduced by DREAMers, 
undocumented youth who were among the first undocumented activists 
to assume visible leadership in the larger immigrantjustice movement. 
Beginning in 2010, as they mobilized for a federal law that would have 
granted a path to citizenship for childhood arrivals, DREAMers began to 
"come out" as "undocumented and unafraid."20 This tactic drew inspi-
ration from the self-disclosures that became paradigmatic for the LGBT 
movement as a vehicle for fighting isolation and generating both com-
munity and public awareness.21 It also drew on the practices of self-
narration common in feminist consciousness raising and in mass meet-
ings of the civil rights movement.22 This self-narration had several func-
tions in immigrant activism. The first was raising consciousness and 
conveying information. The stories of undocumented activists commu-
nicated what it was like to be a person without legal status, thus con-
veying a reality that was starkly unfamiliar to most Americans. Young 
activists described surviving day to day without even the assurance pro-
vided by a legal presence that a family would not be deported or sep-
arated; they described the difficulties of trying to make a living or get 
an education any of the government-conferred benefits-from a social 
security number to in-state tuition or scholarships-that many with 
legal status take for granted.23 But the stories of undocumented youth 
were not simply narratives of suffering. They were also stories about 
progress made in confronting and transcending these limitations, both 
through individual effort and through political solidarity. Finally, there 
was also a persuasive and performative dimension of "stories of seli 
that was directed at the larger public. Coming out as "undocumented 
and unafraid" reflected an almost Austenian performativity. Those who 
declared their fearlessness in coming "out of the shadows" may well have 
felt fear, yet they found energy, strength, and resolve in their own dec-
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larations, the parallel actions of others, and the responsive shouts of 
"undocumented and unafraid" that surrounded them as they exposed 
their identities, crossed borders, or chained themselves to public prop-
erty. By speaking directly and candidly to the public and petitioning the 
government for redress of grievances, they were claiming the role of 
citizens-a role that felt both earned and precarious.24 They were also 
enacting, in salient respects, the political reality to which they aspired: 
a political world in which they could engage, as members, over critical 
questions of national policy. But because undocumented immigrants 
did not yet enjoy, as a matter of formal law, the role that they were 
claiming, these disclosures had persuasive as well as performative value. 
They showcased DREAMers as participants with moral courage and 
political responsibility who were willing to take risks to win a role for 
which they were otherwise prepared, much as the willingness to endure 
violent attacks with nonviolent perseverance had distinguished civil 
rights protesters. 
Whether activists were mobilizing for federal reforms or resisting 
oppressive state laws, practices of "coming out of the shadows" and 
"telling your story" had a flavor of civil disobedience. They made visible 
an ongoing violation of the law and exposed violators to potential con-
sequences25 in order to change the law. When these practices of self-
disclosure26 were combined with familiar forms of direct action, the 
combination made the risk-taking of undocumented activists visible and 
generated visibility for the movement. For example, in july 2012, during 
the federal civil rights trial of Sherriff Joe Arpaio, four undocumented 
Phoenix activists held a press conference announcing their status and 
sat down in the street in front of the federal court building, subject-
ing themselves to arrest.27 Or, later that summer, several dozen undoc-
umented activists rode the Undocubus across several states that had 
enacted or considered anti-immigrant legislation, en route to the in the 
Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina.28 These 
protests used tactics popularized by the civil rights movement: the sit-in, 
the freedom ride, the confrontation at the Democratic National Conven-
tion. But in each case, protesters used a new and innovative tactic-self-
disclosure and self-narration by undocumented activists- to attain the 
visibility and mount the kind of moral claim that civil rights protesters 
had achieved by exposing themselves to state-sponsored violence. 
B. Voter Registration and Civic Engagement 
As a movement of citizens who were, for all practical purposes, dis-
enfranchised, the civil rights movement embraced twin imperatives. 
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First, it sought to enable African Americans to exercise their right to 
vote, which would signal the advent of"first-class citizenship" and would 
be integral in securing future legislative reforms. Second, because that 
right, and any future reforms, would likely require legislative action for 
its vindication, the movement sought to elicit the political mobilization 
of those who were already able to exercise the franchise-namely, sym-
pathetic whites. The vote was sometimes the object of direct action cam-
paigns, such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's (SCLC) 
efforts in Selma in 1964,29 but it was also the focus of a second kind 
of campaign. In the counties of the Deep South, activists from groups 
like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) sought to 
persuade black residents to register to vote. This was no modest under-
taking. Blacks who attempted to register suffered economic retaliation 
and physical violence from employers, neighbors, and state actors.30 Yet 
organizers sought to highlight voter participation as a vehicle for full cit-
izenship and to impart to participants the knowledge and civic respon-
sibility that would sustain it. For example, in SNCC's "Mississippi Pro-
ject," organizers not only sought to facilitate black voter registration but 
also provided registrants and residents of local communities with the 
experience of electoral participation through the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party (MFDP).31 The MFDP conducted its own primaries 
and conventions for local African American participants, giving those 
who had not previously participated direct experience of the electoral 
process. The project also enabled some MFDP activists to communicate 
their experience and commitment to a dubious white public as a result 
of claiming their right to be seated at the 1964 Democratic National 
Convention. Another innovation of the Mississippi Project (sometimes 
referred to as "Freedom Summer") was to bring hundreds of elite, white 
college students to work with local organizers in rural Mississippi.32 The 
role of whites in promoting registration in Mississippi, which built on 
years of organizing by SNCC activists, was more than an injection of 
relief troops in a sharply embattled region. The dangers to which both 
black and white activists were exposed-captured chillingly by the mur-
ders of organizers Goodman, Cheney, and Schwerner in the summer of 
1964-made the meaning of massive resistance, and of second-class cit-
izenship, stunningly concrete to the students and their well-connected 
parents. Their concrete understanding of the ways that racial hierar-
chy was maintained by state-supported violence prompted demands 
for protective federal intervention in Mississippi and created a body of 
influential allies for the movement as a whole.33 
Civic engagement has also played a large role in the movement for 
immigrant rights, but it has been structured by a different set of dynam-
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ics. Undocumented immigrants face a barrier to the franchise that is dif-
ferent from the registrars and sheriffs of Mississippi. With no legal status 
(and for most no legal presence), undocumented immigrants cannot 
assert even a formal right to the franchise. Legislative reform providing 
some path to citizenship is necessary before such a claim can be made. 
To enlist support for such legislation, immigrant activists, like their civil 
rights counterparts, have been required to mobilize voters beyond the 
group who stands directly to benefit. The immigrant rights movement, 
however, can draw on a group of Latino voters that is more proximate 
than the general population of whites and far larger than the group of 
"Freedom Summer" parents whose familial connection to segregationist 
violence spurred their political participation. Many Latino voters have 
firsthand exposure to the struggles of undocumented family members, 
friends, and neighbors or have experienced their own fear of family sep-
aration. The challenge, however, has been to reach and mobilize a group 
of voters who have not historically turned out in high numbers34 and 
help them make the connection between the changes they want to see, 
and their own electoral participation. 
A pivotal innovation in this effort has been the recruitment of undoc-
umented youth to register and mobilize Latino voters. A series of civic 
engagement campaigns in Arizona demonstrate the potential of this 
practice. Undocumented youth have been volunteering in civil engage-
ment campaigns in Arizona since at least 2011 when Randy Parraz and 
Citizens for a Better Arizona mounted a recall campaign against Russell 
Pearce, the legislative sponsor of S.B. 1070.35 Youthful volunteers signed 
on to challenge a politician who had exposed their communities to fear, 
surveillance, and harassment. Both those who had already been active 
in politics, such as members of the Arizona Dream Act Coalition and 
those who were entirely new to organizing, came out for the effort 
to register voters. When voters seemed reluctant about registering or 
doubted that their vote could make a difference, undocumented vol-
unteers engaged them by narrating their own experience under S.B. 
1070, arguing that if they could make a difference when they could not 
even cast a ballot, surely a registered voter could make a contribution to 
bringing about change.36 This tactic was given a powerful boost when 
Pearce was defeated by an unlikely combination of Latino voters, mod-
erate business interests, and concerned Mormons. Both Latino voters 
and undocumented volunteers saw that they could make a difference in 
the direction of state politics. 37 Perhaps the most striking example of 
this approach occurred in the summer and fall of 2012, when a coali-
tion between a proimmigrant civic engagement organization and a local 
union recruited more than two thousand teenage volunteers and orga-
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nizers, many of them undocumented, to register voters for the Novem-
ber 2012 election. Calling their campaign "Adios Arpaio;' the activists 
used the reelection campaign of the sheriff of Maricopa County as a 
hook for registering and motivating Latino voters.38 Through a system-
atic training process supported by nationwide organizations such as the 
Center for Community Change, young activists learned to share their 
stories of racial profiling and family separation perpetuated by Arpaio's 
forces and to engage creatively with apathetic or reluctant voters. A 
DREAM Act organization supplemented their efforts with the "I am a 
DREAM Voter" campaign, in which DREAMers asked registered voters 
to cast their ballots on in support of pro-DREAMer candidates and poli-
cies. Although Arpaio was reelected, his margin was very narrow, and 
the campaigns registered tens of thousands of new Latino voters in the 
greater Phoenix area. 39 
The civic engagement campaigns reflected another dimension of the 
performative strategy of the immigrant rights movement. The volun-
teers who canvassed in Arizona's civic engagement campaigns became 
deeply involved not only with the principal goal of replacing particular 
elected officials but also with the mechanics of the vote, the issues facing 
particular neighborhoods, and the concept of political accountability.40 
In many cases they taught citizens either about the substantive issues 
or about filling out a ballot. Placing undocumented youth in an integral 
facilitative role in relation to one of the most central rights of citizenship 
created a new political reality just as the meetings, caucuses, and elec-
tions of the MFDP created a new political reality in which mainstream 
participants could see the knowledge and commitment of the new par-
ticipants differently. Yet, if anything, the inauguration of new political 
relations-the improbable claiming of the "space of citizenship"-was 
even more striking in the case of young immigrants. Theirs was not a 
parallel process: they were integrally involved with citizens in their reg-
istration to vote and the casting of their ballots. And the young people 
who performed this role were not American citizens brutally deprived 
of their voting righ ts but residents with no legal status and, in some 
cases, no legal right to be present. Both the efficacy and the transforma-
tive symbolism of this strategy were such that it was perhaps no surprise 
that the Arizona legislature soon began to enact legislation regulating the 
roles of volunteers in the early balloting process. 
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11. Rights Consciousness, Emergent Rights, and Performative 
Rights Assertion 
Thus far the civil rights movement and the immigrant justice movement 
have been considered as constellations of actors on the public stage. This 
lens reveals that the discourse, the strategies, and the specific tactical 
repertoires of the civil rights movement have become symbols and tem-
plates for the immigrant justice movement and for many other move-
ments. This perspective also highlights the ways that immigrant activists 
have revised these strategies and tactics to encompass new practices. 
These practices of self-narration and multifaceted civic engagement are 
performative along several dimensions. First, they enable immigrants to 
reject the fear and the resulting posture of hiding that governmental offi-
cials have sought to impose on them through anti-immigrant legislation 
and enforcement efforts. Second, these tactics have enabled undocu-
mented activists to "claim the space of citizenship" while simultane-
ously developing and manifesting the skills and attributes that serve to 
unsettle public understanding of undocumented immigrants and their 
belonging. Finally, these performances create an outside-a public 
impression-that emanates more from desire and imagination than 
from legal foundation or subjective self-conception. In concrete and 
socially transformative ways, immigrants undertake the tasks of a citi-
zenship they have not yet been granted and manifest a confidence and 
self-possession that may belie a far more ambivalent set of feelings and 
expectations. These performative dimensions of the recent immigrant 
mobilization might seem to distinguish it from a civil rights activism 
that was grounded in the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments and 
sought to make good on their incomplete promise through federal leg-
islation and enforcement. 
But the literature of social movements suggests another way to look at 
these two efforts: not as movements engaging with legal institutions in 
carefully choreographed repertoires but as situated groups of individual 
actors, asserting or negotiating rights claims. From this perspective, the 
question is how actors in these two movements think about their rights, 
or how they see their relation to the polity as they go about their day-
to-day work. Viewed in this way, taking the individual activist and his or 
her legal or rights consciousness as the focus,41 the difference between 
the movements is not as stark as one might initially suspect. For many 
grassroots participants in the civil rights movement, the formal rights 
to citizenship and to equal protection that were conferred on Mrican 
Americans by the Civil War Amendments were less constitutive of their 
sense of rights and of belonging than the regimes of social and institu-
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tional exclusion, economic retaliation, and public-private violence that 
structured their daily existence. In pivotal contexts such as movement 
organizing in Mississippi, the self-assertion of African American activists 
had aspects of performativity that, in some respects, resemble those of 
the immigrant justice movement. 
A Rights Consciousness and Emergent Rights among Immigrant 
Activists 
As noncitizens who lack a legal status and, in most cases, a legal right to 
be present, immigrant activists do not instinctively regard their "rights" 
as formal claims that can be directed to courts or enforced by legisla-
tures.42 The experience of mobilizing without legal status, and indeed 
the experience of navigating American society without many formal 
rights, has engendered in many immigrant activists an attitude of 
improvisatory self-reliance. They view progress as more likely to arise 
from their own organizing than from the declarations of the courts.43 
Consequently, groups often operate orthogonally to formal occasions 
of rights declaration.44 Immigrant activists have used major court dates 
as opportunities for rallying, marching, or direct action-for reminding 
public officials that "we are still here and we are watching."45 Activists 
across the country marched on the day that the Supreme Court heard 
argument in Arizona v. United States.46 Activists in Arizona held a press 
conference and engaged in civil disobedience on the day that Sherriff 
Joe Arpaio testified before the district court in Melendres v. Arpaio.47 
Participants also seem to understand their activism as working parallel 
to formal adjudicative processes. For example, activists sometimes say 
that the Melendres decision simply confirmed what they knew about joe 
Arpaio when they sat down in front of his trucks or conducted the "Adios 
Arpaio" campaign.48 
One primary way in which undocumented activists seem to under-
stand their own rights, however, is as claims to be negotiated or extended 
through assertion in encounters with law enforcement officials. One 
starting point for this assertion of rights is the "Know Your Rights" ses-
sions that have been held throughout Arizona and other states, often 
sponsored by legal organizations such as the ACLU in conjunction with 
local proimmigrant organizations. These forums have been frequent 
and well-attended events that have served as both a basis for organizing 
and a vehicle for preventing panic in the face of legislation like S.B. 
1070.49 They advise members of the community about what they should 
do in preparation for a stop, detention, or deportation. The range of 
rights that undocumented immigrants can assert in encounters with 
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state law enforcement officials or with agents of Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE) is, in a formal sense, limited.5° For example, 
they can decline to tell law enforcement officials where they are from 
(though this information may become available if they are ultimately 
held and fingerprinted). They can ask for a lawyer if they are detained. 
They can create an advance directive specifying who will be responsible 
for their children (or pets or property) if they are deported. None of 
these rights, however, will predictably prevent detention or deportation. 
Yet some immigrant activists report that knowing about these rights can 
make a difference in the way they engage law enforcement if they are 
actually stopped and the way they live their daily lives.51 This greater 
confidence is an advantage to the movement because it may prevent 
daunted immigrants from returning to their countries of origin in the 
face of restrictive state legislation. Some report that simply having made 
arrangements for the care of their children gives them greater peace of 
mind as they travel from home to work and back.52 Others say that they 
feel less panic when they are stopped, and they are less likely to make 
costly errors. One young woman explained that this kind of prepara-
tion helped her assert her rights over a thirty-six-hour period of deten-
tion. She noted, moreover, that the calm and persistent way that she 
responded when questioned helped persuade Immigration and Cus-
toms (ICE) officials that she was "a good person"-the kind of person 
who should be released rather than deported even though officials ulti-
mately understood that she was in the United States without authoriza-
tion.53 
This example points to a peculiar feature of immigration enforce-
ment, particularly in a period of legislative stalemate, in which many 
important decisions related to detention and deportation rest on a broad 
and differentially applied set of enforcement priorities. In the gray area 
of intersection between immigration law and discretionary enforcement 
priorities such as those contained in the Morton memorandum,54 one's 
de facto "right" to remain- which is not a formal legal right but an expe-
rientially grounded judgment about the acts for which, or circumstances 
under which, one will not be deported-may ultimately be established or 
extended by tendentious efforts to push the envelope. One young man, 
a naturalized citizen who had been active in the early formation of Ari-
zona's DREAM Act movement, described his disbelief when he heard 
that the first DREAMers had identified themselves publicly as undocu-
mented. "My God, I thought, those kids are going tO be deported. But 
then they were not. And soon others joined them," making similar self-
disclosures. 55 Had those initial DREAMers not disclosed their status, 
the entire community might still believe that their self-identification 
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would trigger deportation. After their action, many began to believe that 
it might not-at least not predictably-do so. Hundreds of DREAM-
ers began to live their lives and conduct their politics differently as a 
resu1L.56 This assertion of emergent rights57 was performative in the 
sense that it reflected neither a foundation in established law nor a 
grounding in the subjective expectations of the participants, who likely 
also assessed the risk of deportation as great. Perhaps more important, 
th is act was performative in the sense that activists' willingness to suffer 
the consequences of a previously untested form of political conduct 
helped establish this form of engagement as a plausible strategy-a 
lower-risk activity than had previously been believed. Because activists' 
legal status has not changed, these acts of self-assertion continue to 
occupy a gray area of hazard. Although the DREAMers themselves may 
not be deported for coming out as "undocumented and unafraid," there 
are cases in which their family members have been detained or have 
come close to deportation in the wake of this form of activism.58 But, 
due in large part to this purposeful pressing of the envelope, the scope 
of the de facto "right to remain" has expanded a bit. 
Activists explain the resolve that has animated these risk-taking acts in 
many ways.59 Some point to a feeling of necessity-that is, they must 
attempt to press boundaries because there is no other choice. 'When 
your back is to the wall, you come out swinging" is a phrase that emerges 
regularly among Arizona activists. Another kind of explanation that 
reflects some tension with the preceding explanation is that undocu-
mented youth often feel like they belong to American society. "We are 
citizens without the papers," activists frequently say.60 A sense of autho-
rization may also come from a subset of families who approach being 
undocumented matter-of-factly and teach their children that it should 
not be a barrier to their aspirations.61 A feeling of authorization may also 
be generated through solidaristic activity within the movement through 
which activists learn that "it doesn't have to be this way: we can empower 
ourselves to make a change"62 or that "the safest place for anyone tar-
geted by these laws is out, proud, and part of an organized commu-
nity."63 But performative assertion of emergent rights-asserting oneself 
and/ or one's right to remain in a negotiation with a state or federal offi-
cial acting in a gray area of enforcement discretion- may have value in 
establishing new boundaries for the activity of undocumented immi-
grants. 
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B. Emergent Rights and Performative Citizenship in the Civil Rights 
Movement 
One might expect this pattern of rights-consciousness and rights-
assertion to distinguish the immigrantjustice movement from the civil 
rights movement, which is grounded on a conception of rights as legally 
established entitlements. No less a document than the Constitution 
declares the rights of former slaves and their descendants to citizenship 
and to the nondiscriminatory exercise of the right to the vote. These 
rights faced adamant resistance; they required articulation by the courts 
and enforcement by the elected branches, neither of which was a fore-
gone conclusion as the civil rights movement waged its early campaigns. 
But the specific rights asserted by the movement had a basis in written 
law. Moreover, as citizens and as federal rights holders, African Amer-
icans assumed a plausible role when they petitioned their government 
for the redress of their grievances.64 The notion of rights as formal con-
stitutional guarantees, which had only to be enforced by the federal gov-
ernment against state and local resistance, was central to the discourse 
of the movement As Martin Luther King Jr. told a mass meeting at the 
beginning of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, "We are not wrong ... [and] 
if we are wrong, the Supreme Court is wrong, and if we are wrong, the 
Constitution is wrong."65 
But if we move from the public discourse and group-based tactics of 
the movement to the self-understandings of participants doing the work 
of the movement on a daily basis, a different picture emerges. For the 
mother sending her child to the first integrated school in her city or the 
Mississippi sharecropper mustering the courage to register to vote, for 
countless movement participants facing administrative intransigence, 
employer retaliation, and the ever-present threat of state-sanctioned 
violence, rights were never simply constitutionally established objects 
of federal enforcement. 66 In individual and family conversations and 
in mass meetings at black churches, participants had to persuade them-
selves and each other that they could claim the role of citizens, a role 
that was as much a product of their persistent, if uneasy, self-assertion as 
of the declarations of federal courts. 
This dimension of the civil rights struggle can be glimpsed, for exam-
ple, in Francesca Polletta's analysis of rights consciousness among SNCC 
activists in Mississippi from 1961 to 1966.67 Studying the sharecroppers 
and domestic workers who risked their lives and livelihoods to register 
to vote, Polletta did not find actors who felt that their constitutionally 
established rights simply had to be vindicated by federal intervention 
and affirmation. She saw people whose daily lives drove home the 
Performat1ve Citizenship in the Civil Rights and lmm1grant Rights Movements 15 
lessons of their m arginality and second-class citizenship, and whose 
struggle, as they put it, to achieve "first-class citizenship" was fraught 
with retaliation, harassment, and pervasive physical danger. These 
activists, Polletta explained, played an active role in unsuccessful lawsuits 
against registrars who denied their rights or sheriffs who beat them. 
They spent hours giving statements or testifying in court because they 
experienced a pride in being able to tell their stories. They gathered at 
the courthouse each day for the trials, fueled by a sense of wonder at wit-
nessing efforts-however unsuccessful-to hold white men to account. 
In much the same way as immigrant activists in Arizona, these activists 
saw moments of adjudication as opportunities for community organiz-
ing, for relating their own experience, for bearing witness to the possi-
bilities of an ongoing struggle rather than simply as occasions of rights 
declaration. 
Civil rights organizing in Mississippi was also characterized by 
moments of improvisatory rights assertion, which sometimes provided 
activists with greater room to maneuver. Neither the groups of prospec-
tive voters who presented themselves to registrars in rural Greenwood 
County, nor the African American organizers who made a practice of 
attending the white movie theater every Wednesday, nor the registrants 
who defended themselves with words or the occasional shotgun against 
neighbors or officials who carne to intimidate them, knew what awaited 
them in these encounters.68 As the courage of these actors became con-
tagious in a county or a region, the tide of violent enforcement would 
sometimes recede a little. 
While participants may have drawn the courage for these moments of 
rights assertion from the knowledge of their formal constitutional rights, 
scholars of movement organizing point to other sources with greater 
parallels to the experience of undocumented students. Some of those in 
the movement drew their strength from the instruction and support of 
family. Charles Payne quotes one Mississippi organizer: "I think some-
how you've always had families who were not afraid ... they just talked to 
their immediate family and let them know, you know 'You're somebody. 
You can't express it right now but you keep this in mind. You're just as 
much as anybody, you keep it in mind.' And then when the time for this 
carne, we produced."69 
Also crucial in fueling this impetus were mass meetings, often held in 
local black churches.70 At these meetings, participants were exhorted by 
leader-organizers like Fanny Lou Hamer or Aaron Henry.71 They sang 
together72 and they narrated to each other the burdens and dangers of 
trying to comport themselves like "first-class citizens" by surmounting 
the many perils of registering to vote.73 By sharing and witnessing each 
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other's stories they began to earn the status of first-class citizens in each 
other's eyes, if not yet in the eyes of the law.74 This attainment enabled 
them to push forward, much like the DREAMers who have celebrated 
each other's "stories of self," both in public and in smaller, organizational 
settings. Participants in Mississippi organizing campaigns had formal 
citizenship, but their daily lives were a constant reminder of its unac-
complished status. Their rights were emergent75 and their participation 
as citizens-though constitutionally warranted-was, in important ways, 
performative. It inaugurated a new political reality in which African 
Americans in the rural South emerged from the constraints imposed by 
threats and fear to be participants in public life, and it created a powerful 
external impression that fueled rather than reflected a subjective sense 
of entitlement. Their "first-class citizenship"-like the undocumented 
immigrants' de facto right to remain-was always in the process of being 
forged by activists' often excruciating efforts. 
Ill. Conclusion 
When immigrant justice activists employ the tactical forms or the broad 
equal opportunity frames of the civil rights movement, this may in 
fact be part of their performative strategy. They embrace the paradig-
matic example of citizens vindicating their rights in the face of brutal 
opposition and uncertain enforcement as yet another way of modeling 
the citizenship that they hope to attain. Perhaps the recapitulation of 
the tactics or frames of the civil rights movement in a more pointedly 
performative register is the ultimate example of creative adaptation. It 
demonstrates that the conceptual and tactical vocabulary developed to 
claim the full measure of citizenship can also be deployed by those who 
lack even its formal guarantees. But immigrant justice activists may also 
glimpse something about the civil rights movement that much of the 
public (and many legal scholars) has tended to miss-namely, that for 
African Americans fighting for civil rights, their recognition was never a 
fait accompli. Their first-class citizenship was always at stake, something 
that had to be contended for every day?6 These parallels suggest an 
insight that may be applicable not only to the civil rights movement but 
to many movements for inclusion through law. Even as we most firmly 
assert our claims to belonging, we are performing, with a fragile mix of 
hope and insistence, our entitlement to exercise them. 
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In addition to barring employers from discriminating on the basis of 
race, sex, and a number of other protected categories, Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act provided for the creation of a new federal agency, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.1 The EEOC's powers 
were relatively limited in the years immediately after Title VII was 
enacted, and the political compromises necessary to secure the law's 
passage deprived the agency of any real enforcement authority.2 From 
the very beginning, however, the EEOC had the power to collect data 
from employers regarding the number of women and racial and ethnic 
minorities in their workforce. 3 One of the first regulations the EEOC 
issued required large employers and government contractors to submit 
annual EE0-1 reports supplying this information to the agency.4 The 
EEOC continues to require EE0-1 reports from employers to this day, 
meaning the agency now has data from nearly half a century document-
ing changes and fluctuations in the racial and gender composition of a 
substantial percentage of American workplaces.5 
Sociologists Kevin Stainback and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey recently 
decided to analyze four decades of EE0-1 reports to determine what 
these reports could tell us about the successes and failures of the project 
of racial and gender integration inaugurated by Title VII.6 They found 
that from the time Title VII went into effect untill980, American work-
places were desegregating, sometimes significantly, in terms of both race 
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and gender, due in no small part to the implementation and enforce-
ment of antidiscrimination law? At the start of the 1980s, however, 
progress began to stall-and it has not picked up since then.8 In fact, 
over the past decade or two, numerous industries in the United States 
have begun to resegregate. Thus far in the twenty-first century, nearly a 
third of all industries have witnessed racial resegregation among white 
and black men;9 racial resegregation among white and black women 
has been even more "disturbingly widespread."10 Moreover, resegrega-
tion and exclusion have tended to rise with higher income opportuni-
ties11-a trend that has contributed to growing economic inequality and 
led Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey to the rather dispiriting conclu-
sion that "[t]he United States is no longer on a path to equal opportu-
nity."12 Put succinctly, the EE0-1 reports tell a story of early success and 
subsequent decline: Title VII got off to a promising start, but progress 
under the statute began to stall within two decades of its enactment and 
has not yet shown much sign of reviving.13 
Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey attribute the decline in Title VII's 
efficacy as a tool for desegregating American workplaces to the major 
political and policy changes that accompanied Ronald Reagan's ascen-
dance to the White House. 14 They argue that white voters' exhaustion 
with, and frustration over, civil rights projects such as affirmative action, 
busing, and government aid to the poor helped contribute to Reagan's 
victory in the presidential election of 1980, and that the new adminis-
tration's stance toward civil rights enforcement mirrored the attitudes 
of these constituents.15 The policy implications of this new stance were 
immediately apparent in the sections of the federal government tasked 
with enforcing Title VII and other civil rights provisions. The Reagan 
administration reduced the budget of the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCCP)-the office within the Department of 
Labor charged with ensuring that federal contractors comply with the 
government's affirmative action and equal employment guarantees-so 
significantly that the OFCCP was forced to cut more than half its staff 
and drastically reduce the number of compliance reviews it conducted; 
this resulted, inter alia, in a 77 percent reduction in back pay awards 
between 1980 and 1982.16 The scene at the EEOC was similar. In the first 
two years of the Reagan administration, the EEOC's budget was reduced 
by 10 percent, its staff was cut by 12 percent, and travel funds for EEOC 
investigations were eliminated.17 The agency's new head, Clarence 
Thomas, declared himself "unalterably opposed to programs that force 
or even cajole people to hire a certain percentage of minorities"18 and 
suggested that employment policies that have a disparate impact on pro-
tected groups ought not to count as discrimination under Title VII.19 By 
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1983, the EEOC was bringing less than half the number of Title VII law-
suits it had brought during the mid-1970s, despite the fact that the num-
ber of discrimination claims it received was substantially greater in the 
later period.20 
Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey use numbers (EE0-1 reports and 
data regarding agency funding and staffing) to tell a story about the his-
tory of Title VII over the past fifty years. This essay tells a similar story 
about the history of Title VII over the past half-century, not by analyzing 
vast demographic shifts in the workplace but by focusing on the shift-
ing meaning of a single word-"animus"-over the same period of time. 
The concept of "discriminatory animus" plays a central role in the inter-
pretation of Title VII. 21 Thus, examining how the meaning of this phrase 
evolves over time can provide additional purchase on the historical tra-
jectory documented in the EE0-1 reports. It can help illuminate the 
change in mind-set and understanding that accompanied the cessation 
of progress the EE0-1 reports reveal. It can tell us something about how 
courts and regulators thought about the concept of discrimination in the 
decade or two after Title VII was enacted, and how these actors came to 
think about discrimination after what Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 
call the "short regulatory decade"22 from 1973 to 1980 came to an end. 
One of the reasons the word "animus" functions as such a useful 
barometer for measuring attitudinal change over time is that it admits 
of multiple meanings. In this sense, it is like the word "age."23 The 
Supreme Court has noted that "the word 'age' standing alone can be 
readily understood either as pointing to any number of years lived, or 
as common shorthand for the longer span and concurrent aches that 
make youth look good."24 So, for instance, the word may mean some-
thing very different in "a sentence like 'Age can be shown by a driver's 
license; [than it does in]. .. the statement, 'Age has left him a shut-in."'25 
The Court has been highly attentive to these variations in the meaning 
of the word "age" when interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act.26 
As we shall see, however, courts have not been as attentive to such 
semantic differences when deploying the word "animus" in Title VII 
cases. They almost never take note of the fact that "animus" also has 
two primary, and quite distinct, meanings. It can mean basic attitude, 
governing spirit, or motivation; this meaning carries no negative con-
notations. But it can also mean prejudiced or spiteful ill will, hostility, 
dislike, or hatred. Animus, in this second sense, connotes something far 
less innocuous. To harbor animus against someone, or against an entire 
group of people, is to actively wish them harm and-in the context of 
antidiscrimination law-seems tantamount to bigotry. 
32 A Nat1on of Widening Opportunities 
From the perspective of a plaintiff in a Title VII lawsuit, it matters 
very much which type of animus one is required to prove. It is not easy 
to prove that an employer's actions were motivated by hatred or ani-
mosity toward a protected group, if only because most contemporary 
employers are too savvy to confess openly to harboring such attitudes, 
and judges are often hesitant to find employers guilty of outright big-
orry.27 If animus, defined in this way, were the legal standard, few plain-
tiffs would win Title VII suits. Officially, of course, it is not the standard. 
Plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment under Title VII are not required 
to prove that an employer acted out of hostility toward a protected class 
but simply that race or sex or one of the other protected categories ani-
mated, or played a role, in the employer's decision. 
In practice, however, courts in Title VII cases have not always main-
tained a clear division between these two meanings of the word "ani-
mus." As frustration with the traditional project of antidiscrimination 
law mounted in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Americans 
increasingly began to view race and sex discrimination as phenomena of 
an earlier era, which surfaced now only as aberrant conduct perpetrated 
by a few malevolent employers in a generally egalitarian labor market. 
Against this backdrop, Title VII increasingly came to be seen not as a tool 
for combating the kinds of structural problems that continue to generate 
vast racial and gender-based inequalities in the labor market but rather 
as a mechanism for policing outliers. Today, this is all too often precisely 
how Title VII functions. This essay argues that if Title VII is to accom-
plish the broader, more structural purposes for which it was enacted, we 
need to engage in a new conversation-or really, reinvigorate an older 
conversation-about what constitutes discrimination under the law. 
I. The Emergence of "Animus" in Title VII Law 
The word "animus" does not appear in the text of Title VII. Nor does 
it appear in early Title VII case law. From the rnid-1960s through the 
mid-1970s,judicial opinions almost never use the word when discussing 
discrimination by employers.28 For the first decade of Title VII's exis-
tence, "animus" simply did not play a significant role in the law's imple-
mentation or the adjudication of employment discrimination cases. 
This is not to say, however, that the word "animus" never surfaces in 
discourse about Title VII in the years after the statute was enacted. Legal 
scholars and lawyers at the EEOC sometimes used the term during this 
period to refer to the old, outdated conception of discrimination Title 
VII was designed to replace. Alfred Blumrosen, who assisted in the orga-
nization of the EEOC in 1965 and served as its first chief of concilia-
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tions and director of federal-state relations from 1965 to 1967, asserted 
that, in the post-World War II era, before the enactment of Title VII, 
"[d]iscrimination was seen as the evil act of the misguided,"29 or as "con-
duct [that was] motivated by the dislike of the group or class to which 
the victims of discrimination belonged."30 Blumrosen noted that gov-
ernmental actors who attempted to police this form of discrimination 
were not terribly successful, in part because "evil motive" was extremely 
difficult to prove, even in midcentury Arnerica.31 Neither employees nor 
judges have access to employers' minds, and courts were generally loath 
to find that employers had acted with malice or ill will toward racial 
minorities. For this reason, among others, antidiscrimination law in the 
postwar period did little to improve the status of racial minorities at 
work.32 
Commentators-and courts-in the late 1960s agreed that Title VII 
had moved antidiscrimination law beyond this search for animus.33 The 
House Report that recommended passage of Title VII asserted that the 
law was necessary not in order to protect minorities from racial ani-
mosity on the part of employers but to ameliorate the following three 
problems: (1) black unemployment rates were double those of whites; (2) 
black workers were concentrated in the lowest paid, least stable job clas-
sifications; and (8) given comparable age, education, and experience, the 
median annual wage and salary income of black workers was 60 per-
cent that of white workers.34 Commentators pointed to these passages 
as evidence that Congress had identified the racial stratification of the 
American labor market as a pervasive and urgent social problem and 
had passed Title VII to ameliorate it.35 They asserted that the law's goal 
is to ensure that those who had historically encountered discrimination 
and exclusion would now be full and equal participants in the work-
place. The law aimed to accomplish this goal, they argued, by providing 
American workers and lawyers advocating on their behalf with tools to 
dismantle structural practices that perpetuate inequality-not simply to 
identify and censure a few renegade employers with sinister motives.36 
In keeping with this understanding of Title VII's purpose, the lawyers 
tasked with enforcing the statute in the years after its enactment targeted 
the kinds of structural practices, such as employment tests and seniority 
systems,37 that locked historically subordinated groups out of good jobs. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of federal courts issued 
key rulings holding that such practices violate Title VII because they 
continue to freeze out members of the groups the law is designed to 
protect.38 The reasoning in these decisions reveals that there was not 
a sharp conceptual divide between discriminatory effects and discrimi-
natory intent in this period.39 If an employer's policy had the effect of 
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depriving members of protected classes of employment opportunities, 
that was considered sufficient- by courts, by the EEOC, and by many 
academic commentators-to show intent. Courts in this era repeatedly 
explained that if an employer implements a policy or practice it can 
reasonably fo resee will have a deleterious effect on the job prospects of 
minorities protected by Title VII, its cognizance of the probable out-
come of its actions satisfies any intent requirement in the statute.40 In 
other words, courts held, it is fair to assume that an employer intends the 
likely consequences of its actions. Foreseeable effects were deemed suf-
ficient to show intent in this period because interpreters of the law were 
not focused on what was transpiring inside the employer's head. They 
had a thin conception of intent: the focus was on eradicating instances 
in which race or sex was functioning as a barrier to employment, not on 
plumbing the depths of employers' minds to determine their motiva-
tions.41 
In the mid- to late 1970s, in the constitutional context, courts began to 
define discriminatory intent differently, and more narrowly, than they 
had in the preceding decade. By 1980, evidence that a decision maker 
could reasonably foresee the deleterious effects a particular policy or 
practice would have on a protected class was no longer deemed sufficient 
evidence of discriminatory intent. The Court suggested in Washington v. 
Davis42 that discriminatory intent and discriminatory effects were con-
ceptually distinct categories that involved separate structures of proof.43 
A few years later, the Court held in Personnel Administrator of Massachu-
setts v. Feeney44 that to prove discriminatory intent for the purposes of 
equal protection law, a plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the 
state had adopted a particular course of action not simply "in spite of" 
its adverse effects on a protected group but at least in part "because of' 
those effects.45 In other words, Feeney defined "intent" as acting not sim-
ply with an awareness of impending harm but also out of a base desire to 
cause such harm. As a result, courts began to understand discriminatory 
intent, for purposes of equal protection law, as a "state of mind akin to 
malice.''46 
Davis and Feeney were not Title VII cases; they concerned state action 
and the meaning of discrimination under the Constitution. But they 
reflected a turn inward-a turn toward the mental state of the discrim-
inator-that was also occurring in Title VII law.47 By this time, courts 
had made it clear that disparate treatment and disparate impact were 
also to be treated as distinct doctrines under Title VII. And it was at this 
moment, in the late 1970s, that the word "animus" first entered Title VII 
case law. For the first decade of the law's existence, "animus" played no 
role in judicial discourse about employment discrimination. But by the 
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late 1970s, courts began to assert, in dozens of Title VII cases each year, 
that an allegation of disparate treatment requires proof of "discrimina-
tory animus."48 By the 1980s and 1990s, the word "animus" started to 
appear in hundreds of Title VII cases each year.49 After the turn of the 
century, such appearances began to number in the thousands.50 Today, 
it has become routine for courts in disparate treatment cases to ask 
whether an employer has acted with "discriminatory animus."51 
II. The Double Meaning of "Animus" and Its Implications for 
Title VII 
To be perfectly clear: Title VII doctrine does not require the plaintiff in 
a disparate treatment case to demonstrate that an employer acted with 
animus defined as hostility or ill wi11.52 A plaintiff is required to show 
only that an employer acted with discriminatory intent. Thus, when 
courts assert, as they frequently do, that proof of "discriminatory ani-
mus" is required under Title VII, they are ostensibly using the word "ani-
mus" as a synonym for "intent." In the late 1970s, when courts first began 
to deploy the word "animus" in antidiscrimination cases, they some-
times took care to explain this. One court explained, for instance, that 
when it used "[t]he term 'animus,' [it meant that term] to be synony-
mous with 'motivation,"'-as in, race animated the decision-and did not 
mean to refer to "animus" in its secondary sense of personal hostility or 
enmity. 53 
In practice, however, it has proven difficult to maintain a strict separa-
tion between these two senses of the word. It is difficult to hear the word 
"animus" without also hearing its negative connotations. The phrase 
"discriminatory animus;' or "racial animus," seems to point to a thicker 
conception of intent. So when courts routinely declare that disparate 
treatment claims under Title VII require evidence of "discriminatory 
animus," this cannot help but shade our understanding of the kind of 
conduct that violates the law. Whatever the formal doctrine says, the 
term "animus" seems to describe a particular mental state, with over-
tones of ill will or hostility toward a particular group. Indeed, this usage 
is far more common in normal everyday discourse than the more inno-
cent use of the word "animus" to mean, simply, intent. 
Not surprisingly, courts often seem to find it difficult to eradicate the 
negative connotations of the word "animus'' from their thought process 
when determining whether a plaintiff has succeeded in meeting the bur-
den of proof in a Title VII case. This second layer of meaning seems 
regularly to spill over into judges' consideration of what constitutes dis-
criminatory intent and, thus, what counts as discrimination under the 
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law. Consider, for instance, the rhetoric the First Circuit deployed when 
discussing discrimination in Candelario Ramos v. Baxter Healthcare,54 a 
Title VII case in which the Puerto Rican employees of a health-care 
products manufacturer alleged they had been discriminated against on 
the basis of their national origin. The court rejected this claim on the 
ground that "there is simply no evidence that Baxter management acted 
out of animus to Puerto Ricans."55 The court noted that "there are no 
statements by Baxter management disparaging Puerto Ricans,"56 nor 
any evidence that the reasons proffered by the employer for its actions 
were pretexts for "wicked motives."57 There is simply no evidence, the 
court concluded, that the company's management "harbored animus 
toward Puerto Ricans."58 
My point is not that the plaintiffs in Candelario Ramos should have won 
their case but rather that this kind of rhetoric, in which there seems to be 
considerable slippage between the two meanings of the word "animus," 
subtly or not-so-subtly affects our understanding of what constitutes 
discrimination. Such rhetoric is not unusual in contemporary Title VII 
cases. 59 Courts today sometimes reject disparate treatment claims on the 
ground that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of "racial ani-
mus"60 or "sex-based animus,"61 and it is hard not to conclude that the 
word "animus" does some work in these instances. For example, when 
courts find for an employer on the ground that the plaintiff has "offer[ed] 
no evidence ... of antipathy toward Hispanics"62 or "anti-Hispanic ani-
mus"63-or when a court observes that a plaintiff has failed to show that 
an employer acted with "invidious racial animus"64-it seems clear that 
the more negative connotations of the word "animus" have conditioned 
the way adjudicators think about the kind of conduct Title VII prohibits. 
Doctrinally speaking, these courts must simply mean that there is no 
evidence in these cases that race or sex played a role in the adverse 
employment actions the plaintiffs allege. But by framing intent as "ani-
mus," courts may allow a lack of evidence of group-based hatred or ill 
will to bring them most of the way to a decision. Thus, although Title 
VII law has not formally incorporated the notion that plaintiffs must 
prove evil motive (indeed, the law explicitly rejects this idea65), the word 
"animus" can nonetheless muddle the meaning of "intent" in a way that 
allows it to slide in that direction. 
It is not a coincidence that the word "animus" began to appear in Title 
VII case law with increasing frequency at precisely the same moment 
workplace integration began to stall. The emergence of this word coin-
cided with a new (or, perhaps, renewed) understanding of discrimination 
as conduct perpetrated by bad apples-a relatively circumscribed num-
ber of employers with evil motives-rather than the pervasive and 
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deeply entrenched social problem Title VII was designed to address. The 
hunt for animus makes sense if one believes discrimination is largely a 
thing of the past-if one believes there may still be isolated bad actors, 
but conditions in the workplace are now generally fair, and any inequal-
ities along lines of, say, race are likely attributable to factors other than 
discrimination. In fact, by the late 1970s, the Court had started to reason 
about discrimination in this way. This conception of discrimination led 
the Court, in the context of affirmative action, to invalidate a series of 
programs designed to integrate institutions of higher education and sec-
tors of the labor market previously reserved for whites.66 In the con-
text of public education, it motivated the Court to curtail the pursuit 
of desegregation through busing and other race-conscious integrative 
measures.67 Today, this narrative features quite prominently in Supreme 
Courtjurisprudence: it recently played a central role in the Court's deci-
sion to eviscerate § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.68 Title VII law has not 
formally incorporated the more restrictive definitions of discrimination 
that historically subordinated groups now confront in the context of 
equal protection law. But as the past several decades of EE0-1 reports 
reveal, employment discrimination law has not remained untouched by 
these conceptual shifts. 69 
The only way to revive the project of workplace integration inaugu-
rated by the passage of Title VII is to begin to tell a different story about 
discrimination than the one that has currently captured the Court's 
imagination. It is not a new story, exactly-it is the story that lawyers at 
the EEOC and academic commentators told in the 1960s, just after the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act. These commentators looked to the 
1963 House report as a guide to the statute's interpretation. That report 
concluded that discrimination in the workplace was an urgent social 
problem-and that a new federal employment discrimination law was 
necessary-because (1) black unemployment rates were double those 
of whites; (2) black workers were concentrated in the lowest paid, least 
stable job classifications; and (3) given comparable age, education, and 
experience, the median annual wage and salary income of black work-
ers was 60 percent that of white workers.7° Statistics like these do not 
come about through the conduct of a few bad actors. They are evi-
dence of major structural problems. Early proponents of Title VII, and 
indeed, many courts, viewed the law as a means of combating such prob-
lems-not by targeting employers with bad motivations but by disman-
tling policies and practices that impede equality in the workplace. 
Today, fifty years after the passage of Title VII, (1) black unemploy-
ment rates remain double those of whites?1 (2) blacks, and other racial 
minorities, are still concentrated in the lowest paying, least stable job 
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classifications;72 and (3) black households earn on average just 59 percent 
as much as white households.73 Thus, we might echo the academics and 
EEOC lawyers of the 1960s in saying that workplace inequality is an 
urgent social problem. Statistics like these do not come about through 
the conduct of a few bad actors. They are evidence of major struc-
tural problems. I believe antidiscrimination law still has a role to play in 
addressing these sorts of problems, but it will not-it cannot-do so if 
we conceive of its goal as the policing of outliers who harbor "animus" 
against protected groups. 
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Civil Rights 3.0 
Nan D. Hunter 
President Obama 's endorsement of gay marriage ... was by any measure a watershed. 
A sitting United States president took sides in what many people consider the last 
civil rights movement ... 
-New York Times, May 9, 20121 
The LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights movement 
owes an immeasurable debt to the advocates for racial justice who cre-
ated the modem American idea of civil rights as well as its doctrinal 
foundation. Perhaps an even greater debt is owed to those midcentury 
civil rights leaders for creating one of the nation's most compelling 
cultural narratives: a scripture-like account of suffering, Exodus, and 
redemption that has inspired every campaign for social justice since that 
time. The quasi-mythologized history of civil rights in the 1960s has 
created the sense of the eventual inevitability of victory over the most 
extreme forms of irrational bias and the achievement of formal equality. 
This narrative now attaches to LGBT rights, as evidenced by how fre-
quently LGBT equality is being described as the last, or the next, or 
today's, preeminent civil rights issue.2 Indeed, it was this background 
narrative that gave such rhetorical power to President Obama's phrasing 
of his support for LGBT equality in his second inaugural address, a pas-
sage that cements the place of LGBT rights squarely in the civil rights 
heritage, in implicit equivalence to its forebears.3 But the march-of-
progress narrative, while not entirely untrue, is deeply misleading. 
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In this chapter, I will explore what it means, for better and for worse, to 
be (arguably) this generation's emblematic civil rights campaign. What 
does the label tell us about the civil rights paradigm itself? If the achieve-
ment of marriage equality is the great civil rights achievement of this 
generation, what does that suggest about a future for equality more 
generally? How have new forms of, and technologies for, movement-
building affected the idea and practice of civil rights? Does the civil 
rights paradigm have a future? Or are we on the cusp of reaching the 
civil rights version of the end of history?4 
This chapter addresses three aspects of the social meaning of civil 
rights: legal doctrine and legal institutions, especially as they relate to 
statutory mandates for equal treatment; social movement strategies, 
with a focus on the professionalization and corporatization of a civil 
rights campaign; and the tension between the discourse of social hierar-
chy and tthat of civil rights. 
The gay story began with what many saw as an upstart, even faux, civil 
rights movement as compared to the traditional civil rights movements 
that were thought to be the real thing. Until recently, LGBT rights advo-
cates struggled to join the informal alliance of constituency-based rights 
groups, to get a place at the civil rights table and entree to the diversity 
industry that flourishes among large employers, and to build their own 
niche as part of the base of the Democratic Party. Those goals have been 
achieved, along with a broad public recognition that the LGBT move-
ment counts as a civil rights struggle. 
As other movements in the American civil rights tradition have each 
brought new insights, approaches, and problems to the fore, so too has 
the LGBT movement. Over time, the movement itself has changed, 
acquiring greater resources and responding to changes in the broader 
political climate. LGBT organizations have utilized increasingly sophis-
ticated technologies to achieve fundamental social movement objectives 
of framing issues, mobilizing a constituency, forging alliances, and inter-
acting with political parties and state actors. 
LGBT legal rights work began in earnest after the ascent of Reagan-
Bush era conservatives whose elections were fueled by the coalition of 
social issues and probusiness policies. For many of the current lead-
ers-in all civil rights movements-that Reagan-Bush political culture 
forms the baseline for goals and expectations.5 This context of backlash 
and retrenchment contributed to the growth of multidimensional advo-
cacy: LGBT rights advocates have moved, or been forced, into a variety 
of lawmaking venues- state and federal courts and legislatures, elec-
tions, and advertising. The result is a melding of new and old models 
of persuasion in which themes developed in nonjuridical contexts may 
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migrate to courts and legislatures. The hyperinvestment in litigation 
during the height of the Warren Court era has ceased. Advocates now 
routinely develop campaigns to eliminate discriminatory laws con-
sciously using litigation as only one component of an array of tech-
mques. 
Underlying the chapter is an understanding that the social meaning of 
civil rights in the United States is extraordinarily rich, with issues being 
framed and reframed in a continuous iterative process. Every margin-
alized group seeks pathways and portals into greater power, whether 
through institutions of the state, the market, or civil society. The dis-
course of civil rights has been productive in both jurisgenerative and 
culture-generative terms. 
Examining the meaning of civil rights through the prism of the LGBT 
rights movement provides a window into strengths, weaknesses, and 
dynamism of the struggle for social justice in the United States. What 
we learn is that LGBT advocates have contributed to the overall project 
of formal equality under law primarily by developing an extraordinary 
strategic and tactical dexterity, uniquely so at the state level and in their 
alliance with the business sector. Particularly as to the latter, however, 
there are major trade-offs that have yet to become manifest. Mean-
while, because of a broader retrenchment in civil rights law generally, 
the possibility of advances in substantive equality law-either statutory 
or constitutional-has shrunk. Even as LGBT rights groups make break-
throughs in achieving goals such as marriage equality, they will have 
to contend with conservative pressure to dismantle overarching pro-
tections such as the disparate impact principle or heightened scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause. For the future, the big question for 
this movement-and all other social justice movements in the United 
States-is whether it will deploy its talents and resources to meet the 
more difficult challenge of dislodging embedded, structural forms of 
discrimination and social hierarchy. 
I. The Law: Equality and Containment 
I got nothing but homage an holy thinkin for the ol songs and stories 
But now there's me an you. 
-Bob Dylan6 
The project that civil rights movem.ents and arguments framed under 
the rubric of equality do best, and for which the law is perfectly suited, is 
ending exclusions and categorical inequalities. What civil rights move-
ments and equality arguments more broadly do not do so well is dis-
mantling hierarchies? The fundamental critique of formal equality is 
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that its very achievement perpetuates more deeply embodied patterns 
of stratification, in part because the existence of civil rights laws tends to 
legitimate the hierarchy that remains. Whether constitutional or statu-
tory, formal equality rights are differentially deployed by differently sit-
uated subjects in a complex stratified society. 
To date , LGBT equality has been overwhelmingly framed as being 
about ending exclusions-currently and most dramatically the exclusion 
from marriage, but prior tO that, a series of other categorical exclusions: 
from legal shelter for the exercise of sexual intimacy, from protection of 
one's parental rights, and often from employment. So in that structural 
sense at least, LGBT rights should be an easy fit for a civil rights para-
digm. And indeed there is truth in this parallel construction: the LGBT 
movement does offer its own narrative of progress in ending exclusions. 
Gay sex is no longer criminal in the United States, even in the most con-
servative jurisdictions. Several million Americans have achieved at least 
a bounded liberty to live honest lives that are more economically and 
physically secure than was imagined possible fifty years ago. Prospec-
tively, a demographically driven tectonic shift in public opinion suggests 
that more progress is on the way. 
Yet it is also true that the LGBT equality movement has not yet 
attained the two traditional markers of formal equality in law. One is 
adoption by the Supreme Court of an equal protection analysis under 
which laws differentiating on the basis of a specific characteristic are pre-
sumptively unconstitutional under a heightened scrutiny analysis. The 
other is national legislation that regulates the private as well as the public 
sectors and that prohibits discrimination based on the given character-
istic in a variety of contexts. Neither has occurred in the field of LGBT 
rights. 
From a political point of view, we must ask whether this institutional 
reluctance by both the Supreme Court and Congress stems from some-
thing more than hostility to a particular and relatively "new" minority. 
Doubtless some part of it derives from controversies specific to homo-
sexuality and gender identity, but it also reflects a shrinking of the vision 
of equality. Mapping civil rights legal doctrine from the perspective of a 
constituency that seems to stand on the cusp of crossing the finish line 
into formal equality can tell us much about how the dialog between law 
and politics has constructed the evolving social meaning of "civil rights." 
LGBT groups are poised to follow in the footsteps of older movements 
based on race and gender, but the parameters of what is possible have 
narrowed. 
In both constitutional and statutory law, the Supreme Court has cut 
back on the promise that law would serve as a tool to achieve racial, 
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and to a lesser extent gender, justice. These examples of retrenchment 
are easy to overlook in the LGBT rights context because, for this group, 
they stunt forward progress, which is less dramatic than forcing a group 
backward, as has occurred with people of color and women. Since Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1964, an increasingly conservative 
Supreme Court has in effect discounted the value of achieving equiva-
lent protection by interpretations that have undermined the efficacy of 
the underlying statute.8 Together, these changes have redefined equality 
under law in more limited ways, even if the number of constituencies 
protected under civil rights law has expanded. 
The shrinkage of the civil rights paradigm is evident in comparing the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to its closest analog in the field of sexual orien-
tation or gender identity that has gotten to a floor vote in Congress. The 
Senate adopted a version of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(ENDA) in November 20139 but the bill died in the House ofRepresenta-
tives.10 In this section, I will describe how ENDA and the current law on 
the standard of review for sexual orientation discrimination under the 
Equal Protection Clause illustrate ways in which constrictions of existing 
civil rights law are channeling future law. Ironically, the strongest pro-
tection against discrimination for LGBT persons may come not from a 
twenty-first-century civil rights bill but instead from a dynamic reading 
of the fifty-year-old Title VII. 
A. A Cabined Vision 
As its name indicates, the ENDA legislation covered only one of the 
realms-employment-that fall within the scope of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. Congresswoman Bella Abzug introduced omnibus legislation in 
1974 that would have added sexual orientation protection to a range of 
issues covered in the Civil Rights Act, but Washington-based advocates 
decided in 1993 that redrafting the bill to cover only employment would 
increase the possibility of legislative success, because the workplace was 
the context that drew the greatest level of popular support for an antidis-
crimination law.11 More recently, hoping to build on the momentum 
from the Supreme Court's ruling on same-sex marriage, rights groups 
introduced a new version of the omnibus approach. Its future appears 
dim, however, as long as Republicans control Congress. 
Despite the increased numbers in public opinion polls voicing agree-
ment that LGBT persons should not be fired based on that character-
istic,12 the needle has not moved for twenty years on advancing fed-
eral antidiscrimination legislation in this area. In addition to the power 
of social conservatives who view homosexuality with distaste, forward 
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progress is stymied by hostility toward civil rights and government reg-
ulation more generally. 
Compare the United Kingdom, which enacted a new civil rights law 
in 2010. The Equality Act unified dozens of laws and policies into one 
comprehensive statute, eliminating fragmented coverage for race, gen-
der, disability, and sexual orientation.13 The new British law is designed 
to modernize and clarify, rather than expand, the reach of the civil rights 
paradigm, in an effort to render the overall concept more accessible to 
the public and to eliminate areas of confusion for employers and other 
institutions that must comply. Civil rights law in the United States has 
expanded since 1964 only through a series of one-off measures, each 
increasing the complexity of the legal edifice of antidiscrimination.14 
Despite the political modesty of the British law, enacting its equivalent 
here seems impossible in the current political environment. 
The second telling characteristic of the version of ENDA that passed 
the Senate is that it explicitly forbade claims based on disparate impact 
theory.15 The disparate impact doctrine allows proof of discrimination 
without the need to prove the defendant's intent to discriminate. While 
disparate impact claims in the context of sexual orientation or gender 
identity have so far been rare, 16 the insistence by business interests on 
the inclusion of its prohibition in ENDA17 reflects a much larger cam-
paign against the underlying concept. 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 18 the Supreme Court held that proof of 
the disparate impact on racial minorities of facially neutral employment 
rules constituted a violation of Title VII. Its effect was a powerful boost 
to the continued efficacy of that statute after employers discarded once 
explicitly discriminatory policies. More than one scholar has character-
ized Griggs as the Court's most important civil rights decision aside from 
Brown.19 The disparate impact principle comes the closest of any aspect 
of antidiscrimination law to reaching structural patterns of stratifica-
tion.20 In other words, at least in theory, disparate impact claims have 
the potential to achieve more than formal equality, something more like 
concrete steps toward disestablishing hierarchy. 
Since Griggs, the battle over disparate impact has become a central 
point of back-and-forth dispute between those who seek to expand the 
concept of civil rights and those who seek to shrink it. The Supreme 
Court has ruled that disparate impact does apply to claims filed under 
the Fair Housing Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,21 
but it has precluded disparate impact claims under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act,22 Section 1981,23 and the Fourteenth24 and Fifteenth25 
Amendments. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 26 the Court severely 
limited disparate impact by its ruling on allocation of burden of proof 
52 A Nation of Widening Opportunities 
and the scope of the business necessity defense. Congress responded to 
Wards Cove with the Civil Rights Act of 1991,27 which effectively reversed 
most of the Court's decision, returning the burden of proof to the defen-
dant and requiring the defendant to show that practice with disparate 
effects was job related and consistent with business necessity. 28 In one of 
the most recently enacted antidiscrimination laws, the Genetic Informa-
tion Nondiscrimination Act, the issue aros·e again. Congress barred dis-
parate impact claims pending review by an Advisory Commission.29 
In light of this ongoing battle, it is a mistake to consider the disparate 
impact exclusion in ENDA as turning on gay-specific issues or as of triv-
ial significance. The enactment of a prohibition on disparate impact in 
LGBT civil rights legislation would contribute to a precedent against it 
in future legislative debates beyond LGBT issues. 
A third weakness of the version of ENDA that passed the Senate was its 
overly broad exemption for religious organizations. In contrast to Title 
VII, which allows religious employers to give preference to employ-
ees based on religion (but not based on other characteristics), the 2013 
iteration of ENDA would have given such employers a blanket exemp-
tion from antidiscrimination requirements based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity and prohibited the denial of federal contracts on 
the ground of noncompliance. The acceptance of this provision as part 
of the negotiations with Senate leadership produced a split among the 
LGBT rights groups; ultimately, all the LGBT groups opposed the ver-
sion of ENDA that emerged from the Senate. 30 
B. Equal Protection 
Many people use the term "civil rights" to encompass equal protection 
law as well as the statutory antidiscrimination prohibitions. In this aspect 
of equality law, the Supreme Court has struck down forms of sexual ori-
entation discrimination, most recently and importantly in the marriage 
decision. 31 Remarkably, however, it has done so without articulating a 
clear standard of review for such classifications, leaving lower courts to 
conclude that some form of a rational basis test was used, even though 
there is little possibility that the outcomes would have been the same 
had the traditional and highly deferential version of rational basis been 
the operative standard.32 
The Court's treatment of this next, last, or most contemporaneous 
civil rights issue signals that, like the scope of antidiscrimination statutes, 
the future likely holds only the possibility of additional one-off invoca-
tions of constitutional equality. The Court has become allergic to any 
extension of a more stringent standard for scrutiny beyond the groups 
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to which it has traditionally been applied.33 I read the Court's message 
in the gay cases as indicating that the Justices accept that they will have 
to address whether sexual orientation exclusions violate the Constitu-
tion but are determined to do so without articulating standards for equal 
protection scrutiny that will have broader application. 
c. Sex Discrimination Claims: A Return to the Future? 
With the failure to enact national legislation prohibiting employment 
discrimination, advocates have turned to the prohibition on sex discrim-
ination in Title VII to reach adverse workplace actions against LGBT 
persons. To date, the progress is uneven but promising. The majority of 
circuits have ruled that adverse actions that result from sex stereotyp-
ing based on gender nonconformity can constitute sex discrimination 
against LCBT people.34 Courts increasingly accept that antipathy toward 
homosexuality or transgender status is vulnerable because it hinges on 
stereotypes of masculinity or femininity. 35 These rulings reopen the 
possibility of using sex discrimination theories, regardless of whether 
new legislation is enacted. 
The EEOC has led the movement forward on this front by issuing 
decisions finding that gender identity and sexual orientation discrimi-
nation are both covered under Title VII as per se sex discrimination. 36 
As a result, the EEOC accepts claims of both forms of discrimination 
for investigation and conciliation and has also initiated or supported lit-
igation on these theories.37 Thus administrative agency enforcement of 
Title VII as it applies to discrimination based on either sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity is already occurring nationwide, and hundreds 
of persons have sought redress through this channel.38 
In many respects-the availability of disparate impact claims and a 
more targeted religious exemption-Title VII is a stronger law than was 
END A. 39 Thus, ironically, the best hope for the future of civil rights pro-
tection for LGBT Americans, at least in the workplace, may well lie in 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a law that is older than most of the lobbyists 
who are working on this issue. 
II. The Law Reform Movement: Mobilization in an Era of Retreat 
While there are lots of lessons that we have learned from chapters one and two of the 
civil rights movement, we're in a new day. We need a little boost. There is so much to 
be learned from [the LGBT forces]. 
-Judith Browne Dianis, quoted in San Frarzcisco Magazine, 201240 
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One cannot understand the ways in which legal claims for LGBT equal-
ity signal both continuity and change in the civil rights paradigm with-
out understanding the historical context and legal culture in which those 
claims were formulated, debated, and adjudicated. Lawyers who brought 
LGBT rights claims beginning roughly in the 1980s had the advantage 
of well-established constitutional law doctrines and equal rights statutes 
that were in their infancy for an earlier generation of civil rights lawyers 
working in the 1950s and 1960s. Ironically, however, the LGBT rights 
lawyers who sought to build on the legal foundations set in place by 
earlier social justice lawyers discovered that the foundations themselves 
were eroding. The adaptations made by the legal wing of the LGBT civil 
rights movement offer a window into changes in strategy and innova-
tions in tactics that other civil rights movements can learn and utilize. 
LGBT rights strategies emerged on a large scale only after-indeed, 
long after-the end of the Warren and early Burger Courts. LGBT rights 
litigation got off the ground not in the afterglow of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,41 but in the midst of a rights counterrevolution. The result was 
a strange disconnect. Many of us grew up with civil rights movement 
lawyers as heroes and with an aspirational understanding of the poten-
tial for using law to achieve justice that grew out of experiencing the 
1960s during childhood. When baby boomers (including the first gen-
eration of women in significant numbers) began attending law school, 
public interest law was already a recognized field. Some of us studied 
with civil rights lawyers who had become law professors. We took 
courses designed to train us as advocates for disadvantaged groups, an 
opportunity that did not exist when the older generation had been in 
law school. Upon graduation, many of us secured jobs with public inter-
est and civil rights groups or worked with civil rights units of govern-
ment agencies-organizations that were available for young lawyers to 
join, rather than to have to invent. 
The legal culture into which we graduated, however, had changed dra-
matically in a conservative direction. The single most prominent issue in 
legal politics grew out of a backlash movement rather than a civil rights 
movement: the continuing effort to reverse Roe v. Wade,42 a goal adopted 
as official policy by the Department of Justice after President Ronald 
Reagan took office.43 As the Reagan administration brilliantly used the 
power of judicial appointment to deepen the conservative nature of the 
federal bench that had begun under President Nixon,44 a new consen-
sus emerged among progressives: that federal courts had become unre-
liable, at best, as allies in struggles for equality. In response to Reagan's 
policies and appointments, traditional civil rights groups were drawn 
to Congress, where Democrats controlled both chambers from 1986 to 
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1994.45 Congress, rather than the courts, became the site for expansions 
of rights to new groups and for legislation effectively reversing Supreme 
Court decisions that had narrowly interpreted civil rights statutes.46 
Advocates seeking to establish equality protections for LGBT persons 
adopted the adjustments made by the older groups and developed new 
ones. The federal courts almost literally closed to equal protection 
claims based on sexual orientation after the Supreme Court upheld the 
legitimacy of a state law that criminalized same-sex intimacy. In Bowers 
v. Hardwick,47 the Court torpedoed what was then the movement's legal 
priority-eliminating sodomy laws, upon which so much antigay dis-
crimination was based. Although grounded in liberty rather than equal-
ity analysis, that decision prevented any significant victory for a class 
understood as being defined by criminal conduct until the Court's deci-
sion in Romer v. Evans ten years later. 
LGBT advocates turned to state courts as an alternative. When Hard-
wick was decided , a deliberate shift to litigation strategies based on state 
constitutional claims had already occurred among progressive lawyers 
engaged with issues such as school financing.48 Building on this base, 
LGBT rights lawyers began identifying and litigating challenges to state 
sodomy laws in state courts. The successes in the campaign to invalidate 
sodomy laws eventually became the most successful use of state consti-
tutions to expand rights. Half of the sodomy laws that had been in exis-
tence at the time of Hardwick were eliminated, which paved the way for 
the Supreme Court's repudiation of Hardwick in the 2003 Lawrence v. 
Texas decision.49 
On the national level, LGBT rights lawyers joined other civil rights 
groups in seeking relief in Congress, but to a lesser extent. Their major 
success was the inclusion of HIV I AIDS as a presumptively covered dis-
ability in the Americans with Disabilities Act adopted in 1990.50 Most of 
the Washington-based LGBT lobbying addressed issues that arose from 
the first decade of the HIV/ AIDS crisis. 51 The movement's greatest con-
gressional setback was the enactment of Don't Ask Don't Tell legislation 
following President Clinton's failed attempt to allow openly gay persons 
to serve in the military.52 
What the LGBT legal groups did much more extensively than tra-
ditional civil rights groups was to focus on state legislatures. During 
the 1980s, this strategy was defensive-driven primarily by the need to 
respond to proposals for coercive restrictions on persons with HIV/ AIDS 
that arose as amendments to state public health laws.53 LGBT organi-
zations often formed alliances with public health officials, who under-
stood that prevention and treatment efforts would be more successful 
if patients and those at risk trusted them. To a large extent, the strat-
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egy worked; the kinds of quarantines and forced testing that many had 
feared did not materialize. 54 
A second, positive rather than defensive, factor drew LGBT rights 
advocates to state legislatures: campaigns to add protection based on 
sexual orientation-and later gender identity-to state antidiscrimina-
tion laws. The initial adoption of laws prohibiting discrimination based 
on race and religion had also begun with state legislatures. The pace 
of enactment of sexual orientation protection between 1990 and today 
resembles that of the race discrimination laws between 1945, when New 
York adopted the nation's first such law, and 1963,just before the federal 
statute was enacted.55 With their attention appropriately directed to 
national civil rights laws, the traditional racial justice constituency 
groups had little ongoing engagement with state legislatures. As a result, 
the discourse of civil rights in state legislatures since the 1980s has 
focused almost exclusively on LGBT issues, together with contests over 
abortion laws. 
The turn to the state level of lawmaking-in both courts and legisla-
tures-has been a distinguishing characteristic of LGBT rights lawyer-
ing, and it has served the movement well. The mutual familiarity 
between state lawmakers and LGBT rights advocates that has developed 
since the 1980s has probably contributed significantly to legal progress 
in moderate to liberal regions of the United States. On the biggest issue 
of family law- marriage equality-the extent of legislative success was 
dramatic. Of the twelve jurisdictions where same-sex marriage was 
authorized under state law at the time of the Supreme Court decision 
requiring the federal government to accept those expanded definitions 
of marriage for the purpose of federal benefits, the change in law 
occurred by legislative action in ten. 56 Marriage equality was forced by a 
judicial decision in only two states.57 
Some scholars, most prominently Gerald Rosenberg,58 continue to 
assert an old critique of civil rights lawyers, now adding to it the lawyers 
in marriage equality cases: that they have been blind to the lack of 
social progress achieved by litigation and the risk of backlash it gener-
ates. In fact, civil rights groups long ago began to develop multidimen-
sional forms of advocacy that are not dependent on litigation.59 The 
LGBT rights movement provides the strongest refutation of Rosenberg's 
arguments. Although some marriage equality litigation undoubtedly has 
triggered backlash in the short term, advocates have adeptly managed a 
complex overall strategy, relying on organizing and education and coor-
dinating lawsuits with lobbying in state legislatures and even with antic-
ipated referenda.60 Litigation is no longer seen as the rifle-shot path to 
equality but rather as merely one device in an increasingly high-tech set 
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of tools. Litigation, in other words, has become radically decentered in 
civil rights strategy. 
In this environment, LGBT lawyering groups have developed an 
extraordinary level of sophistication with regard to nonjuridical modes 
and technologies of advocacy. If the emblematic movement tactic dur-
ing the late 1980s and early 1990s was an ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition to 
Unleash Power) sit-in or demonstration,, the core tactic now is polling. 
Today, LGBT groups commission their own polling, the results of which 
often shape their messaging strategies, which in turn suggest the para-
meters of "story banks" that solicit and authorize the collection of 
accounts of certain kinds of experiences, stories that one often finds 
summarized in the opening portions of the complaints that initiate lit-
igation, in legislative testimony, and in media feature stories.61 Until 
recently, a nonprofit group's media strategy consisted of efforts to attract 
media attention and coverage of its issues; today it is likely to be an 
intentional and data-driven set of techniques to change public opinion, 
the success or failure of which can be measured. 
Use of new technologies of social change is not unique to the LGBT 
civil rights movement, 62 but LGBT groups have been early adopters of 
mechanisms generated by broader technological change. One reason is 
necessity: the frequency of antigay ballot initiatives has forced LGBT 
groups into the electoral arena more often than other civil rights 
groups.63 This experience has required LGBT advocates to develop 
more sophisticated methods for persuading voters-not simply judges 
or legislators-to reject antigay arguments. 
Direct electoral political battles over LGBT rights issues culminated 
in the unsuccessful effort to defeat Proposition 8 in California in 2008. 
Approximately 53 percent of a total of 13.4 million voters supported a 
state constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage.64 Each 
side raised and spent more than $40 million, making it second only 
to the presidential contest that year in the amount of money spent on 
an election campaign.65 The scale of fundraising and the nature of the 
political expertise required to compete in that kind of electoral environ-
ment creates an immediate need for the capacity to play to win in the 
big leagues, and its urgency simultaneously discourages any instinct to 
challenge the structures of wealth that distort the electoral system. just 
as civil rights groups learn from each other, so, of course, do conserva-
tives, and this history of repeated ballot initiatives may be predictive of 
continuing antiequality campaigns on other issues, such as immigration. 
Combined, these interventions outside the courtroom have helped 
shape new constitutional meanings of LGBT equality. In an ironic full 
circle return to Rosenberg's criticism, high-stakes court challenges on 
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the issue of marriage have become virtually a no-lose proposition. Mes-
saging campaigns do not explain all of this success, and there were some 
aspects of the marriage equality campaign that fell short. The litigation 
to invalidate Proposition 8 succeeded but only for California; it did not 
produce the nationwide ruling that plaintiffs had sought.66 And even 
in requ iring all states to allow same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court 
declined to adopt heightened scrutiny in analyzing the constitutionality 
of sexual orientation discrimination more generally.67 But public opin-
ion shifts surely did pave the way for the remarkable number of lower 
court opinions that struck down exclusionary marriage laws in the wake 
of Windsor,68 despite the lack of guidance in that opinion.69 In the spring 
of 2013, Time Magazine declared on its cover that "gay marriage [has] 
already won.''7° For the marriage equality campaign, it would be only a 
sligh t exaggeration to say that the Supreme Court became a very, very 
important opinion poll. 
These nonlitigation skills are not unique to LGBT groups, but mul-
tidimensional advocacy has been formative in its impact on relatively 
newer rights organizations like the LGBT groups and on a younger gen-
eration of leaders in all groups. The by-products of new technologies 
of advocacy and the blurred lines between legal advocacy and election 
campaigns will shape the future dimensions of civil rights practice in 
American political culture. 
Ill. Social Change: Civil Rights + Corporate Social Responsibility 
= Corporatist Civil Rights 
Struggles for human rights always begin with brave men and women who stand 
up, isolated, against the forces of oppression. But, in the United States, victory really 
arrives on the glorious day when the people with money decide discrimination is bad 
for business. 
- New York Times, Feb. 26, 201471 
Law is not an autonomous realm, least of all when one seeks social jus-
tice reforms. Other dimensions of movement advocacy interact with the 
kinds of legal work described in the prior section. The meaning of con-
stitutional principles and the aspiration to equality are shaped by many 
actors-not only courts and legislatures, or even only those in the legal 
p rofession more broadly. 
One distinguishing m ark of the LGBT civil rights movement is the 
extent to which the corporate business sector h as become an important 
nonjuridical voice. More so than in other civil rights movements,72 gay 
advocates have negotiated directly with employers to obtain internal 
policies against discrimination and have enlisted corporate support to 
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stress economic reasons for greater equality. Out of these efforts, a major 
coalition has emerged: an alliance between LGBT rights and corporate 
interests that has become one of the most effective movement resources 
for combating the arguments of moral conservatives. 
Again, historical context is everything. The LGBT civil rights move-
ment grew up under and into a Reagan-Bush-Clinton-Bush-Obama cor-
poratist political culture. Throughout that period, the political and eco-
nomic dynamics of globalization weakened the power of government to 
regulate multinational enterprises and to mitigate the localized external-
ities of downward pressure on wages and benefits. The balance of power 
between business on the one hand and labor and environmental inter-
ests on the other shifted dramatically from what it was in 1964. It should 
not be surprising that the significance and presumed legitimacy of busi-
ness interests would be baked into any overall strategy for achieving civil 
rights that essentially began during this era. 
The alliance with corporate interests in the LGBT rights movement 
grew out of the effort to eliminate workplace discrimination. Outside 
of municipalities, usually in either large urban or university-dominated 
areas, most of the early successes in securing protection came through 
negotiations with large corporate employers rather than from legisla-
tion.73 As more employers agreed to adopt antidiscrimination rules, the 
Human Rights Campaign began a Corporate Equality Index that itself 
has become a major factor in further driving adoption of these policies, 
fostering a competition among human relations and diversity profes-
sionals as they sought the 100 percent score awarded to entities that sat-
isfied each of the HRC's indicia of "corporate equality.''74 
The larger political context for this effort was the rise of a Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) concept within the business sector roughly 
coexistent with the rise of the LGBT rights movemem.75 CSR consists 
of voluntary, nonenforceable practices by which companies use meth-
ods of self-regulation to integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their relations with stakeholders.76 The 
power of internal corporate law has grown as firms have been able to 
bargain with public authorities and to relocate in search of less restric-
tive legal regimes. Implicit in the CSR concept is recognition that corpo-
rations comprise a privatist layer of sovereignty, with internal law that 
crosses traditional political boundaries of state and nation. 
Antidiscrimination agreements for LGBT employees are a classic CSR 
strategy. Especially in sectors such as technology and tourism, corpo-
rations have long viewed the LGBT population as an important source 
of skilled labor or an important market segment for their products, 
or both.77 Today, with popular support for LGBT equality increasing, 
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88 percent of Fortune 500 companies have adopted policies that pro-
hibit discrimination and provide benefits for LGBT employees?8 LGBT 
employee groups exist at nearly three hundred large employers?9 
The corporate-friendly approach has brought cascading benefits to 
the LGBT civil rights movement, at least among elites. Most signifi-
cantly, it has produced a mutually legitimating discourse that can be 
deployed in multiple settings. Advocacy groups repeatedly invoke a 
"business leads the way" theme in efforts to persuade Congress or other 
legislatures to enact antidiscrimination protections.80 When the leading 
corporate actors in a state, region, or nation have endorsed equal treat-
ment, it is much easier to depict companies that continue to discrirni-
nate as laggards or outliers. Corporate support extended to marriage as 
well. Amicus briefs were filed by a number of large corporate employers 
in both the challenge to the "Defense of Marriage Act" and the challenge 
to state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. Employers argued that 
businesses were harmed by the unnecessary complexities in personnel-
related laws caused by their inability to treat married same-sex couples 
in the same way as married different-sex couples under federallaws.81 
A Wikipedia entry lists almost 125 corporations that have issued state-
ments in support of same-sex marriage.82 
The power of corporate support for LGBT rights burst into public 
view in 2014 when Arizona Governor jan Brewer vetoed legislation that 
would have allowed persons with religious objections to same-sex mar-
riage to decline service to gay customers.83 Behind her decision was a 
business-led lobbying effort that stressed the potential of antigay laws 
to harm prospects for economic development.84 The episode illustrated 
the value to LGBT rights advocates of using corporate interests to peel 
off economic from social conservatives. Indeed, LGBT rights, including 
marriage, seems to have become a reverse wedge issue that once fueled 
support for conservative politicians but is now weakening the free 
market-traditional values coalition on which the Republican Party has 
depended. 
There are three major costs to this alliance, however. First, it is contin-
gent on a discourse of cultural and political sameness-that is, that the 
achievement of LGBT equality would change very little in the broader 
society, in family dynamics and certainly in the economic structure.85 
As Patricia Cain has noted, every civil rights movement has relied on 
sameness arguments to allay fears about the effects of eliminating legal 
stigma,86 but such arguments, by their very nature, tend to de-radicalize 
a social movement and distance it from broader efforts to rectify injus-
tice. 
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Second, the mutual legitimation effect of an LGBT-corporate alliance 
strengthens a discourse promoting privatization of social costs and risks. 
In family law, for example, the tendency to shift the cost associated 
with vulnerable populations (unemployed homemakers, children, the 
elderly) to individual caretakers has long been criticized by feminist the-
orists but was largely unexamined in LGBT advocates' proposals for new 
family status forms of domestic partnerships and same-sex marriage.87 
More generally, the effort to allocate to individuals the expenditures that 
flow from increasingly unregulated corporate discretion in hiring, firing, 
and compensation of employees has become a major theme in conser-
vative politics in the United States.88 This development conflicts with all 
but the narrowest conception of equality. 
Lastly, the man-bites-dog narrative that results when well-known con-
servatives, such as Theodore Olson, endorse LGBT rights issues tends 
to garner an outsize amount of media attention and public interest. 
This can provide a powerful mechanism for breaking through media 
noise and clutter to convey a message that equality is a demand with 
broad support, but it can also be used to reinforce old stereotypes that 
the LGBT community is almost exclusively composed of affluent white 
males. 
IV. The Future: Toward Antihierarchy 
For years groups seeking equality for gays drew inspiration from the civil-rights 
era .. .[ After the adoption of Prop 8}, Gay campaigners concluded that their approach 
had been wrong. With their talk of discrimination, they had been appealing to voters' 
heads .. .[The new strategy] involves persuading voters that their existing values allow 
them to accept gay marriage ... because same-sex couples are asking to join the institu-
tion, rather than to change it. 
-The Economist, Feb. 201489 
The future of the civil rights paradigm turns on what "civil rights" 
means in a political and legal environment in which formal equality has 
been incorporated into institutions of governance and cultural author-
ity, although structural forms of subordination continue and even 
worsen. The gains of race and gender civil rights movements have 
reshuffled those hierarchies, benefiting most the women and people of 
color who are socially advantaged in terms of class. Those least likely 
to benefit have been persons with intersecting vectors of social disad-
vantage, for whom the indicia of social inequality have hardened or 
condensed at the bottom of the social pyramid. The prospect that for-
mal equality will fail to achieve social equality, which is so evident with 
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regard to race and gender,90 looms for the LGBT civil rights movement 
as well. 
Liberal equality discourse may provide an essential tool in a long-term 
effort to more fundamentally alter patterns of social stratification. But 
there is an inevitable temptation to declare victory, paired with a ten-
dency to run out of steam (not to mention donors), when a civil rights 
movement has achieved a dramatic success such as marriage. The big 
question for LGBT advocates is whether, when that point is reached on 
these issues, "today's civil rights movement" will take on the project of 
challenging the economic and social hierarchy associated with sexuality. 
The paradoxical effect of securing formal equality can be to 
strengthen the subordination of those at the bottom of the pyramid. 
Progress in ending sex discrimination, for example, can reinforce (and 
not merely pass by) the oppression of low-income women and women 
of color by creating a mutually reinforcing dynamic of invisibility.91 If 
harms disproportionately affecting LGBT people of color or who have 
low incomes are not challenged as such and if privileged sectors of the 
LGBT community tum their attention away from a seemingly com-
pleted set of goals, the least powerful groups will become even more vul-
nerable. The entrenched nature of discrimination against some women 
and some LGBT people not only will remain but also will worsen. 
There are ideological consequences as well as material harms associ-
ated with the condensation of social hierarchy. The resilience of stratifi-
cation along lines of race and poverty, in the face of civil rights progress, 
creates a naturalization effect-a sense that there are intractable, irreme-
diable causes associated with the very nature of the people who suffer 
the worst that explains why they have not succeeded. 
Let me close by briefly sketching two possible futures for the social 
meaning of "civil rights." The first model is civil rights as a cultural com-
modity. LGBT equality is a global brand, grounded in the most desir-
able market demographic: young adults (gay and straight) who are in 
the process of developing public policy loyalties, as they do product 
loyalties, that they will continue to favor for the rest of their lives. 
LGBT equality is a stakeholder-governed, public-private partnership. It 
is both consumer friendly and a consumer durable. It combines value 
and growth. It is market-friendly equality, embedded in the concepts 
associated with CSR. 
The second model of civil rights is grounded in egalitarianism and 
the project of dismantling hierarchy. It is made visible by demographic 
data documenting the LGBT individuals at greatest risk of harm, such as 
low-income parents who-even if entitled to lawfully marry-routinely 
engage with a variety of hostile public and private institutions. Such per-
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sons are at high risk of HIV infection, of police harassment, of incarcer-
ation, and of inadequate educations-all for reasons that are not limited 
to, but are related to, their sexuality or gender identity.92 They are con-
centrated not in the well-known gay strongholds of D.C., Fort Laud-
erdale, and San Francisco but in San Antonio, Memphis, and Virginia 
Beach.93 
One does not have to strain to identify intersectionality in such sit-
uations. Relatively advantaged LGBT people experience modified, usu-
ally mitigated systems of stratification, often sheltered by race or gender 
privilege. Those without such shelters are trapped in complex hierar-
chies, mutually constituted by multiple vectors of subordination. Exclu-
sions can be attacked one by one. But it is not possible to engage any 
hierarchy-whether sexual, racial, or other-without addressing this 
complexity. Heteronormativity is a layered set of interlocking hierar-
chies, not just a collection of exclusions. It is not merely straight-it has 
a race, a class, and even a geography. 
One of these models of civil rights-perhaps even a mixture of 
both-will comprise Civil Rights 3.0. 
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Toward a jurisprudence of the Civil 
Rights Acts 
Robin L. West 
What is the nature of the "rights;' jurisprudentially, that the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act1 legally prescribed? And, more generally, what is a "civil 
right"? Today, lawyers tend to think of civil rights, and particularly those 
that originated in the 1964 Act, as antidiscrimination rights: our "civil 
rights," on this understanding, are our rights not to be discriminated 
against, by employers, schools, landlords, property vendors, hoteliers, 
restaurant owners, and providers of public transportation, no less than 
by states and state actors, on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, age, sex-
uality, or disability. Contemporary civil rights scholarship overwhelm-
ingly reflects the same conception: our civil rights are quasi-
constitutional rights to be free of discrimination in the private as well as 
public world.2 But this conventional lawyerly understanding-basically, 
that "civil rights" are "antidiscrimination rights"-is clearly inadequate, 
certainly with respect to civil rights generally but also, and more 
tellingly, even with respect to the rights created and then protected by 
the 1964 Act itself. 
First, on the general point: some of the "civil rights" sought or held 
across our history have not been antidiscrimination rights of any sort 
at all-labor rights, welfare rights, free speech rights, and the consti-
tutional rights of criminal defendants have all, at various times, been 
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championed as "civil rights," and these rights are neither logically nor 
jurisprudentially tied to any conception of antidiscrimination.3 But fur-
thermore, even the "civil rights" that are defined and then protected 
against discrimination by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as by various 
Civil Rights Acts both before and subsequent to it, are not, in circular 
fashion, simply our rights not to be discriminated against on the basis of 
impermissible characteristics. Rather, the "civil rights" of which we can-
not be discriminatorily deprived, whether originating in the 1964 Act or 
elsewhere, are, after all, rights to something: to vote,4 to physical secu-
rity,5 to enter contracts,6 to own, buy, or sell property,7 to legal recourse 
in the aftermath of a wrong committed against us, 8 to write a will, 9 to 
be considered for or to hold down a job and to be paid fairly for our 
labor, 10 to the use of a restaurant or a hotel or a city bus," to a pub-
lic education,l2 and to marry whom we love.13 And these are just some 
of the public goods that have been recognized at various times as "civil 
rights," of which we cannot be deprived by discriminatory action. 
Even if just that much is correct, then the "civil right" protected by all 
of our Civil Rights Acts, including the 1964 one, is considerably more 
complex, jurisprudentially, than the conventionally legalistic and for-
mulaic equation of "civil rights" with "antidiscrimination rights" sug-
gests. Minimally, the "civil right" recognized or protected by the various 
Civil Rights Acts is almost invariably a multilayered right, or a "right to 
a right": it is a right to not be discriminatorily deprived of some under-
lying right. Only the first right in that phrase "a right to a right" is the 
antidiscrimination right. The second "right," though, is the underlying 
civil right of which we cannot be discriminatorily deprived, and it is 
both itself complex and highly variable. It might be a common law right, 
such as a right to enter contracts or sell property, or a statutory right, 
such as a right to vote, or simply a right to a social or public good, such as 
employment or educational opportunities, or the protection of a trust-
worthy police force against private violence. And while we have gener-
ated a library of writing, and j urisprudence, and judicial opinions on the 
nature of the first "right" in that phrase-the right not to be deprived of 
various rights on the basis of race, sex, and so forth-we have devoted 
much less to the second: the nature of the underlying right of which 
we cannot be deprived. So what is the jurisprudential nature of that 
right? What is a "civil right," jurisprudentially, both with respect to the 
rights protected against discrimination by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and more broadly? Again, and more generally, what is a "civil right"? 
Oddly, I believe, and in spite of their unquestioned importance in 
our contemporary public life, we are woefully short on a jurisprudential 
understanding of civil rights, both with respect to the Civil Rights Act 
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of 1964, whose fiftieth anniversary we celebrated last year, and more 
broadly. Although we have recently seen an explosion of scholarship on 
the history, or histories, of both the civil rights movement of the 1950s 
through 1970s and the Civil Rights Acts they produced,14 there has not 
been, either during or following our various "legislative moments" ush-
ering in civil rights laws, a body of scholarly work engaged in reflective 
debate over the jurisprudential nature of the civil rights they sought to 
win and then to protect. We simply do not have a scholarly jurispruden-
tial canon that seeks to encompass not only the nature of the antidis-
crimination norm that our various Civil Rights Acts codify but also 
the nature of the substantive underlying rights that all of those rights 
against discrimination protect. Legal scholars have, for better or worse, 
focused on judge-made law, and particularly judge-made constitutional 
law, when engaging in the work of discerning the overarching principles 
of rights-based jurisprudence. Nowhere is this clearer than in the areas 
of law and life touched by the Civil Rights Acts themselves. I will return 
to this problem below. Here, I just want to note that for whatever reason, 
our scholarship on civil rights has shortchanged the complexities of 
both the Civil Rights Acts and civil rights movements and their prod-
uct-civil rights-more broadly construed. We have focused our 
jurisprudential scholarship almost entirely on the rights to nondiscrim-
ination our Civil Rights Acts created. But we have neglected the need 
to understand the nature of the underlying rights of access to the social 
goods, systems of law, or institutions-contractual freedom and powers, 
property ownership, education, employment opportunities, public 
accommodation, family life, and so on-that those nondiscrimination 
rights were designed to protect. 
This is a neglect that matters, beyond the obvious problem that the 
neglect itself fosters confusion, with disputants and debaters often talk-
ing at cross-purposes.l5 There are at least two deeper worries. First, the 
lack of a jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts that centers the underly-
ing civil rights, and notjust the antidiscrimination norm, likely reflects 
as well as contributes to a lack of appreciation of the civil society and 
of the law that facilitates it that "civil rights;' historically and today, 
both depend upon and produce. We have a well-developed jurispru-
dential scholarship on the nature of rights, including natural rights, 
human rights, legal rights, and constitutional rights.16 And we have a 
well-developed body of scholarship concerning civil society-but it is a 
peculiarly legally denuded civil society that, thus far, we have studied: 
it is the "civil society" of voluntary bowling leagues and private associ-
ations, often by definition set apart from or in opposition to the legal 
society of the courthouse and City Ha11.17 We do not have much, if any, 
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scholarship seeking to understand the civil society structured, and facil-
itated, by positive law, and we have virtually none centering the nature 
of our rights to participate in it. 
But second, the lack of jurisprudential study of the underlying civil 
rights protected by our various Civil Rights Acts throughout our history 
has quite possibly skewed, and perhaps truncated, our inherited civil 
rights traditions, as well as possibilities for their creative regeneration. 
Civil rights, as well as the civic and participatory life they facilitate, can 
be threatened not only by discriminatory private practices of the sort 
prohibited by the Civil Rights Acts but by much else as well. Our nat-
ural rights to participate in family life can be threatened not only by 
discriminatory state marriage law that grants rights to form families or 
marriages to some but not others but also by private or intimate vio-
lence within those marriages that goes unaddressed by states, by a puni-
tive criminal justice system that overincarcerates marriageable men for 
trivial or victimless offenses, and by a lack of community support for 
our caregiving obligations. Our civil rights to a healthy and physically 
secure life can be threatened not only by sexually discriminatory med-
ical treatment or racially discriminatory policing and profiling but also 
by a lack of affordable health care, a lack of trustworthy police protec-
tion against private or neighborhood violence, and an unhealthy and 
polluted planet. Our rights to decent employment opportunities can be 
denied us not only by intentional discrimination or neutral rules with 
discriminatory impacts but also by a lack of skills and skills training, jobs 
outsourcing, plant relocations, capital strikes, and high unemployment. 
Our rights to education are frustrated by a lack of preschool readiness 
and lack of community support for parents of newborns, infants, and 
toddlers as much as by racially discriminatory admissions or school dis-
tricting policies. To secure these rights, then, to family life, education, 
employment, and physical security (assuming for the moment we have 
such rights), we do indeed need to enforce laws against discrimination. 
But we need to do much else as well. The scholarly focus of the last 
fifty years on the nature of discrimination and its unlawfulness, rather 
than on the full array of obstacles that stand as barriers to the enjoyment 
of civil rights, and without insisting on the point that discrimination is 
but one such obstacle among others, has shrunk our understanding and 
appreciation of our own civil rights tradition, as well as its regenerative 
potential. 
This chapter seeks to begin such a conversation. In Part I, I introduce, 
or reintroduce, and then endorse a definition of civil rights put forward 
by Thomas Paine more than two hundred years ago-well before the 
idea of "nondiscrimination" had taken hold-in his famous and indeed 
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iconic pamphlet Rights of Man. 18 "Civil rights," Paine argued in that 
world-changing document, are, first, "natural rights"-by which he 
meant that they are rights that attach by virtue of our humanity, 19 what 
we today sometimes call "human rights" and what were then sometimes 
called "fundamental rights." But, he went on to explain, natural rights 
and civil rights are not coterminous, for two reasons. First, while nat-
ural rights attach to a man by virtue of his humanity, civil rights, Paine 
argued, are those natural rights that distinctively attach not just by virtue 
of his humanity but also by virtue of his "member[ship] in society."20 
That is what makes "civil" rights civil. Second, and relatedly, "civil rights" 
are that subset of natural rights that a man cannot enforce on his own: 
rights, in Paine's own language, "to the enjoyment of which his individ-
ual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent."21 Unlike the natural 
rights "of the mind;' or of conscience, or of behavior that does not harm 
others, Paine argued, civil rights distinctively require the presence of the 
state for their perfection and enforcement.22 Civil rights, in other words, 
unlike other (noncivil) natural rights, are not rights from, but rather are 
rights to: "civil rights;' distinctively, are rights to state action, to state law, 
to state institutions, to a functioning government, and basically, to com-
munity. Paine's definition, I will argue, penned well before the idea of a 
legal or constitutional right against discrimination had taken hold, may 
provide a better account of both our oldest and our most contempo-
rary civil rights than the modern idea of civil rights as simply rights of 
nondiscrimination. But more to the point, Paine's account highlights just 
the feature of civil rights-the necessity of the state, and of law, to the 
perfection of the rights at the heart of civil society-that we have most 
failed to center in our scholarship. 
Paine's quite formal definition, however, does not give us much help 
in developing the content of our civil rights, beyond his fecund and 
prescient suggestion that they must include rights of "security and pro-
tection."23 Beyond reintroducing Paine, therefore, my second general 
goal in the first part of this chapter will be to marry, or synthesize, 
the formal definition of "civil rights" he provided with the modern and 
very substantive account of the content of "human rights" propounded 
by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen over the last thirty years in 
their exposition of the "capabilities approach" to rights and human wel-
fare. 24 The capabilities approach, as developed by Sen and Nussbaum, I 
believe, fills the gap in a way that is resonant with Paine's overall polit-
ical philosophy: we have human rights, Nussbaum and Sen argue, to 
enjoy those human capabilities that are most conducive to our individ-
ual flourishing-including, for example, our "capability" for a healthy 
and long life, for sociability, for intimacy, for play, for cultural and intel-
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lectual engagement, and for interaction with our natural environment.25 
Protection of these capabilities and the human flourishing they nur-
ture may, sometimes, require that the state leave us alone and let us 
develop and enjoy our capabilities according to our own lights, with-
out interference from an overly intrusive community or censorial state 
actors. Often, though-more often, in fact-the individual flourishing 
that Sen and Nussbaum identify as the end of human welfare requires a 
state actively promoting those fundamental capabilities that produce it. 
States, therefore, sometimes have an obligation to promote and protect 
those capabilities, as well as an obligation to sometimes leave them be, 
and individuals have rights-human rights-to states that do both. 
The various human capabilities Sen and Nussbaum identify that 
require active state promotion and protection, rather than state restraint, 
suggest the premises of a moral argument for Painean civil rights as well 
as a foundation for at least some of the interests protected against dis-
crimination by our Civil Rights Acts, of both centuries. At the same time, 
a (modified) Nussbaum-Senian "capabilities approach" to welfare and 
rights suggests a moral argument for those civil rights we might believe 
we should have but do not yet fully enjoy: rights to decent work that is 
safe, meaningful, and fairly compensated; rights to greater community 
support for parents caring for young children or grown children caring 
for sick or dying parents; a high-quality education that prepares us for 
citizenship as well as gainful employment; a trustworthy and effective 
police force that protects us against violence without violating our rights 
of privacy and dignity; and so on. I will therefore try to supplement 
Paine's bare-boned account of the political logic of civil rights-how 
and where they fit, so to speak, in the pantheon of natural, fundamen-
tal, legal and constitutional rights-with Nussbaum and Sen's rich, sub-
stantive account of human welfare and what states are obligated to do 
to promote it. This blended account, I will conclude, suggests what is 
distinctive about "civil rights" against the backdrop of both our legal 
rights and human rights. Against the former, civil rights are those legal 
rights that promote fundamental human capabilities and protect our 
enjoyment of them against unjust impediments, including public and 
private discrimination. Against the latter, civil rights are those natural 
rights that, more specifically, attach by virtue of membership in soci-
ety, which a man cannot enforce on his own and therefore require active 
state involvement for their protection, much as Paine argued two cen-
turies ago. 
Putting this together, I will ultimately argue in the first part below that 
"civil rights" are rights to be free of unjust impediments-such as, as per 
the 1964 Act, public or private discriminatory practices-to the under-
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lying rights we all should enjoy to some set of legally constructed or 
legally protected social goods or institutions: private property, contrac-
tual freedom and powers, dignified and fairly compensated labor, pub-
lic accommodation and transportation, high-quality public education, 
civil marriage, family life, and religious practice, among others. These 
civil rights and the underlying rights both facilitate participation in civic 
life and permit us to enjoy our most fundamental human capabilities. 
So my claim will be that "civil rights," jurisprudentially, are those rights 
that give us access to the legal apparatus of civil life, which in turn facil-
itates the enjoyment of basic, universally shared human capabilities. I 
will sometimes call my account a Painean-Nussbaumean, or Painean for 
short, account of the jurisprudential nature of a civil right. In the first 
part of this chapter, I will argue that the Painean account illuminates 
features of the Civil Rights Act and shows its continuity with other civil 
rights we possess or should possess, as well as with civil rights move-
ments from our history. 
In Part II, I elaborate a bit on my constructed Painean conception of 
civil rights by contrasting civil rights, so understood, with what I believe 
is an emerging and new paradigm of constitutional rights, which I have 
called elsewhere "exit rights."26 These relatively new and newly constitu-
tionally recognized "exit rights," I will argue briefly here and have argued 
at length elsewhere, are not classically individual rights, justified on tra-
ditionally liberal grounds; they are not simply rights to enjoy some mea-
sure of privacy, or religious freedom, or freedom of conscience, or to 
individuate ourselves in some other way, within civil society. Rather, 
exit rights-which include, inter alia, the rights to own and use a gun in 
self-defense, to procure an abortion, to die, to homeschool one's chil-
dren, and to not purchase health insurance, as well as, possibly, the rights 
of religious corporations or nonprofit entities to exemptions from the 
mandate of antidiscrimination laws-are radically libertarian rights to 
effectively ''exit" civil society, the social contract, or some substantial 
part of it. Our "civil rights," understood in the Painean sense, by contrast, 
can fairly be called "rights to enter" that compact or to garner the benefit 
of it, and to do so, specifically, through accessing some aspect of its legal 
architecture. The exit rights increasingly protected by the Constitution, 
as construed by our courts, are rights to exit the same civil society to 
which civil rights protect entrance. Constitutional rights and civil rights, 
then, contrary to the claims of a number of constitutional law theorists, 
are not only not the same thing and not mutually constitutive of our 
"fundamental law," but they also are more often than not, these days, on 
a collision course. 
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The contrast between civil and constitutional rights that I will explore 
in Section II below is at heart aesthetic and ethical. Our relatively new 
array of constitutionally inscribed "exit rights" have, I will suggest, a 
tragic arc. As in the last act of a classic or Shakespearean tragedy, their 
exercise often culminates with characters splayed dead across the stage: 
individuals exercising their rights to die, to kill, and to abort are, after 
all, severing earthly as well as communitarian coils; they are all dealing 
in death. Even when not lethal, however, the exercise of an exit right 
culminates almost invariably in the spectacle of an isolated individual, 
shrouded in his various constitutional rights to be left alone, with the 
community from which he is so willfully estranged in shatters. The 
intruder is killed by the homeowner, rather than captured by a trustwor-
thy constable; the fetus is expunged, rather than borne into a supportive 
community; the child is educated in isolation at home, rather than at a 
public school and in a community of peers; the suicidal patient is dead, 
rather than cared for in hospice. Civil rights have, by contrast, what I call 
a "comedic arc." As in Shakespearean and classical comedy, the exercise 
of a civil right culminates in a communal ritual or event, such as a cou-
ple's wedding celebration, where they are joined by their community's 
representatives of faith and state, or a new day in a well-functioning 
and integrated schoolroom or workplace, or the cure of an illness and 
restoration to health, financed by a community of coinsureds who have 
spread and shared risks, or the joyous arrival of a new birth accompa-
nied by responsible attendant care and not threatened by the specter of 
a lost job. In the last act of a comedy, the state as well as the community 
and its worth are reconfirmed, and the individual's role within it, as well 
as his distinctiveness from it, is celebrated. Part II below draws the obvi-
ous inference that centering comedic civil rights rather than the tragic 
constitutional rights we have obsessed over for the last thirty years, in 
our understanding of rights and in our ongoing attempts to take them 
seriously, might give us a more balanced jurisprudence and a sliver of 
hope for a more balanced community likewise. 
The conclusion revisits the Trayvon Martin killing and its aftermath in 
light of some of these distinctions. 
I. Tom Paine's Civil Rights 
According to an influential and much-quoted definition provided in 
Thomas Paine's canonical late-eighteenth-century essay Rights of Man, 
"civil rights" are those natural rights that are owed by a government to 
the people-all of them-by virtue of their membership in civil soci-
ety.27 "Civil rights," Paine held, are a subspecies of "natural rights"-a 
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claim repeated and embraced, indeed insisted upon-by proponents 
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, three-quarters of a century after Paine 
wrote.28 Natural rights, in tum, are rights we enjoy solely by virtue 
of our humanity; we hold them regardless of the accident of the geo-
graphic details of our birth. We hold them against our own sovereign, 
whether or not he recognizes them, and would hold them likewise 
against any sovereign. And we aU hold them, Paine thought-slaves and 
American Indians no less than free men.29 That "natural rights" under-
pinning of our civil rights and civil rights tradition is no historical relic; 
it is, rather, a vital connection between both the reconstruction and rev-
olutionary era use of the phrase and our modern antidiscrimination law 
today. From the very beginning, civil rights have been grounded in nat-
ural rights, meaning they are owed everyone, without regard to race, sex, 
disability, and so on-again, they are owed by virtue of one's humanity. 
By virtue of their origin as natural rights, civil rights have always con-
noted some version of an antidiscrimination norm. 
Civil rights were not, however, viewed by Paine and his contempo-
raries as coterminous with the natural rights man possesses by virtue 
of his humanity, when both phrases were part of the ordinary vocab-
ulary of lawyers and constitutionalists. Rather, they were a subset, with 
two characteristics differentiating them from the larger class of natural 
rights, of which, again, they are a part (all civil rights are natural rights, 
all natural rights, however, are not civil rights). First, civil rights, unlike 
other natural rights, are rights that attach by virtue of one's "mem-
ber[ship] in society," rather than solely by virtue of one's humanity. But 
second, although civil rights originate as natural rights, Paine explained, 
unlike some of those natural rights, such as rights to the mind and con-
science or rights to behavior that does not harm others, "civil rights" are 
those rights that cannot be perfected by individuals standing alone, so to 
speak, or outside civil society and law:30 
Natural rights are those (rights] which appertain to man in right of his exis-
tence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and 
also all those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and hap-
piness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil rights 
are those which appertain to man in right of h is being a member of society. 
Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the 
individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all 
cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to secu-
rity and protection.3l 
Civil rights, then, to the founding generation, at least if Paine's under-
standing was representative, were natural rights that require, distinc-
tively, civil society, including both positive law and legal institutions 
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for their perfection. Unlike other natural rights, we cannot enforce civil 
rights on our own. We need the affirmative assistance of positive law. So 
defined, "civil rights" included, for Paine, quintessentially, those rights 
pertaining to protection of the physical security of the individual. The 
security of and protection of the physical body are examples, then, 
of foundational rights that are only imperfectly, at best, enforceable 
through self-help. We "trade in" our natural rights to self-protection and 
security, so to speak, for the "civil right" of the protection of our physical 
security by the state. 
How does Paine's account of "civil rights"-penned long before the 
Civil Rights Acts of either of the two centuries following and before 
the idea of antidiscrimination as an actionable wrong had gained trac-
tion-as "natural rights" that "appertain to man in right of his being 
a member of society" but "of which his individual power is not, in all 
cases, sufficiently competent"32 stand up, as a jurisprudential account of 
civil rights, both those passed into law fifty years ago and those in vari-
ous statutory provisions before and since? Better, I think, than our cur-
rent lawyerly equation of "civil rights" with "antidiscrimination rights." 
At least echoes of Paine's definition can be heard not only in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 but also in virtually all of the various Civil Rights Acts 
and movements of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, 
according to the framers and advocates of the seminal Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, "civil rights" include rights to enter and enforce contracts; to 
buy, hold, rent, and sell property; to sue, be parties, or give evidence in 
judicial proceedings; and to enjoy the protection of the state and its laws 
pertaining to the security of persons and property33-all of which read-
ily fit Paine's description of civil rights as that subset of natural rights 
that should attach by virtue of membership in society and that require 
legal definition and institutions to perfect. These "civil rights," as they 
were then called (in part to distinguish them from "political rights," such 
as rights to vote or serve on juries) clearly required positive law for their 
perfection-the power to make and enforce contracts requires contract 
law, enjoyment of property obviously requires property law, rights to 
sue and give evidence require the law of procedure, rights pertaining to 
the security of persons and property require the criminal law, and so 
forth. As such, these civil rights, which had long been granted by law 
to white men through the combined effect of common law or statute, 
should, according to the framers of the nineteenth -century Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, be granted to African Americans as well.34 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, one of the "enforcement acts" passed in 
the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments and popularly known as 
the Ku Klux Klan Act, explicitly added personal security from various 
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private conspiracies to commit, among other wrongs, acts of domestic 
violence to the list of civil rights to be enforced by the federal govern-
ment, rather than state militias.35 Here too, the extension fits Paine's 
understanding. The civil and natural right to be protected against pri-
vate violence had been granted to some by the criminal laws prohibiting 
it and their enforcement by state authorities, but that protection had 
not been extended to the protection of the freed slaves against private 
conspiracies contemplating violence (such as lynchings) against them; 
thus the need for the Ku Klux Klan Act. The civil right to protection 
against private violence, according to the framers of that Act, must be 
extended to freed slaves. For the authors of the constitutionally doomed 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, "civil rights" also included the right to use public 
accommodations such as hotels and restaurants, to employ public trans-
portation, and to enjoy and participate in public amusements such as 
in theatres.36 Here as well, these rights to participate sociably in these 
public spaces of civil society, which attach by virtue of membership in 
that society, require law for their creation and enjoyment, and the Act 
of 1875 created a nondiscrimination right to enjoy those participatory 
rights. The 1875 Act as well, then, fits Paine's definition. The major Civil 
Rights Acts of the nineteenth century all put into law an inclusive, uni-
versalist, and profoundly Painean impulse: to ensure that civil rights-to 
contract, own property, sue for private wrongs, enjoy the state's pro-
tection against violence, and make use of public accommodations-that 
had been granted to some would be guaranteed to all, conditioned solely 
on one's membership in civil society rather than on one's racial heritage 
or one's earlier identification as free or slave. 
In the twentieth century, the phrase took on new meanings but nev-
ertheless held close to the jurisprudential core of Paine's definition. Vir-
tually all of our twentieth-century civil rights-both those recognized in 
law and those still fought over-can easily be described as natural rights 
that attach, or should attach, by virtue of both one's humanity and one's 
membership in civil society but that cannot be enforced by an individual 
standing alone. Thus, as told in Risa Colubotf's groundbreaking scholar-
ship from ten years ago,37 but as intimated as well in much of William 
Forbath's early work,38 the idea of "civil rights" in the post-Lochner era 
included, foundationally, labor rights, including not only rights to be 
free of peonage and involuntary servitude, derived directly from th e 
Thirteenth Amendment, but also, eventually, the right to join a union 
and to strike, as well as rights to minimum wages and safe work con-
ditions.39 Participation in the labor economy as a free and equal citi-
zen, Coluboff shows, was viewed as key to a shared civic life, according 
to the New Deal-inspired, Justice Department-housed lawyers of the 
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1940s Civil Rights Section, who were responsible for giving content and 
meaning to the "civil rights" they were charged to enforce.40 This usage 
continued in popular discourse throughout much of the century: as late 
as 1968, Martin Luther King himself spoke of rights to jobs, to strike, to 
organize, and to unionize as "civil rights," and scores of labor activists 
since have followed suit.41 
In a now much-studied history, during the middle and second half 
of the twentieth century, the content of "civil rights" shifted from labor 
rights per se to rights of minorities to enjoy employment and educa-
tional opportunities free of discrimination, and it was during this time 
that the lawyerly identification of "civil rights" with "antidiscrimina-
tion rights" apparently took hold, at least according to historians of the 
era.42 Here as well, though, the underlying civil rights-to employment 
and education opportunities-no less than the underlying nineteenth-
century civil rights of contract, property, security, and access to civil jus-
tice-are fairly described as natural rights owed to individuals by virtue 
of their membership in civil society and cannot be enforced by indi-
viduals standing alone. Fair employment and decent education both are 
social institutions that are heavily dependent upon an array oflaws, both 
statutory and common, for their realization. In the last few decades, 
by dint of at least occasional if not common usage, the phrase "civil 
rights" is sometimes understood as including various statutorily or con-
stitutionally created rights that facilitate family life, such as the "right 
to marry" without regard to sexual orientation;43 the right to family or 
medical leave from work necessitated by the birth of a child or the ill-
ness of a family member, as protected by the Family Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA);44 the right to be free of intimate violence, as protected by 
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA);45 rights derived from vari-
ous sources to a high-quality as well as integrated public education, as 
imperfectly echoed in statutes such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB)46 
and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA);47 as well as a 
right to health care, the existence of which is strongly suggested by the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA).48 Here too, the underlying natural rights-to 
family, parentage, marriage, safe intimacy, quality education, and access 
to health care-are owed to all of us by virtue of societal membership. 
And here as well, they are rights that cannot be enforced by any indi-
vidual without the aid of considerable positive law. They all look like 
Painean civil rights. 
Thus, all of these early, mid-, and late twentieth and early twenty-first-
century civil rights laws, or, in some cases, still unfinished civil rights 
campaigns, recognize, create, advocate for, or protect civil rights that 
loosely fit Paine's definition. Most, although not all, protect those civil 
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rights against some form of race, sex, disability, age, or sexuality dis-
crimination. What they all do, though, is protect various civil rights 
against some sort of unjust social ill-either discrimination, poverty, 
joblessness, lack of insurance, private violence, or unequal allocations of 
unpaid intimate labor, with its consequent disparate impacts in work-
places-that in turn hampers enjoyment of underlying civil rights. In 
all of them, the underlying "civil right" protected against these perni-
cious forces is a right to engage or participate in some aspect of civil 
society-employment, education, marriage and family life, access to 
health care, physical security and the mobility that goes with it, con-
tract exchanges, and ownership of property-that is in turn facilitated 
through legal processes. And in all of them, again echoing Paine, the 
underlying right that is being protected, extended, or guaranteed is not 
simply natural, although it is that- a right that should attach to one by 
virtue of one's humanity-but it is also, distinctively, civil-it attaches or 
should attach by virtue of one's membership in society. 
Let me try to extract four definitional principles of the jurisprudential 
nature of a "civil right" from this application of Paine's definition of 
civil rights to the examples surveyed above, of the rights protected by 
our various Civil Rights Acts. First: a civil right is a natural right, mean-
ing it is a right that attaches by virtue of one's humanity. In contempo-
rary terms, we might restate the same point in this way, drawing on Sen 
and Nussbaum's universalist account of human well-being: civil rights, 
like all natural rights, protect or nurture our fundamental "human capa-
bilities"-the capabilities we have, by virtue of being human, for long 
and healthy lives, for cultural and intellectual engagement, for play, for 
interacting with our natural environments, and so on-enjoyment of 
which are the preconditions, universally, for living a good life.49 Some 
of those human capabilities, of course, are nurtured by familial direc-
tion during childhood and then furthered and directed by individual 
effort. They require nothing more than benign neglect from the state 
for their flowering. Some of them are also, though, furthered by social 
institutions and the laws that structure them, and some of them are fully 
dependent on those social institutions and laws.50 Thus, our capability 
for health and longevity is furthered not only by a sensible diet and 
plenty of exercise growing up in a healthy household but also by access 
to health care throughout life.51 Our capability for mobility and phys-
ical freedom is furthered not only by strong limbs developed by nat-
ural and healthy maturation but also by protection against violence and 
the policing that provides it; our capability for intimacy not only by the 
flowering of private lives that seek it and the emotional health that sus-
tains it but also by the promise of a family life that will be protected by 
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sound policing against external threat and internal abuse; our capabil-
ity for sociability not only by a natural capacity for language but also 
by access to our legally structured public accommodations and public 
spaces; and our capability for a stimulating mental life in adulthood not 
only by being left alone to discover (or not) Pythagorean theorems on 
our own but also by a high-quality public education, with sound curricu-
lum and pedagogy and the law that structures it. The "civil right," in all 
of these cases, is the right to access those institutions and to enjoy the 
laws that structure them, which protect and nurture these natural capa-
bilities. The various Civil Rights Acts, in turn, provide that those rights 
cannot be discriminatorily denied. 
The 1964 Civil Rights Act itself, of course, directly and explicitly guar-
antees rights to some of the legal structures that facilitate various capa-
bilities, notably, for employment opportunities, education, sociability, 
and community. These capabilities are quite directly furthered by fair 
jobs offered at nondiscriminatory wages, the hospitality of restaurants 
and hotels and the convenience and mobility of public transportation, 
decent educational opportunities, and the buying and selling of prop-
erty to allow for both mobility and choice of residence and also the 
enjoyment or production of consumer goods. The same relation holds, 
though, for our newer civil rights. The Affordable Care Act directly pro-
tects, through a complex regime of rights and responsibilities, the indi-
vidual capability to live a healthful life,52 while NCLB and the IDEA-53 
protect, again through rights, the fundamental capacities we all share 
for exploring the world and enjoying a lively mental and cultural life. 
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)54 encourages our capabilities 
for both work and family, and state gun safety laws and the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA)55 aim to do the same for our capabilities for 
intimacy, mobility, physical security, safe sociability, and freedom from 
fear. All of these are human capabilities that are essential to a good life, 
on Nussbaum and Sen's account, and all of these capabilities are pro-
tected through the social and civil life that law and society both aim to 
structure. Our civil rights can be understood as the rights to enjoy the 
fruits of all of that law, and our Civil Rights Acts can be understood as 
laws that guarantee that those civil rights will not be discriminatorily 
denied. 
My second principle also tracks Paine: "civil rights" are natural rights 
that attach not only by virtue of man's humanity but also by virtue of 
his "member[ship] in society." Briefly: civil rights center our rights to 
participate in community rather than rights to be free from it. Profes-
sor Rebecca Zeitlow is entirely right, for just this reason, to refer to the 
antidiscrimination rights created by the 1964 Civil Rights Act as "rights 
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of belonging."56 Antidiscrimination rights that attach by virtue of one's 
"m ember[ship] in society," as Paine put the point, are "rights of belong-
ing," in Zeitlow's near-biblical usage. 
The point can, however, be substantially broadened beyond Zeitlow's 
intended meaning. It is not only the antidiscrimination rights created 
by the 1964 Act that can be fruitfully described as "rights of belonging" 
for two reasons. First, the underlying civil rights protected against dis-
crimination by both the 1964 Civil Rights Act as well as the various Civil 
Rights Acts that came after it are themselves "rights of belonging." They 
are all rights to "belong to" or participate in various communities: com-
munities of employers and employees, of landlords and tenants, of buy-
ers and sellers, of students, of teachers and administrators, of neighbors, 
and of officials in polling places. The Acts protect the civil rights of 
workers, buyers, sellers, tenants, voters, citizens, students, teachers, pro-
ducers, and consumers to participate in these various communal work-
places, neighborhoods, markets, schools, city halls, courthouses, sites 
of public gathering and transportation, and voting sites and to do so 
through accessing the legal forms, rules, and entitlements that struc-
ture those locales. As Zeitlow argues, the nondiscrimination right those 
Acts create brings people together in real space and time.57 They do not 
just create an abstract right in an individual to be free of an invidious 
discriminatory intention in the minds of state actors: the antidiscrim-
ination rights originating in the Civil Rights Acts prohibit policies that 
adversely impact actual rates of participation and encourage or man-
date affirmative actions and related remedies that aim directly for more 
inclusive workplaces and neighborhoods. But the same is true of the 
underlying civil rights themselves. The civil rights protected against dis-
crimination by the Civil Rights Acts, in other words, and not just the 
antidiscrimination norm itself, concern the terms of our actual commu-
nal interactions with each other; they are not about the terms of our 
individual relationship with the minds of state actors. They aim to bring 
us together contractually, educationally, civilly, and so on. The aim of 
those laws in toto, then, is a participatory community, by virtue of not 
only the antidiscrimination norm but also the underlying rights. All of 
those rights seek to build trust between classes of strangers once indif-
ferent or implacably hostile, and all do so, toward the end of strengthen-
ing the community's civic bonds. 
Zietlow's provocative metaphor-that the civil rights of the Civil 
Rights Acts are "rights of belonging"58-can be extended in a second 
direction as well. Other rights won or fought for as "civil rights" in our 
history, outside the parameters of those Acts, and whether protected 
against the pernicious effects of discrimination or some other social ill, 
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can also be described as "rights of belonging." The civil right to form a 
labor union and to decent wages for safe labor, for example, prompted 
by the labor struggles of the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, were "rights of 
belonging," aiming for a more decent, fair, and democratically partic-
ipatory workplace. Those rights contrasted-and in ways that parallel 
the contrast between the constitutional and statutory antidiscrimination 
norms-with the bare and sterile right to "individual liberty" presup-
posed by rights to contract: contract rights, at best, create freer individu-
als, unbound by paternalistic states and empowered, at least in theory, to 
set terms and conditions of their own individual employment by virtue 
of their power to exit. 
The Family and Medical Leave Act directly aims to strengthen actual 
communities in the home and in the workplace by pooling the costs of 
early infant care or the care of sick family members, and the ACA like-
wise strengthens ties of responsibility among those who share risks in 
insurance pools. Gun control laws aim to build on mutual trust rather 
than rely on mutually assured destruction-styled individual antagonism 
to protect us each against the threat of violence posed by each other, 
and VAWA aims to protect physical security similarly, toward the end of 
enhancing the protection of women's mobility and safety in the com-
munities of home and civil life. NCLB- and IDEA-styled laws aim for 
stronger communities, both in schools and in neighborhoods that indi-
rectly benefit from the floor of quality they establish, rather than leaving 
parents and their children to their own individualistically fashioned 
means, needs, and desires. Some of these laws can be (and have been) 
fairly described as antidiscrimination laws-VAWA corrects prior dis-
criminatory policing policies, FMLA corrects an indirect form of gender 
discrimination on the job, and IDEA corrects for prejudicial educational 
policies against children with learning disabilities. But they obviously 
cannot be simply described as antidiscrimination laws, and they might 
not be best described in that way. VAWA most directly targets violence 
against women, not discrimination against them; IDEA aims to educate, 
not eradicate invidious distinctions; and FMLA likewise directly aims 
to support parents, rather than abolish discrimination against women 
on the job. All of these laws, whether they can fairly be described as 
antidiscrimination norms, directly aim to strengthen civic, communal, 
or neighborly bonds. 
Third: civil rights distinctively aim to protect those individual fun-
damental capabilities that are facilitated by law and that, as per Paine, 
cannot be perfected or enforced by the individual standing alone. The 
"civil right" is a positive right of access to the laws, legal structures, legal 
forms, and legal entitlements that in turn protect or nurture funda-
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mental capabilities that cannot be protected without societal and civil 
interaction, encouragement, or involvement. So the civil rights acts of 
both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries empower individuals who 
would be otherwise barred by dint of private discrimination from var-
ious social institutions that depend upon civil society, and its law, for 
their very definition: buying and selling property, contracting for and 
then occupying hotel rooms, eating in restaurants, and working at jobs 
under the same terms as white coworkers. 
Likewise, the Accordable Care Act protects the human capabilities 
of health and longevity through pooling risk and thereby ensuring 
improved health, which is facilitated not by individual effort but by an 
intricate and interpersonal jurisprudence interweaving statute, contract, 
and property law. Gun safety laws and the Violence Against Women 
Act protect the individual capabilities of safety, intimacy, and mobility 
by seeking to limit the isolating fears and inhibitions associated with 
excessive private violence and do so through a set of laws and legal 
institutions, rather than through arming everyone or engaging in exhor-
tations toward individual empowerment. The Family and Medical Leave 
Act protects individual capabilities for both work and family life, not 
through cheerleading heroically individualized parenting-exhorting us 
all to "lean in"-but through mandated employer-provided assistance 
with the costs of child care. The underlying individual capabilities in all 
of these cases require legal structures, law, and social institutions, not 
just unimpeded individual initiative. Without the ACA, our ability to 
live a healthy life is frustrated by poverty that prevents the purchase of 
insurance; without FMLA, our ability to care for dependents and remain 
employed-our ability to participate in both family and work life-is 
hampered by our inability to share the burden of caring for newborns; 
without gun control laws, our ability to move freely through our neigh-
borhoods is hampered by our fears for our own physical security; with-
out education laws, our abilities to participate in high culture as well as 
in an educated workforce and public sphere is severely limited by igno-
rance and illiteracy. We cannot do any of this on our own, basically, and, 
per Paine, that is where and why civil rights enter the picture. 
Finally, civil rights are aspirational rather than positivistic. They are 
not a listing of what the state has provided through law. Rather, they are 
rights the state should protect, even if it does not. The positivistic civil 
rights we have, in other words, are an imperfect and incomplete recor-
dation of the civil rights we are owed. Thus, while we have perfected, 
more or less, the right to contract, which the 1866 Civil Rights Act aimed 
to guarantee to freed slaves as well as white men, we have clearly not 
perfected, in our labor law, a fully recognized legal right to good and 
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decently paid labor.59 We may have a "civil right," then, to a decentjob 
at decent wages, but we clearly do not have a legal right to one. Quite 
the contrary: the antidiscrimination right to employment opportunities 
exists against the backdrop of an employment-at-will regime that in fact 
guarantees very much the opposite. Likewise, we may have a "civil right" 
to a high-quality education, as evidenced in part by the rhetoric and jus-
tifications given our rights to "individualized educational plans" if we 
suffer disabilities, our rights "not to be left behind" if we suffer impover-
ished school placements, and the inclusion of a constitutional right to a 
good education in most state constitutions, which guarantees some mea-
sure of intrastate-although not interstate-equality. But we do not have 
a secure and legally recognized legal right to a high-quality education 
across the board. We may have a civil right to health care, as evidenced 
in part by a right we now have to purchase insurance at reasonable rates 
under the Affordable Care Act, but that is obviously a highly contingent 
as well as contested and vulnerable right: we do not have a robust legally 
recognized right to either health or health care. We have various legal 
rights under the Violence Against Women Act, but we do not yet have 
anything like a full recognition of a civil right to be free of intimate vio-
lence. Yet the civil rights to employment, education, safe intimacy, and 
health are nevertheless the aspirational rights that we "have," even if only 
imperfectly secured by these statutes. 
Now, let me contrast this conception of civil rights-Paine's under-
standing, basically-with the conventional and truncated understanding 
of a civil right that I believe wrongly dominates our civil rights conver-
sations. Civil rights, as I believe they should be defined, facilitate forms 
of individual participation in the civic community that promote fun-
damental individual capabilities, such as our capabilities for intimacy, 
work, physical security, health, engagement in mental and cultural life, 
and neighborliness, and they do so through guaranteeing access to the 
laws that structure the civic institutions that promote or protect them. 
Rights to contract, property, employment, and so on facilitate participa-
tion in aspects of civic life that enhance our individual capabilities for 
work, family, health, and sociability. Civil rights to nondiscrimination 
guarantee that access to those rights is equally shared, regardless of race 
and gender. This much of the Paine an view is consistent with what I have 
labeled the conventional view. 
The differences, however, are significant. First, and as I have stressed 
throughout, the Painean conception, unlike the traditional, centers 
rather than ignores the content of the underlying civil rights protected 
by the antidiscrimination norm: rights to contract, employment oppor-
tunities, education, and so on. Second, the Painean conception is aspira-
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tional, meaning rooted in natural as well as positive law: the civil rights 
we have are those rights we should have, not just the rights we have 
already won. Our civil rights are not exhausted by the rights to con-
tract, property, employment, and educational opportunities protected 
by extant Civil Rights Acts but also include rights to marriage, physical 
security, safe intimacy, health and longevity, participation in family life, 
and our capacity for meaningful work, all of which are intimated but 
nevertheless only imperfectly protected by existing law. Third, and as 
I will elaborate below, civil rights, so understood, are neither consti-
tutional rights nor quasi-constitutional rights: their recognition might 
be necessary to further particular constitutional guarantees, but their 
meaning, their reach, and their jurisprudential implications are not 
defined or limited by those guarantees or the constitutional texts that 
provide them. They are determined by our nature, not by our law, con-
stitutional or otherwise. Fourth, "civil rights" so understood are rights to 
the state support, state law, and state institutions that are necessary to 
their enjoyment. Under the Painean view as I have constructed it here, 
this positivity is a central feature of those rights definitionally rather 
than an awkward and contingent feature that clumsily contrasts with 
the overwhelming negativity of the constitutional rights with which civil 
rights are often grouped under the traditional view. 
Last, the barriers to the full development of our capabilities that relate 
to community participation and that require law for their perfection, on 
the Painean conception, do not end with discrimination, either public or 
private. Poverty, poor education, poor health care, and vulnerability to 
violence are also barriers. Laws that seek to counter those barriers, no 
less than laws that seek to counter discrimination, on this understand-
ing of the rights at the heart of "civil rights;' are core, not peripheral, 
examples of Civil Rights Acts. Collectively, civil rights laws all guarantee 
rights to which we are entitled by virtue of our membership in society. 
Some, but not all, do so by providing "rights to those rights" against pri-
vate or public discrimination. They all, though, confer rights to partici-
pate in civic structures that are products oflaw: public education, public 
markets in insurance, secure and safe unarmed communities protected 
by a trustworthy police force, and structured and legally mandated sup-
port in the aftermath of a child's birth. Laws that do so, such as the 
VAWA, ACA, NCLB, IDEA, FLSA, and FEMA, whether or not they aim at 
discriminatory public or private conduct, are also, quintessentially, civil 
rights laws. 
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II. Constitutional and Civil Rights: One Contrast 
Are civil rights, both those protected by the Civil Rights Acts and civil 
rights more generally, best understood as constitutional or quasi-
constitutional rights? A number of commentators over the last ten years, 
including Bruce Ackerman in his Holmes lectures on the subject, have 
suggested, or argued, as much.60 It is easy to see why this collapsing of 
civil and constitutional rights is a prudentially attractive suggestion: if 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act can be regarded as an extended con-
stitutional moment and civil rights, therefore, as constitutional rights, 
then neither the courts nor subsequent congresses should trim them, 
cut them back, repeal them, or find them unconstitutional for any but 
the gravest of reasons. Constitutionalizing them, in effect, gives them 
some measure of permanence as well as stature against potentially hos-
tile future configurations of congresses and courts. It is also a doctrinally 
logical suggestion, particularly if we think of civil rights as antidiscrim-
ination rights: understood as antidiscrimination rights, civil rights, like 
the Court's equal protection doctrine, are attempts to give content to 
the general promises of equality embedded in the Constitution's Four-
teenth Amendment. And antidiscrimination is now the heart of the 
Court's equal protection doctrine. So: if civil rights are antidiscrim-
ination rights, and antidiscrimination rights are constitutional rights, 
then, ergo, civil rights must be constitutional rights, or at least quasi-
constitutional rights, as well. 
It is important to note that the doctrinal syllogismjust spelled out does 
not work: even if the framers of the Civil Rights Acts were reinterpret-
ing section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in devising rights of antidis-
crimination, it by no means follows that that is all they were doing. And 
indeed, it is not all they were doing, as I hope I have already shown. 
There are, however, prudential reasons as well to resist what is essen-
tially a rhetorical and strategic conflation of civil rights on the one hand 
with constitutional rights on the other. The major reason is simply this: 
even if constitutional and civil rights are overlapping categories-some 
civil rights are also constitutional rights, and vice versa-and even 
though civil rights also target the inequality prohibited by the Four-
teenth Amendment, which of course they do, nevertheless, there are 
vast differences between civil rights, at least on the Painean conception 
I have outlined above and particularly our contemporary constitutional 
rights. Those differences are simply obscured, or muted, if we blur the 
distinctions between them. Once we include within the scope of "civil 
rights" the underlying rights those civil rights acts protect-if, that is, 
we examine civil rights in the Painean sense as to include the rights 
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protected against discrimination rather than just the antidiscrimination 
right itself-it is clear that civil rights contrast, far more than they com-
pare, with constitutional rights and particularly with the newly discov-
ered constitutional rights that have been recognized, argued for, or con-
templated over the last twenty or so years. Painean civil rights and con-
stitutional rights so understood are not only, then, not co-constitutive of 
constitutional law. They are also, increasingly, on a collision course, and 
it might be wise not to obscure that fact. Let me just draw out this con-
trast. 
The civil rights I have focused on in this chapter-both the historic 
nineteenth-century civil rights to enjoy property, contract, physical 
security, and public accommodations, and rights to sue for wrongs, and 
also our modern civil rights to a high-quality publicly funded educa-
tion, family and medical leave, access to health insurance, trustworthy 
police protection against intimate, private, or neighborhood violence, 
rights to marry, and rights to decent labor and employment opportuni-
ties-are all rights to be included in a participatory public life. As noted 
above, Professor Zeitlow calls the antidiscrimination rights the Acts cre-
ated "rights of belonging"; I would say, I think more inclusively, that 
the civil rights protected by those antidiscrimination rights are rights 
toenter. They are rights to enter schoolhouses, workplaces, homes, mar-
riages, neighborhoods, and so on. Understood as such, civil rights con-
trast-not compare-with a group of constitutional rights that cover 
much of the same lived geography; that have been sought, recognized, 
or argued for over the last thirty years; and that I have elsewhere called 
"rights to exit": the still-contested but increasingly recognized constitu-
tional right to homeschool one's children;61 the constitutional right to 
die62 and the right to not buy health insurance;63 the Second Amend-
ment right to own a gun and use it in self-defense;64 the ever-embattled 
constitutional right to procure an abortion;65 and, most recently, the 
right of religious schools to exemptions from antidiscrimination law 
for the hiring of their "ministerial" teachers66 and the right of religious 
employers to exemptions from the ACA to protect the sensitivities of 
conscience.67 The contrast between the civil right to enter and the con-
stitutional right to exit can be drawn most sharply one by one. Thus, 
the civil right to public education, in contrast to the constitutional right 
to withdraw one's children from school and homeschool them, reflects 
values of shared sacrifice and common purpose, both in the ways in 
which it is funded and in the content of what is conveyed. The civil right 
is a right to enter a public world of education, while the constitutional 
right is a right to exit it. The civil right to unpaid leave during a child's 
infancy is aimed at permitting a parent to enter a familial and parental 
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relation rather than providing a constitutional right to exit such a rela-
tion through abortion. It imposes a responsibility on the community 
of shareholders, customers, and co-employees for the shared burden of 
the costs of the care required to nurture newborns or sick family mem-
bers, rather than an individual right to avoid those costs by aborting the 
fetus. Again, it is a right to enter a world of shared responsibility for par-
enting, while the constitutional right is a right to exit both the biologi-
cal relationship with the fetus and with other potential caregivers. The 
civil rights to physical security implied by VAWA and decent gun control 
laws create a community of trust and shared interest among commu-
nity members who have laid down their arms and a state's police force, 
rather than a distrust of either the competency or the desires of the 
police to provide that protection, reflected in the Second Amendment's 
right to arms. The civil right is a right to enter that social compact of 
protection for forbearance, while the constitutional right is a right to exit 
it. The civil righ t to health care spreads the burden of sickness and illness 
over a community through the mechanism of shared risk rather than 
on an individual's constitutional right to either self-insure, self-help, or 
commit suicide. The civil right to health care is a right to enter a civil 
world of shared risk, cross-subsidizing insurance, and, at the end of life, 
communal hospice care, while constitutional rights to die and to refuse 
insurance arc rights to exit just those worlds. And of course, the civil 
rights to nondiscrimination-the rights of belonging, as Zeitlow dubs 
them-protect rights to enter employment and education institutions, 
while the "freedom of the church" now being pressed by scholars and 
to some extent by courts protects the rights of churches and the schools 
and hospitals they sponsor to exit those laws, through blanket exemp-
tions and various "ministerial exceptions." In each of these examples, the 
civil right, unlike the constitutional one, not only envisions a commu-
nity constituted by the civil right to enter but also rests on an assump-
tion of trust and common purpose between the individual holder of the 
civil right and his co-citizens-parents, teachers, neighbors, and taxpay-
ers sharing the burden of educating children; employers, coworkers, and 
customers of an enterprise as partners in the financing and support of 
new parents; a community of insured individuals and medical profes-
sionals sharing the burdens and risks of sickness of each member-and 
between neighborhoods and police empowered to minimize violence in 
responsible and humane ways. 
In other work,68 I have put forward the claim that these constitutional 
"exit rights" represent the first wave of an emerging new paradigm 
of constitutional individual rights. Unlike earlier First, Fourteenth, and 
Fourth Amendment rights valorized during the first two-thirds of the 
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last century, this new generation of rights-rights to homeschool, to own 
and use a gun in self-defense, to procure an abortion, to die, to refuse 
health insurance, and to exempt oneself from antidiscrimination law by 
referencing one's conscience or ministerial role-are rights that facili-
tate not just the liberty of individuals within the confines of civic life but 
also a quite extreme form of "exit" from civic life and from the com-
munity and the state that structure it. They guarantee exit from some 
aspect of the social contract that defines civil society. The constitutional 
right to own a gun and to use it in self-defense is a right to not partici-
pate in-to exit-the traditional liberal social compact by which we dis-
arm-relinquish our right to self-help-in exchange for the sovereign's 
duty to protect us from private violence. It envisions an erected wall of 
distance, difference, and lethality not only between the individual gun 
owner and the intruder who endangers his life and interrupts his soli-
tude but also between the individual gun owner and the state and its 
police force who have failed to protect him, the community from which 
intruders come, and neighbors who must be kept at bay. It is a right to 
exit that part of the social contract constituted by the trade of one's right 
to self-help in exchange for the civil right to protection from private vio-
lence. The constitutional right to die is a right to exit not just life itself 
and all of its biological ties but also the social compact by which that 
life is protected against self-abnegation. It protects the most isolated, 
solitary, noncommunitarian act an individual can possibly make against 
the paternalistic interventions of community, family, medicine, or state. 
The abortion right, as well, obviously older but consistent with these 
newer rights, is a right to exit an unwanted relationship not only with 
the fetal life within but also from the community, family, or state that 
seeks to protect it. Both killing oneself and aborting fetal life do, after all, 
like killing an intruder in justified self-defense, sever earthly coils. The 
right to homeschool one's children with no supervision from a school or 
school board, recognized by some lower courts as well as by school dis-
tricts in several cash-strapped states, is similarly a "right to exit" from the 
civic and shared project of intergenerational public education with its 
shared liberal norms of tolerance, pluralism, and feminism. The home-
schooling parent seeks to exit the shared communal project of educa-
tion as well as, oftentimes, its shared goal: a civic life informed by norms 
of tolerance, gender and racial equality, and individual, but civic, auton-
omy. The right to not buy health insurance, heartily insisted upon by 
Chief Justice Roberts as well as numerous com.mentators is likewise a 
"right to exit"-this time, from the shared societal project of pooling 
health risks through the mandatory purchase of insurance. All of these 
newfound rights (the oldest of the group being the abortion right) are 
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echoes of the much older Lochner-era contract right, which, within the 
context of employment, confers an explicit right to "exit," at will, the 
employment relation. 
In all of these cases, the individual's constitutional exit right is, in form, 
a negative right protecting individual liberty against an intrusive state. 
But they are not only that. Exit rights protect not just an individual's 
liberty within a community but, more radically, an individual's willed 
separation from the community or from some threatening part of it: a 
moralistic state with its intrusive sonograms and impediments to repro-
ductive choice; a totalitarian state with its threatening black helicopters; 
an incompetent state with its ineffectual police force and poor educa-
tional pedagogy; a liberal state with its offending teachers preaching 
noxious norms of inclusion and respect; or a nanny state with its manda-
tory insurance policy and its forced sharing of risk and coshouldering of 
costs. In every one of these cases, the constitutional right found by the 
Supreme Court or ardently desired by advocates is not only not a civil 
"right of belonging," quasi or otherwise. It is the antithesis of one. The 
constitutional right protects the individual's right to exit the very com-
munity that the civil right, at least on the Painean conception, protects, 
nurtures, and seeks to promote. Civil rights and constitutional rights are 
not mutually constitutive. They are on a collision course. 
Let me draw out one further contrast. Part of what is distinctive about 
exit rights-rights to homeschool, to kill oneself, to abort a pregnancy, 
to refuse to buy health insurance, to exercise lethal self-help against vio-
lence-is their tragic hue. They protect a radical separation of the self 
from others or, at best, an extreme alienation from the civic national 
community: the homeschooled child is homeschooled precisely in 
order to maintain or erect a strict separation from that community; 
the health insurance holdout wants nothing to do with an obligation 
to support co-citizens in a mutual web of obligation toward a mutual 
goal of a healthier community; the gun owner risks his own death and 
that of loved ones as the price he willingly pays for his rights of self-
defense against hostile outsiders and an ineffectual (or worse) police 
force; the "free contractor" from the Lochner era deals with unhelpful 
co-contracting employees or employers through the right to exit at will; 
the suicidal individual and the woman obtaining an abortion are both 
dealing in death. And, in each case, the constitutional exit right separates 
the individual from some feared part of the physical, biological com-
munity: from a fetus that may threaten a woman's life or well-being, a 
threatening intruder that endangers a homeowner's life, a public school 
teacher with liberal norms of forced ideological inclusion and equal-
ity, and, most poignantly, the suicidal individual from his own pained 
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body. All of this recalls, if nothing else, classical definitions of tragedy: in 
the last act of Shakespearean or classical tragedy, the characters wind up 
dead on the stage, with the community or state from which they came 
torn asunder. In constitutional tragedies, those dead individuals as well 
as those who killed them are shrouded in rights. 
Painean civil rights, by contrast, are comedic rather than tragic. The 
last act of a comedy typically culminates in a community ritual, such as 
a wedding celebration or the birth of a child, that reaffirms the value of 
a shared, communal life, both for the individuals involved and for the 
larger society. Our civil rights are "comedic" in precisely this way. If Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act is working properly, then the last scene of the 
last act of that legal drama is a workplace that is actually integrated, not 
a society of atomistic individuals who have rights against irrational state 
classifications. If Title IX is functioning properly, then in the last act, 
universities and colleges are healthier communities: women are actu-
ally playing on sports teams and African Americans are actually partic-
ipating in classrooms. When the Family Medical Leave Act is working 
properly, actual workers tend to dependents in their real-life families, 
creating stronger communities in both homes and workplaces. The par-
ent nurtures the newborn child, or the adult child cares for the par-
ent, without fear of losing her place in the workforce. When civil rights 
to education are secured, then the classroom is public, in all senses of 
the word-publicly funded, publicly supported, open to all comers, and 
serving the public that funds it. It educates for citizenship and fulfill-
ing lives. When labor rights are enjoyed, workplaces are healthier, better 
paid, and more participatory. With the civil right to marry secured, the 
couple weds, in a ritual of communal reaffirmation, toward the end of 
a communally recognized shared life. With the civil right to gun safety 
and gun control, the neighborhood is safe, and the individual and her 
community are supported and healthy. In the last act of comedy, not just 
individuals but also the communities in which they live are on stage, cel-
ebrating the civil rights that unite and support them. 
There is, it is important to note, nothing Dionysian or even romantic 
about any of this. These rituals are made possible by law, and lots of 
it-not by an inherently sociable nature. All of these rituals-a marriage, 
the opening of a school, the integration of a workplace, the care of a 
newborn, the policing of a neighborhood-are not just dependent upon 
but fully constituted by law and legalism. The workplace is a prod-
uct of contract, property, and labor law; the parent's nurturance of a 
newborn without fearing loss of employment is a product of an act of 
Congress; the safe neighborhood is the end result of the social com-
pact that exchanges, at its core, the natural right of self-help with the 
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mutual obligations of a communally funded and manned police force; 
the healthy individual owes her health to the pooling of risk, itself facili-
tated by a set of tax and spending acts of Congress; and civil marriage, as 
commentators on all sides of the debates surrounding its expansion have 
noted, 69 is a product of law and legalism, not of faith traditions. There 
is nothing particularly romantic, and certainly nothing anarchic, about 
any of these rights. Health care is not something we enjoy by nature's 
bounty; it is something we enjoy if we have structured our commu-
nity and its laws in a way that is conducive to pooled risk. Education is 
not something that a child will pick up willy-nilly if we would but leave 
him to his own devices; it is a highly structured product of law, bureau-
cracy, deliberation, compromise, and pedagogy. Safe neighborhoods are 
not the spontaneous flowering of a natural Homo sapiens community in 
Walden Pond; they are the deliberate outcome of a self-motivated con-
tract through which we exchange our own natural rights of self-defense 
for a web of communal protection. Our own health is not something 
we will enjoy in a state of nature; quite the contrary, our lives in such a 
state would be both nasty and short, even without the brutishness of oth-
ers. It is something that is produced through effective law facilitating the 
production and distribution of effective medicine and medical care. An 
integrated workforce and access to fair labor is not the natural product 
of a primitive instinct to bargain or unstructured, spontaneous contracts 
without need of public enforcement. Rather, it is the product oflegalistic 
constraints on those instincts. Civil rights speak to our capabilities, our 
respect for community, and our recognition of how law is in service to 
those communal instincts. They speak to law's virtue and law's necessity, 
not to law's mendacity or irrelevance. T hey are, in short, rights to law, 
not rights to be free of it. We would not enjoy the goods they promise or 
the capabilities they protect-health, education, welfare, safe neighbor-
hoods, decent work, family, and marriage-without law's presence. 
Ill. Conclusion: Civil Violence, Civil Rights 
In contemporary usage, we tend to conflate civil rights and the idea of 
civil rights with the antidiscrimination laws that protects those rights. 
This is a mistake. Antidiscrimination laws protect us from unequal 
enforcement of our civil rights, particularly where that unequal enforce-
ment is due to racial discrimination or classification on the basis of irra-
tional criteria. Our civil rights, though, are not simply the rights we 
have to that nondiscrimination. Rather, they are rights to participate in 
our community in all of the ways peculiarly facilitated by law, which 
we have a right to enjoy free of the discrimination that would deprive 
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us of them. By conflating the antidiscrimination norm with the civil 
rights that norm protects, we have unnecessarily truncated the natural 
development of our understanding of the contribution our very civil law 
makes to our very civil society, and to the aspects of the good life that 
civil law facilitates, and for which law is so architecturally central. 
By way of conclusion, look again at the killing ofTrayvon Martin, the 
trial of George Zimmerman for that death, and its aftermath. The fail-
ure to find Zimmerman guilty of second-degree murder70 may or may 
not be attributable, in part or whole, to either intentional or uninten-
tional racism on the part of the jury, the judge, the community, the pros-
ecutors, the expert witnesses, the police force, and the defense team. If 
it was, then there may have been a violation of not only the antidis-
crimination norm in the abstract but also Martin's civil rights, both as I 
have defined them here and as traditionally defined, primarily to secu-
rity and protection. But whether that is the case or not, there is another 
violation of Trayvon Martin's civil rights revealed by that tragedy that 
is not fundamentally a function of racism-although it is certainly exac-
erbated by it. "Stand your ground" laws,71 as well as newly broadened 
self-defense laws that expand the scope of permissible violence in alter-
cations,12 basically expand the scope of justified lethal force to include 
all scenarios in which a combatant is in fear for his life, regardless of 
who or what triggered the fight that put him there. You can, that is, 
stalk someone so long as your "stalking" is itself legal, pick a fight with 
him, find yourself losing that fight, consequently fear for your own life, 
and then fire a gun with the intent and hope to kill, all in justified self-
defense. That is what Zimmerman did. Martin's mistake was to fight his 
stalker, and effectively. 
Zimmerman's justified lethal violence, because it was lawful "self-
defense," was not criminal. That which is not criminal is legal. So, when 
we expand self-defense law with stand-your-ground laws and simulta-
neously protect rights to carry weapons, we have in effect changed the 
terms of our civil, or social compact: some measure of public, "civic vio-
lence" is now fully permitted that was fully criminal a very short time 
ago. When we embrace broad defenses that shrink the sphere of crim-
inal lethal violence, we not only expand the scope of permissible indi-
vidual self-help in altercations; we also shrink the sphere of the pacific 
civility that is expected of us in our public as well as private spaces. If 
a combatant is permitted to carry a gun, start a fight, and then "stand 
his ground," regardless of what he did to trigger the assault, virtually 
every fist fight, regardless of how it began, becomes, potentially, a justi-
fied homicide. The sphere of peaceful coexistence-of community-is 
gravely reduced. 
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It seems to me that on Paine's understanding, this entire body of newly 
made law, with state statutory and U.S. constitutional underpinnings 
both, far more clearly than the jury verdict acquitting his killer, is a mas-
sive violation of Trayvon Martin's civil rights. By virtue of its enact-
ment, Martin's civil right to the enjoyment of his physical security and 
his equally civil right to the state's protection of his physical security are 
what was not protected that night on his walk back from the store to his 
father's apartment. The core civil right, Paine urged, is the right to the 
state's protection of one's physical security. That protection, to which we 
have a right, is and must be provided by the state; it is the paradigmatic 
right that we cannot perfect on our own. The authors of the 1871 Ku 
Klux Klan Ace3 realized this. The authors of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized this. The authors of the late 
twentieth century's Violence Against Women Act recognized this. The 
authors of our various Criminal Codes recognize this. Yet somehow, we 
have lost track of the civil rights underpinning of our right to be pro-
tected by the state against private violence. Instead, we shrink the scope 
of the right to be protected while constitutionalizing various rights to kill 
each other. I am not urging a massive enlargement of our overly puni-
tive criminal justice system. But it hardly follows from the sad fact that 
our criminal justice system is unjust that what we should do is return the 
streets to the armed. The result of the abandonment of the civil right 
to protection against violence, and the civil duty of the state to provide 
it, whether through the defunding of police forces or the expanding of 
"self-defense" principles, is and will continue to be carnage-in homes, 
schools, and on public streets. 
That carnage, no less than discriminatory law enforcement, is a central 
civil rights issue of our age. It should not need to rear its head only in 
the aftermath of spectacularly tragic public killings of innocents. There 
is now no question but that this breach of our civil rights-the failure of 
the state to protect all of us against private violence-affects blacks more 
than whites, and black youth far more than white youth. It is young black 
men and boys, more than white men, who are targeted not only by ordi-
nary crime but also by vigilante neighborhood watch groups staffed by 
white men carrying guns and whose death-dealing acts of killing can 
then be tallied as justifiable homicide. The "civil right," then, of which 
young black men are deprived, is not only the right to be free of discrim-
inatory policing, discriminatory profiling, and discriminatory sentenc-
ing policies, but it is also the civil right to live out their lives without fear 
of intimate and neighborly-and, as it turns out, fully legal-violence 
every time they walk from their homes to their neighborhood stores. 
Both they and all the rest of us are deprived of that right by virtue 
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of neutral-sounding expansions of our self-defense laws, stand-your-
ground laws, open carry laws, and constitutionally grounded gun rights, 
all of which, collectively, have a horrifically adverse impact on minority 
communities. But the existence of the civil right these laws offend does 
not depend on such a showing. The thoroughly positive right to thor-
oughly positive, state-provided protection against thoroughly private 
violence is a-maybe the-quintessential civil right: it is a right that 
can only be realized through the enactment of positive law and its fair 
enforcement. It is the civil right to the protection of the state against 
the private violence occasioned upon him by George Zimmerman, as 
accomplished here through the state of Florida's quite intentional 
shrinkage of their criminal law of homicide, which was denied Trayvon 
Martin. 
A civil right, again, is a civil right to law-in this case, to laws crim-
inalizing private violence. That civil right cannot be realized through 
negative rights to be free of law, nor can it be realized by rights to be 
free of state or private discrimination. It cannot even be seen, in fact, 
as a civil right as long as we remain besotted by our negative constitu-
tional rights to be free of the state, leavened only by our insistence that 
the state not irrationally discriminate between us. Neither of the two 
dominant understandings of rights that circulate in our contemporary 
legal culture-our understanding of our beloved negative constitutional 
rights that shrink the role of the state in our lives or our limited under-
standing of our equally cherished civil rights to nondiscrimination-no 
matter how seriously we regard them, will be much help on this one. 
All the constitutional rights and antidiscrimination rights in the world 
would not have helped Trayvon Martin against George Zimmerman's 
fully legal lethal force. For that, we need to regenerate interest in and 
commitment to the rights to civil society, including Martin's vital civil 
rights to physical security and mobility, envisioned by early and forgot-
ten architects of our classical civil rights tradition. 
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On Class-Not-Race 
Samuel R. Bagenstos 
Throughout the civil rights era, strong voices have argued that policy 
interventions should focus on class or socioeconomic status, not race. 
At times, this position-taking has seemed merely tactical, opportunistic, 
or in bad faith. Many who have opposed race-based civil rights inter-
ventions on this basis have not turned around to support robust efforts 
to reduce class-based or socioeconomic inequality. That sort of oppor-
tunism is interesting and important for understanding policy debates in 
civil rights, but it is not my focus here. I am more interested here in 
the people who clearly mean it. For example, President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson-who can hardly be accused of failing to support robust race-
based or class-based interventions-advised Dr. Martin Luther King 
after Congress passed the Voting Rights Act that the race-neutral, class-
based Great Society programs had to be counted on to eliminate race 
inequality from that point forward.1 William Julius Wilson famously 
argued that our policies should focus on "the truly disadvantaged" of all 
races and spelled out a rather aggressive approach to promoting eco-
nomic development in American cities.2 And Richard Kahlenberg and 
Richard Sander have urged that universities should get rid of race-based 
affirmative action in admissions but replace that policy with preferences 
for members of disadvantaged socioeconomic groups.3 
Calls for class-not-race interventions are likely to grow stronger over 
the next few years. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Fisher v. Uni-
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versity ofTexas atAustin4-which did not formally change the law govern-
ing affirmative action in higher education admissions but did highlight 
the vulnerability of the policy with the current Supreme Court-has 
been read by some commentators as auguring a decisive turn toward 
class-based affirmative action.5 The Supreme Court's decision uphold-
ing Michigan's state constitutional prohibition on race-based affirmative 
action in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action6 predictably 
led to renewed calls for class-based preferences? This, then, seems an 
opportune time to examine the class-not-race position that underlies 
them. 
There is a lot that can be said about the beyond-race interventions 
favored by class-not-race advocates. And I say a lot of it elsewhere.8 
Here, I want to focus on a single aspect of the argument. I want to 
develop an understanding of what sincere advocates of the class-not-
race position mean and offer an initial assessment of whether that posi-
tion is a sensible one. 
It seems to me that sincere advocates of the class-not-race position are 
making one of two distinct arguments. The first argument is basically 
a strategic one. That argument accepts that racial inequality is a funda-
mental problem that we must attack. It argues, however, that for a vari-
ety of pragmatic reasons, race-targeted approaches are not likely to be 
the most successful ways of attacking them. There is much to this argu-
ment, but it seems to suffer a basic flaw. Problems of race inequality go 
well beyond problems of economic or class inequality. And there is a lot 
of reason to believe that efforts to respond to class inequality that do not 
take race into account either will not help or actually will exacerbate race 
inequality. I discuss those points in Part I below. 
These points lead to the second distinct argument that advocates of 
the class-not-race position may be making. That argument is that race 
inequality is not in fact the fundamental problem that we should attack 
but is at best an example or a consequence of class or economic inequal-
ity. If we have a limited reservoir of enforcement resources, redistrib-
utive largesse, or public compassion, the argument implies, we should 
focus that reservoir on eliminating class-based inequality. I think some 
argument like this explains why many people influenced by traditional 
left politics support the class-not-race position. But I nonetheless believe 
that the argument is wrongheaded. The problem of racial inequality 
overlaps with, but is importantly distinct from, economic disadvantage. 
I discuss these points in Part II. 
In Part III, I assess the prospects for getting beyond the class-not-race 
position. Although I find some reasons for hope on this score, I am, ulti-
mately, pessimistic. 
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I. The Strategic Argument for Class-Not-Race 
Many of the reasons offered for the class-not-race position are essen-
tially strategic. These arguments assert not that class-not-race is superior 
as a matter of principle or first-best policy but that approaches that tar-
get class instead of race are more likely to succeed in the political or 
legal process than are approaches that focus directly on race. This is 
most apparent in the context of affirmative action. Many of the advo-
cates of class-based affirmative action-particularly after the Supreme 
Court decisions making race-based affirmative action more difficult to 
defend-believe that targeting class rather than race will place the prac-
tice of affirmative action on stronger legal ground. The legal-doctrinal 
argument is certainly a key talking point for some of the most promi-
nent advocates of class-based affirmative action.9 
Viewed purely as a tactical gambit to shore up the legality of affir-
mative action, it is unclear whether a focus on class instead of race will 
work. Under current doctrine, it is a nice question whether admissions 
preferences for people of particular socioeconomic statuses are consti-
tutional when they are motivated by a desire to achieve a particular 
racial outcome. The argument that they are unconstitutional involves 
a seemingly straightforward application of Washington v. Davis10 and its 
progeny (which held that race-neutral practices that are motivated by 
race are the equivalent of racial classifications) and Adarand Construc-
tors v. Pena11 and its progeny (which held that the constitutionality of 
racial classifications is the same no matter which race is benefited or bur-
dened). We know that if a school adopted a class-based preference for 
applicants from higher socioeconomic classes and did so with an aim of 
increasing the proportion of whites that are admitted, that action would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Given Adarand's holding that equal 
protection analysis does not depend on which race is burdened or bene-
fited, shouldn't the result be the same when a school adopts a preference 
for applicants oflower socioeconomic classes, with an aim of increasing 
the proportion of minorities who are admitted?12 
But the Court has never been called on to add up the Davis and 
Adarand lines of cases in this precise way. And there are substantial rea-
sons to think that it will balk before ruling race-motivated but class-
based affirmative action unconstitutionai.13 One is that in its cases inval-
idating affirmative action programs, the Court has looked carefully to 
ensure that race-neutral means could not achieve the same ends.14 
Although that analysis does not logically compel the conclusion that 
race-neutral affirmative action programs are constitutional, a contrary 
conclusion would stand in great tension with it. Moreover, Justice 
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Kennedy's pivotal concurrence in the Parents Involved case15 suggests that 
he would vote to uphold class-based affirmative action programs. In that 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy explained his decision to provide the fifth 
vote to invalidate race-based student assignment plans in K-12 schools. 
He indicated that race-neutral efforts to achieve diversity and overcome 
racial isolation would be constitutional-and indeed probably would not 
even be subject to strict scrutiny.16 As a pure predictive matter, then, it 
seems unlikely that five justices on this Supreme Court would invalidate 
class-based affirmative action. 
Other strategic arguments for the class-not-race position are political 
rather than legal in nature. William Julius Wilson emphasizes many of 
these points in THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED.17 Policies that aim overtly at 
protecting or advancing the interests of particular disadvantaged racial 
groups may be especially politically vulnerable. This may be because of 
implicit or overt racial bias in the political process, including the phe-
nomenon of selective sympathy and indifference.18 It may be because 
of a general support for color-blindness among the public and political 
leaders-a sense that race should not matter. (Query how much overlap 
there is between these two positions.) Or it may be because of simple 
majoritarianism. Policies that obviously provide benefits to a minority 
of the population may be politically vulnerable to efforts by the majority 
to get some of those benefits for itself. 
As Wilson makes explicit, these arguments tie rather directly to argu-
ments among social policy experts regarding targeted versus universal 
social-welfare policies.19 Many experts argue that social-welfare policies 
are more politically durable when they are framed in universal terms.20 
Means-tested programs like welfare (or, perhaps now, food stamps) are 
understood to be more vulnerable than universal social insurance pro-
grams like Social Security. There are a couple of reasons for this. One, 
again, is simple majoritarianism-if everyone feels they can benefit 
from a program, it will be easier to persuade them to support it than 
if they are paying for the benefit of someone else. Another is a sense 
of desert. Universal programs are more easily understood in solidaristic 
terms as a reciprocal covenant among all citizens. As a result, solidaristic 
and reciprocal principles of distribution make sense-one deserves to 
receive benefits because one is a citizen and has contributed to the sys-
tem.21 But the public expects one to prove desert for targeted benefits 
more specifically-if an individual is receiving government benefits to 
which other individuals are not entitled, the public expects the benefi-
ciaries to demonstrate that they really deserve them. As a result, targeted 
programs are administered in a much more stingy fashion than univer-
sal ones. And scandals regarding alleged waste, fraud, and abuse arise 
On Class-Not -Race 109 
far more easily in targeted programs and are far more likely to delegit-
imize those programs than they are to delegitimize universal programs 
of social insurance. 
This is a very controversial issue in the social policy world. Professors 
Schuck and Zeckhauser make a strong theoretical argument that tar-
geted programs more efficiently achieve their aims and therefore are 
more likely to draw political support than are less efficient universalist 
ones.22 Basic public choice theory also suggests that targeted programs 
will generate fervent support from their beneficiaries, while the broad 
spreading of the costs will dampen opposition from those who do not 
receive the benefits.23 (This point seems more plausible when the ben-
eficiaries are not as socially and politically disempowered as the bene-
ficiaries of race-based interventions, however.) And the empirical evi-
dence on targeting versus universalism is mixed. Social Security is, to 
be sure, far more politically stable than was welfare. But when we look 
at smaller programs for classes of poor people, the targeted ones (that 
focus on people with disabilities or children in poverty) have, on occa-
sion, seemed more resilient than the broader universalist ones.24 
In the race-versus-class context as well, the strategic argument for 
universalism is not obviously correct. For one thing, class-based inter-
ventions (like class-based affirmative action) may readily come to be 
understood in the public mind as really targeted toward m inorities.25 
That is particularly true because in many cases, the alternative to race-
based interventions is not universal social insurance; it is a policy that 
really is targeted at disadvantaged people, just a bit more broadly than 
at minorities. Think about welfare in this regard and the general axiom 
that programs for the poor are poor programs. One reason programs for 
the poor are politically vulnerable is that they are often associated in the 
public mind with racial minorities. Efforts to target class-based disad-
vantage as a way of eliminating racial disadvantage often are understood 
as being "really" about race and provoke political resistance accord-
ingly-a point George Romney, U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development from 1968 to 1973, learned when his efforts to achieve 
economic integration in housing provoked fierce resistance from white 
suburbanites who feared that racial integration would be the result.26 
William Julius Wilson's critique of the Great Society is apt here. Wilson 
argued that the Great Society's reliance on means-tested antipoverty 
programs associated it with minorities and made it politically vulner-
able.27 Unless efforts to focus on class rather than race take the form 
Wilson's effort does-by employing truly broad-scale economic devel-
opment programs- they will likely remain politically vulnerable as tar-
geted programs. And the truly universal proposals urged by Wilson and 
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others have virtually no hope of being achieved in our current politi-
cal environment, in which austerity sets the terms of economic policy 
debates. 
Class-based policies, then, may not be especially politically strong. 
And there may be circumstances in which programs targeted at racial 
minorities are quite strong politically-precisely because they appeal to 
a shared commitment to equal opportunity. To the extent that race-
focused programs are understood as overcoming the particular injustice 
of discrimination or the legacy of slavery and segregation, many people 
will see that disadvantage as not being the fault of the beneficiaries 
(unlike poverty in general). In those circumstances, candid use of race 
will be politically superior to the use of class as a proxy for race. 
I do not doubt, however, that class-focused approaches are likely to be 
more defensible, legally and politically, than race-focused ones in many 
cases. But this brings us to the deeper problem with the strategic argu-
ments for class-not-race. Recall that the premise of the strategic argu-
ment is that race-based injustice is a distinct and important concern that 
the law should address; the argument for class-not-race is that class is 
a more legally and politically stable way to address that concern than 
is targeting racial injustice directly. But that argument depends on class 
disadvantage being a good proxy for race disadvantage. And it is not. In 
other words, even if class is a more stable way of addressing the prob-
lem, it does not address the problem very well. In part, that is because 
there are so many more poor white people than poor minorities that any 
help to poor people in general dilutes what minorities get (assuming a 
sort of constant budget of compassion). But there is a more fundamental 
reason class disadvantage is not a good proxy for race disadvantage. The 
strategic argument assumes that racial disadvantage is a subset, a specific 
application, of class disadvantage-or at least that there is a large overlap 
between the two categories. There is certainly some overlap, but racial 
disadvantage is in fact quite distinct. Racial disadvantage in the United 
States involves economic deprivation, to be sure, but it also involves 
stigma and stereotypes with a variety of consequences for the day-to-
day lives of even economically advantaged members of racial minority 
groups.28 
And efforts to focus on class disadvantage may actually reinforce the 
structures that promote racial disadvantage. We know this, in part, from 
history. The New Deal took what was well understood as a class-not-
race approach. It led to substantial economic development. But because 
of the lines of eligibility its programs drew-lines that were formally 
race-neutral- it also entrenched racial hierarchy and subordination.29 
As insightful recent work by Jessica Clarke and KT Albiston argues, 
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these problems are not confined to history. 30 They argue that formally 
gender-neutral efforts to expand women's opportunities in the work-
place, like the Family and Medical Leave Act, have actually entrenched 
gender hierarchy in workplaces. Deborah Malamud makes the same 
point about class-based affirmative action.31 
I do not mean to deny that class-based approaches might be a possible 
second-best solution to the problem of racial disadvantage. Legal and 
political developments may substantially limit the prospect of relying 
on race-based approaches, so class-based ones might be the best avail-
able way of achieving those ends. But the same legal, and especially 
political, developments are likely to limit the utility of class-based 
approaches in achieving racial justice. If the class-not-race position is a 
purely strategic one, it is a deeply problematic one. 
II. The Substantive Argument for Class-Not-Race 
I have argued that class-based interventions are not likely to be an espe-
cially effective way of overcoming race-based disadvantage. But what if 
race-based disadvantage is not what we think of as the essential prob-
lem? What if the basic problem is class-based disadvantage? While race-
and class-based disadvantage overlapped in the past, one might argue, 
there is a substantial disconnect between the two problems now, and it is 
class, not race, on which our policy interventions should focus. I call this 
the substantive argument for class-not-race. This argument is implicit 
or explicit in many critiques of race-based affirmative action. Numer-
ous affirmative action critics ask why the child of the Huxtables, or of 
a rich African immigrant family, should get a preference over a poor 
white kid from Appalachia. William Julius Wilson asks why we should 
have policies that benefit the most advantaged blacks but do very little 
for the least advantaged blacks-those whom he called "the truly disad-
vantaged." The argument is basically that racial disadvantage may have 
at some point overlapped with class disadvantage but that the two have 
diverged. Now that they have diverged, we should identify which of 
these is the real problem. And, the advocates of class-not-race argue, the 
real problem is class. The influence of traditional left-wing thinking on 
this position is patent. 
There is obviously something to this argument. In a nation in which 
economic inequality continues to grow, and our public services shrink, 
life chances and opportunities depend greatly on the socioeconomic cir-
cumstances in which one is born.32 And this is true for people of all 
races. Policy interventions that focus on ameliorating economic inequal-
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ity and class disadvantage are important tools to attack this serious prob-
lem. 
But I think the substantive class-not-race argument ultimately reflects 
a category mistake in treating race-based policies as ultimately aimed 
at alleviating economic inequalities. Antidiscrimination law and affir-
mative action have of course provided economic advancement to some 
women and minority group members. And that is a significant goal 
of these bodies of law. Scholars tend to agree, in particular, that the 
first decade of enforcement of Title VII was associated with a dramatic 
increase in the earnings of African Americans relative to those of 
whites.33 
But why must we choose which is the reaL problem? Both economic 
inequality and racial disadvantage are, it seems to me, real problems. We 
can acknowledge that members of disadvantaged socioeconomic classes 
face common barriers to opportunity, whatever their race. And, as I have 
argued, there are more poor whites than there are poor blacks and Lati-
nos (though a much higher proportion of the black or Latino population 
than of the white population is poor). The problems of poor people of all 
races are best addressed by race-neutral programs of economic devel-
opment and public assistance. 
But race remains an important axis of disadvantage in America, even 
of its own accord. Some of this disadvantage is economic. Even middle-
and upper-middle-class blacks are more likely to hold that status pre-
cariously than whites. They have less wealth on average, they are more 
likely to have relatives in poverty, and they are more likely to have chil-
dren who are downwardly mobile economically.34 
Some of this disadvantage relates directly to continuing discrimina-
tion. Housing discrimination keeps African Americans segregated in 
less desirable neighborhoods, which limits educational opportunities.35 
Employment discrimination continues to limit job opportunities.36 Dis-
crimination extends beyond economic opportunities: use of race by law 
enforcement drives home the salience of race in the day-to-day lives 
of members of racial minority groups, for example.37 And racial bias 
in the criminal justice system has a pervasive effect on minority com-
munities.38 In a provocative recent paper, Betsey Stevenson and Justin 
Wolfers argue that "the fruits of the civil rights movement may lie" 
beyond economic opportunities but "in other, more difficult to docu-
ment, improvements in the quality of life-improvements that have led 
to rising levels of happiness and life satisfaction for some blacks."39 As 
they note, however, "these improvements have taken decades to be real-
ized, and even if current rates of progress persist, it will take several 
more decades to fully close the black-white happiness gap.''40 
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Much of this continuing race-based disadvantage results from subtle, 
unconscious, or implicit racial bias.41 But the disadvantage also results 
from the persistence of racial stereotypes. These stereotypes and biases 
make it necessary for minority group members in many jobs to engage 
in constant impression management to demonstrate that they do not 
conform to the stereotypes. This impression management imposes a 
significant personal cost. But it also can be self-defeating, by discourag-
ing the sort of risk-taking that leads to success in many employment set-
tings.42 (There is obviously a similar double-bind in the case of women 
in workplaces.) Even the most economically advantaged African Amer-
icans face these constraints, as the example of the fine line President 
Obama has had to walk in managing racialized expectations demon-
strates.43 
These problems are distinct from the problems of socioeconomic 
class. And we know that ameliorating economic inequality and disad-
vantage will not necessarily eliminate these problems of racial inequal-
ity. Rather, the most effective way we know to ameliorate problems of 
racial discrimination is an affirmative focus on promoting racial inte-
gration throughout society. Intergroup contact and work on common 
projects on terms of equality remain the best ways to break down stereo-
types and bias.44 Although there are substantial legal and political bar-
riers to achieving that goal-something I have lamented in my earlier 
work45-po1icies that specifically target racial discrimination and 
inequality are the first-best way to respond to those problems. To say 
that our policy should focus on class instead of race is to say that we 
should not address these problems. And I can think of no good substan-
tive, as opposed to strategic, argument for doing that. 
Ill. Class-and-Race: The Civil Rights Act and the Great Society 
I should emphasize that to be against class-not-race is not to favor the 
opposite policy-race-not-class. We live in a big, complex world, one 
with many axes of disadvantage. I do not know of any advocate for 
racial justice who is against ameliorating class-based injustice. Nobody 
seriously proposes including racial diversity as a factor in a higher-
education admissions policy but refusing to consider class or economic 
disadvantage. Advocates of expanded antidiscrimination law typically 
strongly support antipoverty laws and broad-based economic develop-
ment policies. Consider, in this regard, how race-oriented civil rights 
laws, antipoverty policies, and broad-based social insurance were all cru-
cial pieces of the Great Society. There may be tactical questions about 
how and when to press different pieces of the agenda, but there is no 
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reason we must choose to ameliorate disadvantages along only class or 
only race axes. 
Indeed, I would argue that the most effective social justice strategies 
are those that, like the Great Society, combine efforts to eliminate the 
effects of group-targeted discrimination with broader efforts to promote 
social welfare. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 guaranteed nondiscrimina-
tion in employment, which helped African Americans gain access to job 
opportunities that had previously been closed to them. But the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act, Head Start, and other Great Society 
Programs provided educational opportunities that made it more likely 
that more African Americans could take advantage of those new job 
opportunities. In my earlier work, I have argued that the Americans 
with Disabilities Act's effects on employment for people with disabilities 
have been significantly limited by the failure to pursue social welfare 
interventions (like universal health insurance and investment in accessi-
ble transportation) that would break down deep-rooted structural barri-
ers to employment.46 And women's workplace opportunities have been 
limited by both narrow interpretations of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act and the failure to provide child care and paid family leave; an effec-
tive solution to this problem would combine more robust antidiscrimi-
nation protections with more robust social provision.47 To make further 
progress against racial inequality will require both an aggressive effort to 
enforce antidiscrimination provisions and a broader focus on economic 
development and providing housing and educational opportunities.48 
So why do we have this endless fight? One reason I assumed away at 
the outset-bad faith. What about people who sincerely support class-
oriented, but not race-oriented, interventions? The essential reason, I 
think, is strategic, but in a broader sense than I discussed in Part I. For 
many years, one of the only commitments that united both edges of the 
progressive movement-those influenced by social democratic politics 
at the left edge and mainstream centrists at the right edge-was the con-
viction that identity politics was bad for the movement. Each faction had 
a slightly different reason for, or way of articulating, its position: those 
on the Left believed that identity politics undermined class solidarity 
among the working class, while the centrists believed that identity poli-
tics made it difficult to appeal to "mainstream" Americans. But however 
derived, the policy agenda of both the leftists and the centrists eschewed 
race-oriented solutions in favor of class-oriented ones. 
There is some reason to believe that political conditions now have 
evolved in a way that might make it possible for each of these factions 
newly to endorse race-focused interventions. Labor unions have 
achieved great success in recent years by appealing to identity politics 
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and incorporating race- and sex-focused goals into broader class-
focused ones. It appears, then, that identity politics need not undermine 
the class solidarity that those on the left of the progressive spectrum aim 
to achieve. And Barack Obama won two consecutive presidential elec-
tions by assembling a coalition of racial minorities, together with a size-
able minority of whites. So identity politics perhaps need not impede 
mainstream political success. In this environment, race-oriented inter-
ventions may seem less threatening to the success of progressive politics 
in general, and advocates of class-not-race may be persuaded to rethink 
the notion that there must be a choice between race- and class-based 
approaches. 
Yet there are substantial grounds for pessimism on this score. Despite 
the makeup of his electoral coalition, President Obama tended to 
emphasize class-focused remedies at the expense of race-focused 
ones.49 And the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence of antidiscrim-
ination law and affirmative action are likely to make race-focused inter-
ventions less tenable, at least for the near future. Ultimately, then, the 
class-not-race position may be the best we can do, despite its problems. 
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The Diversity Feedback Loop 
Patrick Shin, Devon Carbado, and Mitu Gulati 
I. Introduction 
By most accounts, the pursuit of racial diversity in the modern U.S. 
workplace is ubiquitous. The extent to which firms genuinely care about 
achieving it may be debatable, but assertions of commitment to a 
diverse workforce have become a familiar corporate refrain. But does all 
this routine talk of racial diversity square with the legal status of work-
place diversity initiatives? Arguably, there is a tension.1 Given recent 
developments, 2 it is uncertain whether Title VII permits race-conscious 
hiring measures that seek workplace racial diversity, especially if such 
measures do not fit the mold of traditional affirmative action plans 
designed to remedy "manifest imbalances" associated with past discrim-
ination.3 
This legal issue is one that the Supreme Court will eventually be called 
upon to resolve. In anticipation of that intervention, this chapter seeks 
to understand the significance of workplace affirmative action from a 
broader perspective that scholars have largely overlooked. We step back 
from the question of whether employer affirmative action can be doc-
trinally and theoretically justified by appeal to the value of diversity and 
examine, instead, the systemic role affirmative action plays in shaping 
workplace diversity. Significantly, our inquiry is not limited to work-
place affirmative action plans. We focus our attention on university 
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affirmative action plans as well. We do so to investigate the relation 
between workplace diversity and what we hypothesize to be a critical 
determinant: the diversity of the colleges and universities that feed the 
employment market. We examine, in short, the causal relation between 
diversity in the workplace and diversity in the student bodies of higher 
educational institutions. We describe this often overlooked relationship 
to situate race-conscious hiring by employers in the context of other 
important systemic factors that contribute to the production of work-
place diversity. Our hope is that the framework we employ will inform 
the debate about the legal permissibility of employer affirmative action 
that is sure to come. 
For purposes of the discussion, we assume that it is an open question 
whether employers can invoke the value of diversity to justify their affir-
mative action policies.4 We assume further that, as recently restated by 
the Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas,5 the value of diver-
sity can justify a university's consideration of race as one factor among 
many in deciding which applicants to admit. 6 Given the accepted value 
of diversity in the constitutional setting and the common goals of educa-
tional affirmative action and of Title VII in general,7 many have argued 
that affirmative action is as desirable and as necessary in the workplace 
context as it is in the university. The thinking is that, because workplaces 
should be in equipoise with universities with respect to realizing the 
benefits of diversity, the normative justifications for diversity and the 
policy mechanism for implementing it-affirmative action-should be 
transplanted from the educational context to the employment context.8 
Multiple scholars have endorsed some version of the "transplant" 
argument. 9 Some support their position with reference to the persis-
tence of historical employment inequalities in the modern workplace. 
Others highlight the purposes of Title VII. Still others invoke empirical 
evidence showing how the presence of diversity can reduce discrimina-
tory bias and harmful stereotyping. 
We do not argue that the transplant approach is mistaken. The benefits 
of educational and workplace diversity may indeed be comparable. The 
problem is that scholars who justify affirmative action in the workplace 
by analogy to the educational context overlook the implications of a 
crucial fact: the university and the workplace are not separate and dis-
tinct institutional settings in which diversity is or is not achieved. They 
are part of a causally connected system.10 This is no small thing. It 
means that the policies and practices surrounding diversity in each con-
text shape and influence the diversity that emerges in the other. Schol-
ars, policymakers, and judges have largely ignored this crucial dynamic. 
They continue to frame affirmative action practices in the workplace 
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and those at colleges and universities as disaggregated diversity mech-
anisms. This limits our ability to understand fully what is at stake with 
respect to overruling Grutter and/or prohibiting affirmative action in the 
workplace. In this respect, analyses of diversity-based affirmative action 
in the employment context or the educational context are incomplete 
unless they take into account the consequences that rules permitting or 
restricting such action in either domain are likely to have for the system 
as a whole. We examine these consequences by way of a model that we 
call the "diversity feedback loop." 
Three central features constitute our model: a supply effect, a reiteration 
effect, and a demand effect. The schematic below and accompanying texts 
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The basic dynamics are these: 
Demand tot 
• The university, through its admissions policy, assembles a diverse 
student body (or not) that, on graduation, becomes a key supply of 
labor for potential employers-a supply effect. 
• The diversity that exists in the supply of labor is, at least to some 
extent relocated to or "reiterated" in the workplace through the 
operation of employer hiring mechanisms-a reiteration effect. 
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• The employer's diversity hiring criteria exen a demand for 
employees who have particular characteristics, which can influence 
the criteria that universities use to determine the students they 
admit-a demand effect. 
The remainder of this chapter elaborates on these dynamics to demon-
strate that we stand a better chance of improving the diversity of univer-
sities and workplaces if we recognize that both domains are part of the 
same diversity system.ll This insight is relevant not only as a normative 
matter (whether it makes sense to promote affirmative action in both 
the workplace and the university setting) but also as a doctrinal matter 
(whether the legality of affirmative action in the context of the workplace 
should be coexte·nsive with its legality in the context of the university). 
Our argument unfolds in four parts. Part II discusses the supply and 
reiteration effects. These effects follow from the fact that universities 
are a gateway to the workplace. Today's student bodies are tomorrow's 
potential workforces. To the extent that employers rely on universities 
as a source of labor, universities function as a pathway through which 
diversity is supplied. The diversity of the university provides both a 
limit on and a template for diversity in the workplace. 
Yet when employers hire from affirmative action institutions, their 
own diversity-enhancing selection measures might not mirror the mea-
sures implemented at the university admissions stage. When hiring, 
employers might seek to realize a conception of diversity that differs in 
significant ways from the educationally rooted ideal of a diverse student 
body. Actors in these two institutional contexts might therefore "screen" 
for diversity in distinctive ways. Part III explores the implications of 
the possible divergence between the employer and university diversity 
screens. 
Part IV demonstrates how the hiring practices of employers can influ-
ence the admissions practices of universities in the educational context. 
Universities operate within multiple competitive markets. Among other 
things, they are competing to place their students with the best employ-
ers. Students, in tum, evaluate schools, at least in part, based on their 
placement rates. Universities with poor placement records are at a com-
petitive disadvantage vis-a-vis those with stronger ones. This creates an 
incentive for universities to supply the kind of diversity employers want. 
Doing so maximizes the likelihood that employers will hire the gradu-
ates of those universities. To the extent that universities structure their 
diversity initiatives to maximize the employment opportunities avail-
able to their graduates, employer diversity preferences influence the 
university's admission's regime. Part IV discusses this demand effect. 
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11. The Supply and Reiteration Effects 
A. The Basic Supply Hypothesis 
The Supreme Court recognized long ago that the composition of the 
relevant labor market can constrain an employer's ability to eliminate 
patterns of racial exclusion from its workplace.12 Of course, employers 
who engage in discrimination (or who practice affirmative action) can 
cause their workforces to be significantly less or more racially diverse 
than the available pool of qualified labor. But the fact remains that the 
makeup of that pool places certain limits on the composition of the 
employer's workplace. For example, if there are no Asian Americans in 
the labor pool, there will be no Asian Americans in the workplace, no 
matter what hiring preferences employers might use. Employers cannot 
create workplace diversity out of thin air. They need a supply. 
The importance of educational diversity as a source of workplace 
diversity was emphasized in an amicus brief filed by Fortune 100 com-
panies in the Fisher case. We quote directly from the brief: 
But amici [Fortune 100 companies] cannot reach [the] goal [of a diverse 
workforce] on their own ... When amici make decisions about hiring and 
promotion, it is critical that they be able to draw from a superior pool 
of candidates-both minority and non-minority-who have realized the 
many benefits of diversity in higher education. There can be no question 
that "[t]he Nation's future" does indeed continue to "dependO upon lead-
ers"-including business leaders-"trained through wide exposure to the 
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."l3 
The fact that employers rely on institutions of higher education to pro-
vide a supply of diverse labor implies that the achievement of racial 
diversity in the workplace will depend on not only the behavior of 
employers but also the behavior of educational institutions. Thus, work-
place diversity is potentially affected by the use of affirmative action by 
universities at the admissions stage as well as by employers at the hiring 
stage. If this is so, understanding the conditions necessary for achiev-
ing workplace diversity requires isolating the expected effects of race-
conscious selection measures at each stage. To what extent would we 
expect the diversity of the workplace to be affected by (1) the use of 
affirmative action in education and (2) the use of affirmative action by 
employers? 
Our aim here is to provide a theoretical model that provides prelimi-
nary answers to these questions. But first, two specifications are in order. 
Though we believe that the model we describe below applies to employ-
ers who hire from highly selective colleges and universities generally, 
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for simplicity, we narrow our focus to law firms who hire their associ-
ates predominantly from highly selective law schools. We will refer to 
the law firms that hire in this way as "elite law firms" and the selective law 
schools from which they hire as j'elite law schools." Of course, elite law 
firms do hire from nonelite law schools, and nonelite law firms do hire 
from elite law schools as well. The principal reason we limit our analy-
sis to the "elite'' context is to simplify our analysis. We note, too, that 
most of the literature on racial diversity and law firms focuses on elite 
law firms and suggests that elite law firms are more likely to hire from 
elite law schools than from nonelite law schools. Indeed, there is rea-
son to believe that elite law firms will hire very few people of color from 
nonelite law schools.14 Focusing on elite law firms and elite law schools 
allows us to track a very real dynamic- the flow of diversity from elite 
law schools to elite law firms-and at the same time describe our theo-
retical hypothesis: namely, that the diversity of elite law school student 
bodies is a causal determinant of the diversity of elite law firm work-
places. This is true simply because whatever diversity exists in elite law 
firms has to come from somewhere, and we have stipulated that elite law 
firms hire from elite law schools. 
The question then becomes: What affects the diversity of elite law 
schools? One answer is the school's admissions policy. The diversity of 
an elite law school student body is at least partly determined by the 
school's positive consideration of race as a factor in admissions-that 
is, its affirmative action policy. The more robust the elite law school's 
race-conscious affirmative action program is, the more diverse its stu-
dent body will be; and the more diverse a law school's student body is, 
the more diverse its graduates will be. Since elite law firms, by our def-
inition, hire from the labor pool formed by these graduates, it follows 
that the use of affirmative action by elite law schools is causally linked 
to the racial composition, and hence the diversity, of the workplace of 
these employers.15 
To summarize, a law school's admissions regime affects the diversity 
of the student body; the diversity of the student body shapes the diver-
sity of the labor pool; and the diversity of the labor pool influences the 
diversity of law firms. These observations together make up the sup-
ply effect in the university-workplace relation. With this preliminary 
hypothesis in place, we now model how a legal rule permitting or 
restricting race-conscious hiring might modulate the movement of 
diversity from law school student bodies to the workplace of the law 
firm. 
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B. The Reiteration Effect: Default Case 
We begin by establishing what we call a reiteration effect, or the basic 
tendency of the level of diversity that exists in the labor supply pool 
to be reproduced in the relevant workplace. As a predicate, we make 
four additional assumptions. First, for reasons previously discussed, 16 
we assume that, above some threshold of satisfactory academic perfor-
mance, elite law firms are indifferent to grades.17 Second, we assume that 
the diversity of the group of students who achieve this level of acade-
mic performance is the same as the diversity of the student body over-
all.18 These first two assumptions imply that most graduates of elite law 
schools, including black and Latino students, are regarded by elite law 
firms as equally qualified to be hired as associates.19 Third, we assume 
that the graduates of all elite law schools who are interested in working 
in elite law firms are equally willing to accept positions in all elite firms, 
but that any given firm can lure any particular graduate by expending 
more resources on recruiting or offering a higher salary. Fourth, we 
assume that the law firm's and the law school's conceptions of diversity 
are congruent (including judgments about whether a particular individ-
ual will contribute to diversity).20 
With these assumptions out of the way, it is helpful to invoke a general 
axiom endorsed by the Supreme Court, albeit in the context of a rather 
different issue. According to the Court, "absent explanation, it is ordinar-
ily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time 
result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic 
composition of the population in the community from which employ-
ees are hired."21 This axiom, as applied to our model, suggests that in the 
absence of employer discrimination,22 the level of workplace diversity 
among elite law firms will, over time, be the same as the level of diver-
sity that exists in law school student bodies. Whatever diversity exists in 
elite student bodies will be randomly supplied to all firms, with no single 
law firm having a higher or lower level of diversity than others, except 
by operation of chance.23 
This general axiom might strike some readers as an overly simplistic 
assumption, one that flies in the face of empirical evidence about ongo-
ing employment discrimination. Some might argue that any model that 
accepts the Court's assumption in the Teamsters case assumes away too 
much. Two responses are in order. First, if we do not assume away dis-
crimination, that variable becomes a showstopper for our desired analy-
sis. If employers are assumed to discriminate, then workplace diversity 
will be almost entirely a function of their exclusionary policies-period. 
Thus, we might learn more about the structural relationship between 
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educational and workplace diversity if we think about what we would 
expect to happen in the absence of discrimination. 
Second, and perhaps more important, imagining what we would 
expect to happen in the absence of discrimination is a useful exercise 
because a comparison of the expected consequences of that assumption 
with real-world observations may provide a way to test whether the 
assumption is true. The assumption is not an idle one. Although it would 
be putting the point too strongly to say that the federal courts assume 
that employment discrimination does not exist, it is fair to say that they 
have not been sympathetic to plaintiffs who bring claims of discrimina-
tion.24 Our sense is that many people believe that employment discrim-
ination is largely no longer a real problem and that if workplaces lack 
diversity, this is explained by a lack of qualified candidates, not by dis-
crimination The assumption behind this common belief is that if there 
were a qualified, diverse pool of people of color, firms would hire them, 
and their workplaces would become diverse. Note how this view aligns 
with the assumptions of our model-namely, the elite law school's stu-
dent body diversity will be supplied fully and uniformly into the work-
place. 
In any event, our claim is that in a world where our basic assumptions 
hold true, the racial diversity that exists in the graduating student bodies 
of elite law schools will be uniformly distributed among all elite law 
firms, such that the level of diversity in the group of students who enter 
the elite workplace matches the level of diversity in the elite law school 
student pool overall. In other words, in the default conditions of our 
model, workplace diversity simply reiterates student body diversity. 
C. Modeling the Reiteration Effect under Four Alternative Conditions 
If full and uniform reiteration is expected in our model's default condi-
tions, what might we expect to observe if we vary both the law firm's and 
the law school's behavior? That is the question we now address. We will 
examine how the supply of diversity from the law school to the law firm 
might vary under four specific conditions. Condition 1 assumes that the 
level of law school diversity is high and that the law firm is prohibited 
from using affirmative action. Condition 2 imagines a low level of law 
school diversity; here, too, the law firm may not use affirmative action. 
Condition 3 permits the law firm to use affirmative action and posits a 
high level of law school diversity. Under Condition 4, the law firm is also 
permitted to use affirmative action, but the level of law school diversity 
is low. We discuss below how each of these conditions might affect the 
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supply of student body diversity from the university (the law school) to 
the workplace (the law firm). 
1. Condition 1: High Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative 
Action Prohibited 
Suppose that there is a high level of racial diversity in the student bodies 
of elite law schools, such that the presence of racial minorities in these 
student bodies is as high as or higher than in the general population. 
(We might imagine a world in which all elite law schools were permit-
ted under applicable state and federal law to consider the race of their 
applicants as a positive factor in the admissions process, and all elite law 
schools did in fact do so.) Stipulate also that law firms are not legally 
permitted to take race into account in their hiring decisions-that is, 
that the law requires formally color-blind hiring. What result should be 
expected for law firm diversity, given the assumptions of our model? 
Assuming full compliance by law firms, we should expect that, over 
time, all elite law firms would come to have the same high level of diver-
sity that is present in elite law school student bodies. That is to say, 
the diversity of the student bodies will be fully and uniformly supplied 
to the workplace. To understand why, recall that we are assuming, for 
purposes of analysis, that there is no explicit or implicit discrimina-
tion in the labor market. Insofar as firms are not going to differentiate 
among elite students (per our earlier hypothesis and explanation), we 
should expect student body diversity to be supplied to and randomly 
distributed among all elite law firms. We would also expect that, over 
time, every elite law firm would mirror the demographic of the elite law 
school student bodies from which they are populated. In short, under 
Condition 1, workplace diversity would be established at levels match-
ing the diversity of the student pool, even without the utilization of 
employer affirmative action. 
2. Condition 2: Low Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative 
Action Prohibited 
In this condition, suppose that elite universities have low levels of racial 
diversity, such that the proportion of racial minorities in their student 
bodies is significantly lower than their proportion in the general popu-
lation. This scenario could emerge in a jurisdiction (like California) that 
prohibits the consideration of race in university admissions; the sce-
nario could also occur if, at some future point, the Supreme Court over-
ruled Grutter and held that affirmative action was unconstitutional in the 
128 A Nat1on of Widening Opportunit ies 
educational context. Assume, as in Condition 1, that the law prohibits 
race-conscious affirmative action hiring. What is the expected result? 
As in Condition 1, we should expect that, under Condition 2, over time, 
all elite workplaces will come to share the demographic of the student 
bodies from which they draw. That is, all law firms will come to have 
an equally low level of racial diversity. A formally colorblind hiring rule, 
again assuming nondiscrimination, should reproduce the level of diver-
sity present in the elite student body pool at the workplace level of the 
law firm. If the level of diversity in the overall pool of job candidates is 
low, then colorblind hiring should produce an equally low level of work-
place diversity, uniformly distributed among firms. 
3. Condition 3: High Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative 
Action Permitted 
In the third condition, stipulate that there is a high level of diversity 
in elite law school student bodies, as in Condition l. But now suppose 
that employers are permitted (but not required) to consider job appli-
cants' membership in a minority racial group as a positive factor in their 
hiring decisions, if doing so is reasonably necessary to create or main-
tain diversity in the workplace.25 What outcomes should we expect? 
The short answer: roughly the same level and distribution of workplace 
diversity as in Condition 1, the condition with high diversity in the labor 
market and no affirmative action. 
This might seem counterintuitive. One might think a rule permitting 
consideration of race for diversity purposes would lead to variances 
among law firms in their levels of diversity. But remember that firms 
are only permitted to employ affirmative action "if reasonably neces-
sary" to ensure diversity. Since we stipulate in Condition 3 that there is a 
high level of diversity in the pool of available candidates, and given our 
overall assumption that this labor market is free of explicit or implicit 
forms of discrimination and biases, employers should not need to take 
race into account to yield meaningful diversity. A sufficiently high level 
of diversity in the pool of available candidates should, under formally 
color-blind hiring, be adequate to supply that same level of diversity 
uniformly across all law firms. Assuming that employers are aware of the 
racial demographics of the pool, it is reasonable to conclude that they 
would see little need to engage in affirmative action hiring and would 
refrain from doing so.26 Combining the results from Conditions 1 and 3, 
we can conclude that in conditions of high diversity in the available pool 
of job candidates, we should not expect overall levels or the distribution 
of workplace diversity across law firms to be significantly dependent on 
The Diversity Feedback Loop 129 
whether or not employers are permitted to take race into account as a 
positive hiring factor for the sake of diversity. 
4. Condition 4: Low Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative 
Action Permitted 
Our final condition assumes that there is a low level of racial diversity in 
the student bodies of elite law schools. Recall that this is also the case in 
Condition 1. Stipulate now that, as in Condition 3, law firms are permit-
ted (but not required) to consider job applicants' race as a positive factor 
in their hiring decisions. The caveat, again, is that they may do so only 
if reasonably necessary to create or maintain diversity in the workplace. 
Under this condition, what should we expect vis-a-vis the overall supply 
and distribution of diversity in the workplace? 
The results will depend on the extent to which law firms give positive 
weight to race in their hiring decisions. If law firms behave uniformly, 
then the results of Condition 4 should be the same as Condition 2 (the 
condition with low education diversity and employer affirmative action 
prohibited). There are two ways in which employers could act uni-
formly. 
First, all law firms might refrain from using affirmative action. This 
would render Condition 4 indistinguishable from Condition 2, so the 
same results should follow. Second, all law firms could decide to practice 
affirmative action. Under the default assumptions of our model, elite law 
firms are all on equal footing in terms of the likely success of their diver-
sity initiatives. Thus, a university's student body diversity would be sup-
plied uniformly to all elite workplaces. The overall level of resultant law 
firm diversity will also likely be uniform. 27 
But now, let us imagine that elite firms have different views regarding 
the importance of establishing diversity in their workplaces. Assume 
that some firms give high priority to having a diverse workforce, while 
other firms care less about diversity as such or are committed to an ideal 
of formally color-blind hiring. Suppose, in other words, that only some 
elite firms consider race as a positive consideration (call these "prodi-
versity" firms), while other firms do not take race into consideration at 
all (call these "color-blind firms"). Under these additional assumptions, 
what result should we expect for workplace diversity among elite firms? 
In our model, the amount of diversity in the elite law school student 
body pool limits the diversity that can be reiterated into the workplace, 
so we should expect the overall level of diversity among all elite firms to 
be about as low as that observed in the candidate pooL But unlike in pre-
vious conditions, we would expect the distribution of that diversity to be 
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nonuniform across firms. Prodiversity firms, insofar as they see a greater 
value in establishing workforce diversity, will offer higher salaries or 
expend more recruiting resources to lure job candidates who would 
enhance or bolster the firm's diversity profile. Color-blind firms, who 
by definition care Jess about diversity or are ideologically committed to 
color-blindness, would have no reason to make the extra expenditures 
necessary to attract the diversity candidates away from prodiversity 
firms and so would be less likely to attract and hire them. Over time, 
therefore, prodiversity firms will come to have a higher level of work-
place diversity than color-blind firms. As student body diversity con-
tinues to cluster in prodiversity firms from year to year, prodiversity 
firms will eventually achieve a level of diversity that is higher than the 
level of diversity available in the elite student body pool, and color-blind 
firms will eventually have a level of diversity that is even lower than the 
already-low level available in the candidate pool. 
It may not seem particularly remarkable that in Condition 4, prodi-
versity firms will come to achieve more workplace diversity than color-
blind firms, but there are two less obvious points that bear mentioning. 
First, Condition 4 is the only one of the four conditions in which we 
would expect anything other than a uniform distribution of diversity 
across all hiring firms. In all other conditions, including Condition 2, in 
which we stipulated that employers are permitted to engage in prodi-
versity hiring, we would expect the diversity of the workplace to be the 
same as the diversity of the relevant labor pool. Second, a comparison of 
Conditions 2 and 4 shows that where the diversity of the available can-
didate pool is very low, then an employment rule that permits but does 
not require prodiversity hiring will tend to result in a lumpy distribution 
of diversity among hiring firms, such that some firms will come to have 
high levels of diversity, while other firms will have minimal or no diver-
sity. In contrast, an employment rule that requires color-blind hiring in 
conditions of low labor-market diversity will tend to produce an even, 
albeit low, level of diversity among all hiring firms. 
D. Summary 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the preceding four conditions. 
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Table 1 
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I Htgh No High Yes 
II Low No Low Yes 
Ul H1gh Yes Htgh Yes 
IV Low Yes Depends on uniformity among employers: 







Six conclusions follow from these results. First, even when one takes into 
account the diversity practices of firms- that is, whether they engage 
in or refrain from using affirmative action hiring-the diversity of law 
school student bodies (the diversity supply) remains crucial to the analy-
sis. Second, a similar point can be made with respect to law: whatever 
the governing legal regime with respect to whether employers are per-
mitted to use affirmative action, the diversity of university student bod-
ies will play an important role in shaping the diversity of the workplace. 
These two points highlight the importance of affirmative action in the 
educational domain. It is a significant mechanism through which diver-
sity is supplied to the labor market. 
This brings us to our third point. Our model provides only two ways 
to achieve high diversity in all elite workplaces. One is to ensure high 
diversity in elite student bodies. The other is to induce all law firms to 
engage in affirmative action in conditions of job scarcity (creating an 
amplification effect28). 
Fourth, the results of Condition 1 might lead one to conclude that we 
should jettison affirmative action in the employment context if we have 
robust affirmative action in the educational context. The latter will nec-
essarily be supplied to the former. That is indeed the story our theoret-
ical model tells. But a limitation of our model is that we assume away 
discrimination in the marketplace. If we add discrimination back into 
the model-and not necessarily invidious discrimination but simply 
implicit bias-the results under Condition 1 would change. For exam-
ple, firms whose decision making reflected implicit bias would have a 
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lower level of diversity than firms whose decision making did not reflect 
this bias. For many proponents of affirmative action, this is precisely 
what affirmative action is designed to counteract-biases (implicit and 
explicit) in the labor market. 
Fifth, understanding the foregoing limitation of our model is espe-
cially important in light of the Supreme Court's commitment to color-
blindness and general judicial skepticism about workplace discrimina-
tion.29 This is a point we made earlier but bears emphasizing here. 
Condition I is, for us, decidedly theoretical. However, for the conserva-
tive justices on the Court, Condition 1 might be an assumed reality. That 
has implications for the future of affirmative action in the context of 
the workplace. If a majority of the Supreme Court concludes that work-
place discrimination is a thing of the past, it could conclude that, even 
if affirmative action is necessary in the context of university admissions 
to achieve student body diversity, it is unnecessary in the context of the 
workplace, because the diversity of the student body would be reiterated 
into the workplace. 
Our sixth and final conclusion is this: in low educational diversity con-
ditions, rules that permit prodiversity hiring will likely result in racial 
clustering, and law firms will separate themselves over time into high-
diversity and low-diversity workplaces.30 This has implications for juris-
dictions like California that prohibit state universities from engaging in 
affirmative action. Some employees might find themselves in law firms 
in which there is meaningful diversity. Most will not. Still, to the extent 
that having meaningful diversity in some workplaces (Cond ition 4) is 
better than having low diversity across all workplaces (Condition 2), we 
should ensure that the prohibition of affirmative action in the context of 
education is not extended to the context of employment. 
Il l. Divergent Diversity Screens: Complicating the Reiteration 
Dynamic 
In modeling the supply of diversity from elite law schools to elite law 
firms in Part II of this chapter, we assumed that law firms and law schools 
share a common notion of "diversity." This need not be the case. A law 
firm might employ very different criteria than law schools. Law schools 
are admitting students to service multiple markets, including the pub-
lic interest markets. As a general matter, these students are likely to be 
more racially conscious with respect to both their sense of selves and 
their normative commitments more generally. Moreover, as academic 
institutions, law schools will likely seek to admit at least some students 
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who they think will stir things up and facilitate the robust exchange of 
ideas. 
Law firms, on the other hand, may want very different kinds of diver-
sity. Their corporate market context will presumably shape the kind 
of-and how much-diversity they pursue. For example, while law firms 
are prohibited from invoking customer preferences to justify screening 
their application pool for racially palatable African Americans, it is hard 
not to imagine that some firms end up (at least implicitly) doing just that. 
To recognize that law schools and law firms do not necessarily employ 
the same diversity screens is not to say that their diversity initiatives 
must be regarded as autonomous. Indeed, we claim just the opposite. 
For one thing, law firms and law schools might actually employ precisely 
the same diversity criteria (e.g., looking for people who will facilitate 
racial cooperation and understanding), in which case we might say that 
their screens expressly converge. For another, even when law firms and 
law school diversity criteria do not expressly converge in this way, the 
diversity that actually arises in each context could nevertheless appear 
to converge on a shared conception. 
Suppose, for example, that law firms care more than law schools about 
weeding out individuals with poor teamwork attributes. One might 
assume that this could cause law firm diversity to diverge from law 
school diversity. That is possible. But on the other hand, law firms might 
find that the experience of a diverse elite law school prepares students 
of all backgrounds to work productively and harmoniously in hetero-
geneous social settings. If this were true, even law firms that prioritize 
teamwork might be happy to accept, without much further screening, 
whatever type of diversity law schools produce. The general point is that 
iflaw firms perceive value in the diversity produced by law schools, they 
might seek to capitalize on that value by reproducing it in their work-
places. 
Finally, law school and law firm diversity initiatives are not 
autonomous in another way: any diversity criteria the law firm utilizes at 
the hiring stage will necessarily piggyback on the diversity efforts of the 
law school at the admissions stage. As argued above, the diversity of law 
schools creates the diversity of the labor pool from which law firms hire. 
Keeping in mind these ways in which law school and law firm diversity 
initiatives are connected, we turn our focus in this section to how law 
school and law firm initiatives can diverge. To appreciate how law firm 
and law school diversity screening can diverge and the implications of 
that divergence for the reiteration effect, let us call the set of minority 
individuals who are the beneficiaries of affirmative action at the law 
school admissions stage "Law School Diverse" or "LS-Diverse" individu-
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als. And let us call the set of minority individuals who are beneficiaries 
at the law firm hiring stage "Law Firm Diverse" or "LF-Diverse" individ-
uals. Some minorities might be both LS-Diverse and LF-Diverse, while 
others might be neither. 
Consider the ways in which the set of LS-Diverse individuals might 
relate to LF-Diverse individuals. Quantitatively, the LF-Diverse group 
could be larger than, smaller than, or the same size as the LS-Diverse 
group. Qualitatively, the LF-Diverse group could overlap the LS-Diverse 
group in whole, in part, or not at all. These various possibilities could be 
combined in a number of ways. We will not attempt to march through 
all of the permutations, but a few comments are in order. 
For various reasons, the set of people who are the beneficiaries of 
LF-Diversity initiatives might be different from those who previously 
benefited from LS-Diversity initiatives. The two sets might be quanti-
tatively different simply because universities and employers assign dif-
ferent weight to racial considerations in the selection process. A heavier 
weighting will naturally tend to result in a larger set of individuals who 
benefit from the diversity initiative. 
There might also be systemic reasons for this quantitative divergence 
between LS-Diversity and LF-Diversity. For example, if law schools 
engage in robust affirmative action measures and succeed in creating 
highly diverse student bodies, who then form the labor pool from which 
law firms hire, law firms might perceive that there is less of a need for 
them to use prodiversity affirmative action in order to achieve signifi-
cant workplace diversity. They may assume, per our discussion in Part 
II, that the diversity in the labor market will naturally "trickle up" or be 
reiterated into the firm. This might be especially true of firms that con-
ceive of themselves as nondiscriminatory. These firms would see little 
need to employ affirmative action as a prophylactic against the possibil-
ity of discrimination. Under this scenario, the set of people who benefit 
from LF-Diversity efforts may be low relative to the set of people who 
benefit from LS-Diversity efforts. 
Law firm and law school affirmative action initiatives might also yield 
different sets of beneficiaries for reasons having to do with the context-
dependent nature of diversity initiatives. LF-Diversity might be quali-
tatively different from LS-Diversity. Employers and universities might 
look for different characteristics in constructing their institutional diver-
sities. For example, employers might screen candidates for compatibil-
ity with their corporate culture in ways that constrain their prodiversity 
hiring.31 In some cases, what might appear to be facially neutral screen-
ing criteria could cause LF-Diversity selections to be negatively corre-
lated with LS-Diversity selections. A silly example: a law firm might 
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screen in favor of minority candidates who, in addition to attending elite 
law schools, attended prestigious private prep schools. But minority law 
students with prep school backgrounds might be less likely than others 
to have benefited from affirmative action at the law school admissions 
stage-that is, less likely to be LS-Diverse. If so, then law firm screen-
ing for minorities who attended prestigious private prep schools could 
cause LF-Diversity to be negatively correlated with LS-Diversity. 
Law firm diversity and law school diversity might diverge in other 
ways. Elite law firms and elite law schools might have different ideas 
about the characteristics (in addition to simple racial phenotype) that 
could make one person preferable to another from the standpoint of 
enhancing the institution's diversity. The basic educational goals and 
academic p rinciples that define the mission of elite universities (of 
which elite law schools are a part) do not apply to most elite employ-
ers.32 The value of diversity in the educational context, or at least the 
value that has been assigned constitutional significance, encompasses 
a well-known melange of goods, including enhanced educational dis-
course, eradication of racial stereotypes and other types of de-biasing, 
reduction of racial isolation, preparation for citizenry in a pluralistic 
society, providing good modeling for minority youth, creation of a visi-
ble path for minorities leading to leadership roles in society, and so on.33 
Against the background of these interests, a law school might make spe-
cial efforts to enroll students from racial minority groups who are most 
likely to bring an overtly "racial perspective" to classroom discussions. 
This might include minority students who have the least in common 
with most other students with respect to their backgrounds and experi-
ences, in order to activate Bakke!Grutter discourse benefits. 
Law firms might also have an interest in fostering diverse perspectives 
in the workplace on a different basis, such as the belief that this would 
improve their ability to anticipate client or customer needs. But over-
riding concerns about workplace harmony might make employers wary 
of hiring individuals who will have trouble fitting into the corporate cul-
ture.34 This does not mean that these institutions would seek individuals 
who dis-identify with their race or embrace a color-blind sense of self. 
Corporate cultures are increasingly interested in establishing so-called 
affinity groups- that is, groups that are organized around specific iden-
tities (such as being gay or lesbian, a person of color, or a woman). While 
these groups are less prevalent in the law firm context, elite law firms are 
still interested in hiring people of color who will perform palatable or 
modest forms of racial diversity work. The point is that it will be the rare 
elite law firm that would hire an African American applicant because 
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that person will shake up the firm's institutional culture. This is precisely 
the kind of person an elite law school might admit. 
More generally, the benefits that law schools as academic institutions 
might seek to advance will not necessarily readily map onto the priori-
ties of a typical (nonacademic) employer's workplace. To be clear, this is 
not to say that law firms will perceive no value in diversity. The point, 
instead, is that even when they perceive positive value in a diverse work-
force, they may have different reasons than law schools for pursuing 
diversity. 
A final reason that law firm diversity screens might be different from 
law school diversity screens is that the employer may be hiring from a 
pool that has already been made diverse through affirmative action at 
an earlier screening stage (the admissions process). This fact may have 
varying implications. One possibility is that a law firm might make fine 
distinctions between minority individuals within the pool who may have 
been equal beneficiaries of prodiversity admissions criteria. It might do 
so, for example, in order to screen out individuals who might clash with 
its corporate culture. 
Much of the foregoing is speculative. That should not obscure that 
our analysis is theoretically grounded in the fact that law firms and law 
schools operate under different incentive systems with respect to their 
pursuit of diversity. The difference in their incentive structures means 
that elite law firms may utilize different diversity-screening criteria than 
law schools. 
IV. The Demand Effect 
In Part III, we explored the implications of law firms and law schools 
employing different diversity screens. We assumed that these diversity-
promoting criteria are stable over time and that they are independently 
fixed within each context. In this part, we relax the latter assumptions 
to explore the possibility that universities might adjust their admissions 
policies in response to observed employment patterns, including 
employers' revealed preferences about the kind of diversity they want. 
Elite law schools operate in a competitive market. While their primary 
mission may be educational and academic, they compete with each 
other to attract exceptional students who will enrich the community, 
perform to the highest academic standards, and make valuable contri-
butions to society after they graduate. One way in which law schools 
attract students is by trying to outperform their peer institutions in plac-
ing their graduates in the most desirable jobs. If they are unable to com-
pete with other law schools in achieving placement of graduates in the 
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job market, the best students will decide to matriculate elsewhere, which 
will erode the affected schools' prestige and academic standing, even-
tually making it difficult for them to maintain their status among their 
elite peers. The fact that placement rates figure significantly in the over-
all ranking of law schools makes this dynamic all the more significant. 
The competition to place graduates in desirable jobs gives rise to an 
incentive for universities to admit more of the types of students who are 
sought by employers when they graduate and fewer of the types of stu-
dents who are not.35 Law schools may have multiple reasons to admit 
or not admit a particular type of student. In general, to the extent that 
employers actively seek graduates who possess some discernible set of 
characteristics, universities will have an added incentive to look for those 
characteristics in the students they admit. If law firms tend not to hire 
graduates with some set of characteristics, then law schools will have less 
reason to admit applicants fitting that type. 
There is no reason that this demand effect should not apply to char-
acteristics associated with enhancing workplace diversity. If elite law 
firms give priority in their hiring to elite law school graduates who pos-
sess diversity-enhancing characteristics, law schools will have an added 
incentive to screen in favor of those characteristics at the admissions 
stage. That is to say, other things equal,36 law schools that engage in affi.r-
mative action have an incentive to craft their diversity initiatives to give 
preference to applicants who are likely to become LF-Diverse graduates. 
The demand exerted by employers for graduates meeting their diversity 
criteria could cause law firm and law school diversity initiatives to con-
verge over time.37 Whether this occurs will likely depend on the strength 
of the law firm's diversity demand38 and the strength of the incentive for 
the law school to respond to this demand.39 
V. Conclusion: Some Implications of Our Model 
Our point of departure was the claim that the diversity of law schools 
and of law firms is intertwined. What happens in one setting affects the 
other. We then moved on to show some of the specific ways in which the 
two contexts interact, including a discussion of how law firm diversity 
initiatives might modulate the flow of diversity from law schools to law 
firms and how those initiatives might in turn loop back to influence the 
behavior oflaw school admissions committees. We conclude by suggest-
ing several implications of our account for the development and promo-
tion of workplace diversity. 
First, the existence of diversity in the supply of labor that feeds into 
the employment market is a necessary condition of workplace diversity. 
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Workplace diversity cannot be created from thin air. And insofar as law 
school student body diversity depends on educational affirmative action, 
it follows that educational affirmative action is a necessary condition of 
workplace diversity. In other words, in addition to constituting a law 
school's entering class, law school admissions constitute the future law 
firm application pool from which law firms hire. 
Second, there is a quantitative and a qualitative dimension to this sup-
ply function. Quantitatively, the more aggressively prodiversity the law 
school's admissions criteria are, the more diverse its contribution to the 
hiring pool will be. Qualitatively, the stronger the convergence between 
the kind of diversity in which a law firm is interested and the kind of 
diversity a law firm seeks to advance, the greater the likelihood that the 
law firm will rely on the law school's graduates as its employment pool 
and thus the greater the likelihood that the law school's diversity will be 
reiterated into the law firm. 
Third, by and large, we ought not worry about law schools engaging 
in "too much" affirmative action. Law firm behavior in this regard will 
be disciplined by the competitive markets in which they operate. But 
the same goes for the behavior of universities. Diversity initiatives in 
the educational context are, after all, voluntary. Universities have no rea-
son to engage in affirmative action beyond a level that balances educa-
tional usefulness with whatever demand for diversity actually exists in 
the employment market. 
Finally, we should query whether the story we tell about the demand 
effect means that law firms may be exerting too much pressure on law 
schools to conform their conception of diversity to the model that hap-
pens to prevail in the workplace. Law schools might have good reasons 
to offer admission to the iconoclastic, overtly racialized student with 
a penchant for challenging hierarchy and complacency with the status 
quo. But law firms might be more reticent in offering that student a 
job-and that might affect the law school's willingness to offer admis-
siOn. 
Similarly, law firms and law schools might have a very different sense 
of how much diversity is enough. ''Critical mass" from a law firm's per-
spective might look quite different from "critical mass" from the per-
spective of the law school- and the former might end up shaping the 
latter. To put this another way, if law firms have a diversity saturation 
point or a diversity ceiling, law schools have an incentive to adjust their 
affirmative action efforts to keep the diversity of their student bodies 
below that level. The concern, in short, is that the demand effect can 
influence both the quantitative and the qualitative supply of diversity 
throughout the loop. This suggests that we ought to begin a conversa-
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tion about whether there are ways to effectuate a counterbalancing force 
so that a law school's quantitative and qualilative commitments to diver-
sily not only are shaped by but also shape how law firms articulate their 
vision of a diverse workplace. 
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possible with other modes of diversity, then universities might give priority 'to 
achievement of those educational benefits even at the cost of marginally lower 
employment of graduates. But our point is that employer demand for a particular 
type of diversity will exert a pull in that direction, not that the value of Lf-
Diversity will necessarily trump all other law school values. 
37. We would not predict complete convergence because satisfying employer 
demand is only part of (and concededly, perhaps only a small part of) the 
educational benefit of a diverse student body. See discussion in Part III above. 
38. At least two factors could shape the strength of this demand: the law firm's 
substantive commitment to diversity and the employer's symbolic commitment 
to diversity. With respect to the substantive commitment, an employer might be 
committed to diversity because it thinks (a) it is the right thing to do, (b) diversity 
will improve workplace efficiency and productivity, and (c) it provides access to 
markets. With respect to the symbolic commitment, an employer might simply 
want to signal ("showcase") diversity to avoid the teputational costs of not doing 
so. 
39. The strength of this incentive would tum on (a) how important employment 
rankings are to the overall ranking of the institution, (b) how much attention 
students pay to employment rates and/or rankings, and (c) whether jobs are 
scarce. As to the scarcity of jobs, we note that in conditions of full employment, 
the demand effect will be weak unless employers actively avoid hiring students 
who are LS-Diverse-a possibility that is factored out by our initial assumptions 
of Part II. The demand effect will be most pronounced when law firms implemem 
diversity initiatives in conditions of job scarcity. In those conditions, LF-Diverse 
students will be hired at a disproportionately higher rate than all other students, 




Is the Future of Affirmative Action Race 
Neutral? 
BrianT. Fitzpatrick 
The outlook does not appear particularly bright for affirmative action 
programs in the United States that grant preferences based on race to 
blacks, Hispanics, and others in hiring, university admissions, and bid-
ding on government contracts. These programs continue to be unpop-
ular with the public and face increasing hostility in courts of law.1 In 
their place, courts and commentators have been promoting an alterna-
tive form of affirmative action that I will call "race-neutral affirmative 
action." Race-neutral affirmative action seeks to change the racial com-
position of those who benefit from employment, education, or gov-
ernment spending not by granting preferences based on race (what I 
will call "racially explicit affirmative action") but by granting preferences 
based on characteristics that are correlated with race. That is, as I will 
define it, the purpose of race-neutral affirmative action is the same as 
the purpose of racially explicit affirmative action-to increase the num-
bers of c~rtain racial groups who benefit from these opportunities. But 
the means are different: race-neutral affirmative action uses correlates of 
race rather than race itself. 
Perhaps the best-known race-neutral affirmative action program in 
the United States is the Texas Ten Percent Plan at the University of Texas, 
which grants automatic admission to any in-state applicant who gradu-
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ated in the top 10 percent of his or her high school class.2 For applicants 
admitted under this plan, the Texas legislature eschewed all other crite-
ria in favor of high school class rank because the racial segregation that 
still exists in Texas high schools leads class rank to correlate with appli-
cants who are black and Hispanic better than other traditional admis-
sions criteria such as SAT scores.3 For the same reason, other universities 
have adopted preferences for poor, bilingual, and first-generation appli-
cants, as well as for students who have "overcome diversity" or "demon-
strated cultural awareness."4 Although many of these preferences have 
merits of their own, when they are motivated in whole or in part by 
their ability to generate racial diversity, I call them race-neutral affirma-
tive action. 
As 1 noted, courts have become increasingly hostile to racially explicit 
affirmative action, and many commentators have turned to promoting 
this sort of race-neutral affirmative action instead.5 Indeed the United 
States Supreme Court recently vacated a lower court's approval of a new, 
racially explicit affirmative action program at the University of Texas in 
part because the Texas Ten Percent Plan alone had been so successful 
there.6 The Court will consider the question again this corning year. 
In this chapter, I examine the rise of race-neutral affirmative action in 
the United States and assess the costs and benefits of trying to diversify 
through race-neutral means. I conclude, first, that, although courts have 
been promoting race-neutral affirmative action, they have yet to con-
front serious questions about whether it is any more constitutional than 
racially explicit affirmative action. In my view, it is hard to square race-
neutral affirmative action with the Supreme Court's cases that prohibit 
programs that have both the purpose and effect of racial discrimination. 
Second, even if the courts decide not to adhere to these past cases, it is 
unclea~ whether race-neutral affirmative action is any less problematic 
than racially explicit affirmative action. Although race-neutral affirma-
tive action may be less divisive and less stigmatizing to its beneficiaries, 
I suspect it will be so much less efficient at bringing about racial diver-
sity that it will require institutions to make much greater sacrifices to 
other aspects of their missions. Indeed, the race-neutral programs that 
are likely to be the least divisive and least stigmatizing are probably also 
those that are the least efficient at diversifying. For both of these reasons, 
I am not sure race-neutral affirmative action is the panacea that many 
seem to think it is. 
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I. The Rise of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action 
As is well known, in the late 1960s, employers, governments, and uni-
versities began efforts to increase opportunities for racial minorities 
by granting preferences to blacks and Hispanics who applied for jobs, 
university admissions, and government contracts? These efforts were 
highly controversial from their inception-both politically and 
legally8-but they received qualified legal blessings from the United 
States Supreme Court in 1978 in education,9 in 1979 in employment,10 
and in 1980 in government contracting.11 As the federal judiciary 
became more conservative in the 1980s, the legal foundation of racially 
explicit affirmative began to weaken, 12 but it has thus far survived, if only 
by the narrowest of margins.13 Nonetheless, many observers believe it is 
only a matter of time before the legal foundation crumbles altogether.14 
Indeed, even jurists supportive of racially explicit affirmative action have 
said it should come to an end in the next several years.15 Courts hostile 
to racially explicit affirmative action have cited the availability of race-
neutral affirmative action as one reason for their hostility.16 
In some ways, the political fortunes of racially explicit affirmative 
action have improved over time even as its legal fortunes have declined. 
Although the Republican Party made these programs a prominent target 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the party has now largely abandoned its oppo-
sition.17 In light of the increasing racial diversity of the population of 
the United States, I believe the prospects for the opposition to resume 
are dim. Nonetheless, the programs remain unpopular with the public.18 
Consequently, antipreference activists have gone around the political 
parties in a number of states and directly to a plebiscite for votes to 
ban their governments (but not private parties) from using racial pref-
erences.19 These efforts have almost always succeeded and are likely to 
continue.20 To date, there are now six states where state governments 
and state universities have been prohibited from using racially explicit 
affirmative action by direct democracy: California (1996), 21 Washington 
(1998),22 Michigan (2006),23 Nebraska (2008),24 Arizona (2010),25 and 
Oklahoma (2012).26 Two other states have enacted these prohibitions 
through other means: Florida (1999)27 and New Hampshire (2011).28 
Where racially explicit affirmative action has been banned, the states 
faced a choice: forgo efforts to increase opportunities for racial minori-
ties or practice race-neutral affirmative action-that is, to find correlates 
with race and to replace preferences for race with preferences for those 
correlates. In many instances, state universities chose the latter course. 29 
As I explained above, one of the best-known examples is the University 
of Texas (which lost the ability to use race by court decision30), which 
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elevated high school class rank in its admissions decisions over any other 
criteria because it was better correlated with black and Hispanic appli-
cants.31 Other states-such as Califomia and Florida-also rely heavily 
on this correlate with race.32 Class rank is better correlated with race 
than other traditional admissions criteria in these states because the high 
schools are still so racially segregated.33 Other universities have used or 
considered using preferences for other correlates with race, including 
family income, residence in urban areas, and bilingualism.34 There is no 
reason similar correlates cannot be used to replace racial preferences in 
employment and even government contracting (a popular example in 
the latter context is preferences for smaller business).35 Although there 
have been periods of transition, these correlates have proven largely 
successful in achieving levels of racial diversity in universities similar 
to those achieved with racial preferences.36 It is harder to find data on 
employment and government contracts, but there is some evidence that 
race-neutral affirmative action has been less successful at diversifying in 
these contexts.37 
Many commentators believe that the trend in favor of race-neutral 
affirmative action will continue, compelled by the public, by the courts, 
or by both.38 Indeed, many commentators believe that racially explicit 
affirmative action will eventually meet its demise and that the only 
future for affirmative action in the United States is the race-neutral vari-
ety.39 On this point, it is interesting to note that race-neutral affirmative 
action apparently is now being used in other countries, even those that 
never had the appetite for the racially explicit variety.40 
Some commentators have celebrated this future while others have 
decried it.41 As I explain below, I am not persuaded that race-neutral 
affirmative action should fill the void that may be left by the demise 
of racially explicit affirmative action in the United States. As 1 explain, 
not only are race-neutral programs with racial purposes as legally dubi-
ous as racially explicit programs, but it also may very well be the case 
that race-neutral affirmative action is no less problematic than racially 
explicit affirmative action. 
II. Is Race-Neutral Affirmative Action Constitutional? 
Many commentators believe that race-neutral affirmative action can 
overcome the legal infirmities that still dog racially explicit affirmative 
action.42 As I have written in the past and as I explain in this section, I 
think the legal advantages of race-neutral affirmative action have been 
seriously overstated. 43 
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Racially explicit affirmative action is legally infirm because using racial 
classifications to burden or benefit individuals must pass the Supreme 
Court's "strict scrutiny" test in order to satisfy the Equal Protection 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Under this test, affirmative action must 
be supported by a "compelling government interest" and be "narrowly 
tailored" to support that interest.44 Although the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a few compelling interests in this context-for example, cor-
recting for an institution's own past discrimination45 and reaping the 
educational benefits of racial diversitl6-the Court continues to make 
it hard on racially explicit affirmative action.47 For example, in Fisher v. 
University of Texas,48 the Court sent a racially explicit affirmative action 
program back for further litigation over whether the university had 
proven that marginal educational benefits continued to accrue at the lev-
els of diversity it was seeking.49 The Court will consider the question 
anew this coming year. 
Some commentators believe that strict scrutiny can be avoided alto-
gether with race-neutral affirmative action because it does not rely on 
racial classifications,50 but I think this view is mistaken. In a number 
of cases, the Supreme Court has held that race-neutral classifications 
must satisfy the strict-scrutiny test when they have the same purpose 
and effect as racially explicit classifications.51 As the Court put it in one 
case, "[a] racial classification .. .is presumptively invalid and can be upheld 
only upon an extraordinary justification. This rule applies as well to a 
classification that is ostensibly neutral but is a ... pretext for racial discrirn-
ination."52 Almost by definition, these holdings would encompass race-
neutral affirmative action.53 
Other commentators believe that the legal parity between race-
neutral-but-racially-motivated classifications and racially explicit clas-
sifications should not include race-neutral classifications that are moti-
vated to help blacks and Hispanics as opposed to hurt them.54 But, as it 
has with so-called benign racially explicit classifications,55 the Supreme 
Court has already applied strict scrutiny to race-neutral classifications 
that seek to aid blacks and Hispanics in its voting-district gerrymander-
ing cases. 56 
In my view, there is only one way in which race-neutral affirmative 
action is on firmer legal footing than racially explicit affirmative action: 
the narrow-tailoring inquiry in the strict scrutiny test for race proxies is 
easier to satisfy than it is for racially explicit programs. 57 Other than that, 
however, race-neutral affirmative action would seem to have to over-
come all the same legal barriers that racially explicit affirmative action 
does, including the barrier for which the Supreme Court remanded in 
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Fisher: to show that marginal increases in racial diversity continue to fur-
ther a compelling interest. 
With all this said, it should be emphasized that the Supreme Court 
is much like the stock market in at least one respect: past performance 
is no guarantee of future success. The Court's personnel changes over 
time, and precedents are not always followed. Moreover, justices are free 
to change their minds. Constitutional law is, to a large extent, politi-
callaw,58 and, if race-neutral affirmative action maintains its popularity 
with the public, the Supreme Court may look for ways to facilitate it.59 
There is some reason to believe this transition is already underway.60 
Ill. The Social Desirability of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action 
Perhaps courts will give a green light to race-neutral affirmative action 
despite the precedents I marshaled in the previous part. Does that mean 
that race-neutral affirmative action should fill the void that many com-
mentators believe will be left by racially explicit affirmative action's 
demise? I am not so sure. As I explain in this part, it may very well be 
that race-neutral affirmative action is just as problematic as the racially 
explicit variety. 
A. The Advantages of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action 
There are some reasons to believe that race-neutral affirmative action 
will be less problematic than racial preferences. Many commentators, 
for example, favor race-neutral affirmative action because they believe 
it can achieve the same amount of racial diversity as racial preferences 
but without as much racial divisiveness.61 The assertion here is that the 
same people who find racially explicit affirmative action immoral or 
otherwise objectionable do not get as exercised about preferences of 
other sorts-even if those preferences are correlated with race and were 
selected for that very reason. Indeed, there does seem to be empirical 
support for the notion that the public favors at least some race-neutral 
programs more than racially explicit ones, such as the Texas Ten Per-
cent Plan and preferences based on family income.62 In many of these 
surveys, however, it may have been hard for the public to know whether 
the race-neutral program was or was not motivated by its racial effects 
as opposed to some end independent of racial diversity. Some commen-
tators are skeptical that the public will support these programs if it is 
aware of the racial motivations.63 On the other hand, the motivation 
behind the Texas Ten Percent Plan should have been apparent to any 
observer,64 and that does not seem to have detracted from its popular-
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ity. Thus, I tend to agree that race-neutral affirmative action is probably 
less divisive than the racially explicit variety. 
Other commentators believe that race-neutral affirmative action will 
not burden individuals aided by it with the same stigma that is asso-
ciated with preferences based on race.65 The notion here is that the 
same people who might think less of blacks or Hispanics because they 
may have been admitted to a university or received a government con-
tract or job in part because of their race will not think the same way if 
they received the same benefits because of other criteria-even if, again, 
those other criteria are correlated with race and selected for that very 
reason. This claim is harder to prove, and I am not aware of any empir-
ical evidence either for or against it. Nonetheless, for the same reason 
that race-neutral programs tend to be less divisive and more popular 
with the public, it may very well be that the beneficiaries of these pro-
grams are not held in lower regard. 
Some people also believe that race-neutral affirmative action is a less 
problematic way to generate racial diversity because it avoids the messy 
business of figuring out who belongs in one racial group or another in 
order to determine who should benefit from a racial preference and who 
should not. 66 Although this business may have been messy at one time, 
in recent years, racial preferences have largely operated on the "honor 
system," where individuals self-declare their race. 67 Thus, it strikes me 
that any advantage here may be insignificant. 
B. The Disadvantages of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action 
Although race-neutral affirmative action may offer some advantages 
over racially explicit affirmative action, I believe it also comes with dis-
advantages. The biggest problem with race-neutral affirmative action is 
that it is much less efficient at generating racial diversity than racial pref-
erences are.68 By definition, proxies or correlates for race will sweep in 
individuals of all races, including those for whom greater representation 
is not sought, usually whites and Asians.69 How much less efficient race-
neutral affirmative action is depends on how good the correlates for race 
are. Some correlates-such as residence in urban areas-may be highly 
correlated with race. For example, Wayne State Universily Law School 
in Michigan has adopted an admissions policy that gives preferences to 
applicants from Detroit, which is almost 90 percent black and Hispanic, 
in order to maintain diversity in the face of the ban on racial prefer-
ences in Michigan.7° But other correlates such as family income and 
high school class rank are very inefficient-blacks and Hispanics make 
up much smaller percentages of individuals from impoverished fami-
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lies or who graduated at the top of their high school class;71 these corre-
lates are not very good, but they are used because they are better than 
SAT scores. This loss in efficiency has a serious and negative implication: 
in order to achieve desired levels of diversity with race-neutral affirma-
tive action, universities, employers, and governments may have to forgo 
other criteria that are important to their missions. For example, under 
the Texas Ten Percent Plan, in order to achieve the same racial diversity 
it had when it used racial preferences, huge portions of the University of 
Texas had to be admitted on class rank alone;72 the state finally permit-
ted the University to cap Ten Percent admissions at 75 percent of each 
freshman class.73 All of the other characteristics that a university might 
think are important to assemble in a successful student body-good test 
scores, extracurricular activities, leadership skills, perseverance, and so 
on-must be relegated to the remaining 25 percent of the student body. 
That strikes me as an incredible sacrifice to institutional mission. 
Some commentators believe another disadvantage to race-neutral 
affirmative action is that it undermines transparency in government 
because race-neutral affirmative action obscures the racial motivations 
behind legislation.74 This may be one reason race-neutral affirmative 
action is less divisive than racially explicit affirmative action: the public 
simply may not realize that race-neutral affirmative action is motivated 
by racial diversity at all; perhaps if the public knew that, it would not 
support race-neutral affirmative action either. On the other hand, as I 
noted above, when I think it has been clear to the public that race-
neutral programs were racially motivated, as it was with the Texas Ten 
Percent Plan, the public still supports the programs more than it does 
racial preferences. Of course, the Texas Ten Percent Plan is only one 
example, and it may be true as a general matter that it is difficult for 
the public to see the ''affirmative action" side to race-neutral affirmative 
action. Certain schools of political science might see this as a cost to 
race-neutral affirmative action. 
Some commentators also oppose race-neutral affirmative action 
because they think its success is a product of-rather than an antidote 
to- discrimination against blacks and Hispanics.75 For example, univer-
sity preferences based on class rank achieve diversity only to the extent 
that school segregation persists. Preferences for urban residents do so 
only to the extent that neighborhoods are segregated by race. Prefer-
ences for family income do so only to the extent that blacks and His-
panics are stuck in greater poverty than whites and Asians. For these 
commentators, race-neutral programs "lock in" racial segregation and 
disadvantages based on race rather than break them?6 This argument 
has some rhetorical appeal, but I am unsure if race-neutral affirma-
152 A Nation of Widening Opportunities 
live action does any less to free blacks and Hispanics from, for exam-
ple, poverty and segregation than racially explicit affirmative action. If 
racially explicit affirmative action in education, employment, and gov-
ernment contracting mitigates poverty and segregation by increasing 
the wealth and improving the aspirations among blacks and Hispanics as 
many commentators suggest,77 then why would race-neutral affirmative 
action not do the same so long as it places the same numbers of blacks 
and Hispanics into these opportunities? In other words, I am not sure 
this should count as a "cost" of using race-neutral affirmative action to 
bring about racial diversity. 
C. Assessment 
Although the empirical evidence is somewhat undeveloped, race-
neutral affirmative action may well be able to generate the same racial 
diversity as racially explicit affirmative action without two serious down-
sides: racial divisiveness and stigmatization. At the same time, however, 
it may impose a cost of its own: because it is a less efficient means to 
achieving racial diversity, it may force institutions to sacrifice other ends 
important to their missions. A rigorous assessment of these costs and 
benefits is a difficult endeavor that certainly goes beyond the scope of 
this book chapter, if it is possible at all. That is, it may be impossible to 
discern (at least in any coherent way) which is worse: fostering racial ani-
mosity and social stigma or undermining the institutional missions of 
our universities and governments. 
Nonetheless, there is one feature of the above discussion that leads 
me to suspect that it is unlikely that race-neutral affirmative action will 
be any less socially problematic than racially explicit affirmative action. 
This feature is that the advantages offered by a race-neutral affirmative 
action program are likely to be directly correlated with its disadvan-
tages. In other words, the race-neutral programs that will be the least 
divisive and least stigmatizing are probably the same ones that rely on the 
weakest correlates for race and will pose the greatest costs to institutional 
missions. I think this might be the case for two reasons. First, weaker 
correlates benefit whites and Asians more frequently; thus, from simple 
self-interest, individuals from these groups (the groups mostly likely to 
find such programs divisive and to impose social stigma on others) may 
well prefer weaker correlates. Second, because they are so inefficient, it 
may be less apparent from weaker correlates that they were adopted for 
racial reasons. This could lead to more support from whites and Asians 
if racial motivations behind legislative programs are what triggers oppo-
sition to them. 
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Indeed, as I noted, preferences based on family income and, in the 
university setting, high school class rank (such as the Texas Ten Percent 
Plan) tend to be popular with the public, but these criteria are at the 
same time poorly correlated with race. In regions with segregated 
schools like Texas, the racial composition of individuals with top high 
school rankings will be little different than the racial composition of 
high school-aged students in the region overall; although this may make 
class rank a better correlate with race than other traditional university 
admissions criteria, it is still a weak one. Family income is a somewhat 
better proxy for race-the racial composition of families in poverty is 
more skewed toward blacks and Hispanics than is the overall popula-
tion78-but even this correlation is not particularly strong. 
If I am correct about this, and only those race-neutral programs that 
require institutions to make the greatest sacrifices to their missions will 
offer corresponding advantages over racially explicit affirmative action, 
then it is easy to see how race-neutral affirmative action may be no less 
costly to society than is racially explicit affirmative action. 
IV. Conclusion 
Many advocates of racial diversity have pinned their hopes on race-
neutral affirmative action to take the place of racially explicit affirmative 
should it meet its political or legal demise. But I do not see race-neutral 
affirmative action as the panacea that some do. Although race-neutral 
programs appear to have the support of increasingly conservative courts 
and of many commentators, these judges and commentators have not 
yet wrestled with what I believe are serious constitutional questions 
posed by these programs. Moreover, even if these questions are pushed 
to the side, it is not clear to me that race-neutral programs are any 
less problematic: the very programs that are likely to offer the greatest 
advantages over racial preferences may very well pose the greatest costs. 
As a result, if the future of affirmative action is indeed to be race-neutral, 
it may not be a particularly happy one for proponents of increased 
opportunities for blacks and Hispanics. 
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to congressional judgment that a remedial race-conscious contracting program 
is necessary to ensure equal protection). The Court later retreated from Fullilove, 
holding that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review for race-conscious 
contracting preferences. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995). 
12. SeeKENNEDY, supra note 7, at 54- 69 (discussing the "affirmative action stalemate" 
that has developed since the late 1970s); ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 189-205 
(describing the halting narrowing of affirmative action in the 1980s and general 
solidarity of Reagan appointees in opposing racial preferences). In a survey of 
federal district judges in the early 1990s, approximately 78 percent agreed with 
the statement, "Overall, the federal judiciary is becoming more 'conservative' 
than it was in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s." SeeKEVIN K. LYLES, THE 
GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS lN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 28-30 (1997). 
This is no doubt a residual effect of President Reagan's unprecedented 
opportunity to remake the federal judiciary: Reagan made more appointments 
to the circuit courts of appeals than any other President and is second only 
to President Clinton for number of district court appointments. U.S. COURTS, 
jUDGESHIP APPOINTMENTS BY PRESIDENT, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
JudgesAndjudgeshipsNiewer.aspx?doc=/ uscourts/judgesJudgeships/docs/ 
appointments-by-president.pdf (last visited jan. 28, 2014); see David M. O'Brien, 
Federal Judgeships in Retrospect, inTHE REAGAN PRESIDENCY: PRAGMATIC 
CONSERVATISM & ITS LEGACIES 327, 327 (W. Elliot Brownlee & Hugh Davis Graham 
eds., 2003) ("Reagan appointed close to half of all lower court judges, more 
than any other previous president."). Most of these appointees were "opposed to 
[racial] preferences" and laid the foundation for later Supreme Court decisions 
"dirninish[ing] affirmative action." ANDERSON, supra, at 215-16. See 
generallyTHOMAS M. KECK, T HE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE 
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ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2010) (recounting the emergence of 
conservative judicial activism in the late 1970s and 1980s). 
13. See, e.g .• Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (sustaining the University of 
Michigan Law School's affirmative action program by 5-4 vote). 
14. E.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION: STATE UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL 
PREFERENCES 1, 7- 10 (2012) (hereinafter KAHLENBERG, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION], available at http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf ("After almost a 
half century, American higher education's use of racial preferences in admissions 
to selective colleges may well be coming to an end:'); Kim Forde-Mazrui, The 
Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 
2337-51 (2000) (questioning the legal future of race-conscious affirmative action); 
Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color-Blind Constitution, 54 WASH. U.]. URB. & 
CoNTEMP. L. 157, 207 (1998) ("[A]n overly strict application of the race-neutral 
alternatives ... [would] assure that strict scrutiny is indeed fatal in fact. There are 
always theoretically workable race-neutral alternatives available, and they almost 
always fail to work."). 
15. Justice O'Connor, who joined with her more liberal colleagues to provide the 
critical fifth vote in Grutter, famously predicted: "We expect that 25 years from 
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today." 539 U.S. at 343. 
16. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420-21 (2013) (holding the 
court of appeals failed to determine that adding a race-conscious component 
to a race-neutral affirmative action program was "necessary ... to achieve the 
educational benefits of diversity" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
17. For example, although Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush waged several 
high-profile battles against affirmative action, George W. Bush basically 
abandoned the issue-if not switched sides on it. See, e.g., Harry Stein, Now the 
GOP Is for Affirmative Action?, CITY JOURNAL (Autumn 2006), http://www.city-
journal.org/html/16 _ 4_gop_affirmative_action.html ("[T]he Republican 
backtracking on preferences in Michigan reflects a quiet but steady shift in the 
national party, too, with the Bush administration undercutting affirmative-action 
foes-longtime GOP supporters-by embracing the 'diversity' mantra that 
liberals so fervently preach."). Likewise, recent Republican presidential candidates 
have not emphasized the issue. See, e.g.. Peter Schmidt, Texas Lawsuit Complicates 
Presidential Race, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 30, 2012, http://chronicle.com/ 
anicle/ U -of-Texas-Admissions-Case/133203 ("Mr. Romney's campaign has yet 
to make any major pronouncements on affirmative action and ... [his] record on 
affirmative action is difficult to parse."). Similarly, while California Governor Pete 
Wilson made enactment of Proposition 209, a direct democracy initiative 
banning racial preferences by state government, a centerpiece of his 
administration in lhe 1990s, no governor in recent years has done so. See B. 
Drummond Ayres Jr., On Affirmative Action, Wilson's Moderate Path Quickly Veered 
to Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/08/us/on-
affirmative-action-wilson-s-moderate-path-veered-quickly-to-right.html?. 
18. The public gives conflicting answers when it is asked whether it supports "racial 
preferences" (no) or "affirmative action" (yes). SeePEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC 
BACKS AFFlRMAT!VE ACTION, BUT NOT MINORITY PREFERENCES Uune 2, 2009), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/2009/ 06/02/public-backs-affirmative-action -but-
not-minority-preferences/. The more meaningful surveys move beyond these 
vague terms and ask the public directly whether it supports using race as a factor 
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in decision making. Americans have consistently opposed this practice; a recent 
poll found opposition by a two-to-one margin (67 percem to 28 percem) even if 
it "result[ed] in few minority students being admitted" to colleges. jeffrey M. 
jones, In U.S., Most Reject Considering Race in College Admissions, GALLUP POLL NEWS 
SERV. (July 24, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163655/reject-considering-race-
college-admissions.aspx. 
19. SeeKENNEDY, supra note 7, at 69-76 (discussing California's Proposition 209 and 
subsequent ballot initiatives to ban affirmative action); DANIEL C. LEWIS, DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY AND MINORITY RIGHTS 42- 44 (2013) (evaluating role of direct 
democracy in state affirmative action bans). 
20. As of this writing, voters in six states have succeeded in banning affirmative 
action through referenda. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. The 2008 
ballot initiative in Colorado remains the only failed statewide attempt to ban 
racial preferences through direct democracy. See Reeves Wiedeman, How Colorado 
Became the First State to Reject a Ban on Ajfinnative Action, CllRON. OF HJCIIER EDUC., 
Nov. 10, 2008, http://chronicle.com/ article/ Analysis-Why-Colorado-Failed/1317; 
see also Sam Howe Verhovek, Referendum in Houston Shows Comple:rity of Preferences 
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/ ll/06/ us/ 
1997 -elections-affirmative-action -referendum-houston -shows-
complexity.html?pagewanted=aU&src=pm (reporting on failed ballot initiative in 
Houston). For an accounting of state-based efforts to ban affirmative action, see 
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, AfFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE ACTION 
(Nov. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/affirmative-action-state-
action.aspx. 
21. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (Proposition 209). See generallyLYDIA CHAVEZ, THE COLOR 
BIND: CALIFORNIA'S CAMPAIGN TO END AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1998). 
22. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2013) (Initiative 200). 
23. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26 (Proposal 2). The Michigan ban was upheld by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & 
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 
1623 (2014). 
24. NEB. CaNST. art. I, § 30 (Initiative 424). 
25. Aruz. CaNST. art. II, § 36 (Proposition 107). 
26. OKLA. CaNST. art. II, § 36A (Question 759). 
27. In 1999, Governor jeb Bush banned the use of race or gender preference in 
college admissions by executive order. Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 2009), 
available at http://www.dms.myflorida.com/contentldownload/705/ 3389/ file/ 
Executive0rder99-28l.pdf. This was a supplement to the state's general ban on 
discrimination in public education. SeeFLA. STAT. ANN. § 1000.05(2) (West 2013). 
In early 2000, the Florida Board of Regents adopted the governor's ban on 
affirmative action and his proposal for a "talented twenty" percentage plan. Karla 
Schuster, Regents Approve One Florida Plan, ORLANDO SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 2000, 
http://articles.sun -sentinel.com/ 2000-02-18/ news/ 0002180223 _1_new-
admissions-admissions-rules-preferences; see also Peter T. Kilborn, Jeb Bush Roils 
Florida on Affinnative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2000/ 02/04/ us/jeb-bush-roils-florida-on-affirmative-action.html (discussing 
E.O. 99-281 and the "One Florida" program). 
28. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 21-!:52 (2013) (House Bill 623). 
29. See, e.g., KAHLENBERC, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 26-63 
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(describing states' and universities' responses to affirmative action bans); 
KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 92 ("One response is to create interventions sensitive 
to the racial dimensions of class stratification."); David Leonhardt, The New 
Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES MAc., Sept. 30,2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
09/ 30/ magazine/ 30affirmative-t.html (chronicling changes in the University of 
California System post-Prop. 209). 
30. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996). 
31. Seesupra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
32. See Fitzpatrick, Texas Ten Percent Plan, supra note 2, at 290 (noting that California 
and Florida have implemented plans that guarantee admission to the top 4 and 
20 percent of students, respectively). 
33. See id. at 847 ("Members of the Texas Legislature shrewdly identified class rank as 
the race-neutral university admissions criterion on which blacks and Hispanics 
performed better than any other ... "). 
34. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies for Race after the Ban 
on Racial Preferences?, 13 MICH. j. RAcE & L. 277, 278-79, 292 (2007) [hereinafter 
Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies?] ("[Michigan) universities have 
identified a number of criteria which would appear to correlate fairly well with 
African American, Hispanic, and Native American applicants: bilingualism, 
residency on an Indian reservation or in Detroit, and experience overcoming 
discrimination."); see alsol<AHLENBERG, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 
14, at 52 (noting Michigan's preference for background factors such as "cultural 
awareness/experiences, status as first generation college student, low economic 
family background, and residence in an economically disadvantaged region"); 
UNIV. OF WASH., OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, FRESHMAN REVIEW, 
http://admit.washington.edu/ Admission/ Freshmen/ Review Oast visited Jan. 31, 
2014) (considering personal characteristics such as "[a)ttaining a college-
preparatory education in the face of significant personal adversity, or 
disability ... [or] economic disadvantage" and "[d)emonstrating cultural 
awareness"). 
35. The Small Business Administration, for example, has a program of technical and 
financial support for small, disadvantaged businesses (SDBs). 13 C.F.R. § 124.101 et 
seq. (2013) (establishing eligibility requirements for SDBs); see City of Richmond 
v. j.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) ("[A] race -neutral program of city 
financing for small firms would, a fortiori , lead to greater minority participation."); 
id. at 526 (Scalia, ]., concurring) (noting that small-business preferences "may well 
have racially disproportionate impact," but are nonetheless permissible); see also 
Gilbert j . Ginsburg & Janine S. Benton, One Year Later: Affirmative Action in Federal 
Government Contracting after Ada.rand, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1903, 1917- 45 (describing 
federal programs designed to benefit SOBs). 
36. Seel<AHLENBERC, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 26- 63 (profiling 
states that have banned affirmative action in college admissions). 
37. See David G. Blanchflower & Jon S. Wainwright, An Analysis of the Impact of 
Affirmative Action Programs on Self-Employment in the Construction Industry 12-16, 
24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11793, 2005), available 
at http://papc:rs.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papcrs.cfm?abstract_id•851702 ("[W)hcn [race-
conscious) programs are removed or replaced with race-neutral programs the 
utilization of minorities and women in public construction declines rapidly."); 
MARfA E. ENCHAUTECUI ET AL., THE URBAN INST., Do MINORITY-OWNED 
BUSINESSES GET A FAIR SHARE OF GOVERNMENT COf\TRACI'S? 62 (1997} 
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("[D]isparities [in contracting] are greater in those areas in which there is no 
affirmative action program in place."). Isolated data also suggest that states with 
bans on race-conscious affirmative action have seen a decrease in minority 
contracting. See, e.g., MICH. ROUNDTABLE FOR DIVERSITY & INCLUSION, AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION DENIED: MICHIGAN IN TilE WAKE Of PROPOSAL 2, at 14 (2013), available 
at http://www.miroundtable.org/assets/postproptworeport_8_30.pdf (finding 
"Michigan has had a very low number of minority and women-owned contracts 
with the state"); james Nash, Whites Get 92% of Contracts in Post-Affirmative Action 
LA., BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, May 9, 2013, 5:37PM, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2013-05-09/ white-men-get-92-of-contracts-in-post-affirmative-action-l-a-
_html (reporting that white men received 92 percent of all contracts with Los 
Angeles despite comprising just 14 percent of the city's population). 
38. See, e.g., I<AHLENBERG, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 4-10 
(explaining why racial preferences are legally and politically vulnerable); Gregory 
Rodriguez, The White Anxiety Crisis, TIME, Mar. 11, 2010, http://content.time.com/ 
time/ specials/packages/ article/0,28804,1971133 _19711 I 0 _1971119,00.html 
(predicting that demographic changes may cause whites to "develop a stronger 
consciousness of their political interests as a group"); Nina Totenberg, Supreme 
Court Wades into Affirmative Action, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 21, 2012, 4:14 PM), 
hup://www.npr.org/ 2012/02/21/147212858/supreme-court-wades-into-
affirmative-action-issue (noting that the decisive vote in Grutter,justice O'Connor, 
was replaced by justice Alito, who "has quite consistently been hostile to the idea 
of racial preferences"). 
39. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
40. E.g., KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 248-49 ("French authorities have quietly sought to 
influence the racial demographics of college admissions ... by using as criteria of 
eligibility for benefits the residential location and socio-economic class position 
of candidates-in other words, 'race neutral' affirmative action."). 
41. Compare Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 5, at 1060, 1099 
("If genuine equal opportunity is the agreed-upon end, class-based preference 
is the obvious remedy."), with Richard H. Fallon Jr., Affirmative Action Based on 
Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1913, 1951 (1996) ("[W]e should not allow 
proposals for economically based affirmative action to divert attention from the 
need for other, more effective public policies to combat both poverty and race-
based disadvantage.''). 
42. See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 21 ("Even 
opponems of using race in student assignment concede that using socioeconomic 
status is perfectly legal."); John Martinez, Trivializing Diversity: The Problem of 
Overinclusion in Affirmative Action Programs, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER LJ. 49, 54 (1995) 
("If we reconstrUct affirmative action programs according to neutral criteria, then 
minimum rationality judicial review would apply instead of strict scrutiny ... "). 
43. See Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies?, supra note 34, at 281 
("[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not only are explicit racial classifications 
subjected to strict scrutiny, but so are race -neutral classifications that have the 
same purpose and effect as the explicit ones."); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. 
Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg,J.. dissenting) ("[O]nly an ostrich could regard the 
supposedly neutral alternatives as race unconscious."); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 
43 UCLA L. REv. 1781, 1791 (1996) ("The central problem is that the race-neutral 
means still have a race-conscious motivation."); Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-
Based Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs after Miller v. Johnson: A Race-
Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1289, 1297 (1997)("[W]henever 
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the Court suspects a racial motivation behind an ostensibly neutral statute, the 
principle against subterfuge will prohibit the government from doing covertly 
what it may not do overtly."); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 14, at 2333 ("A serious 
problem facing these ostensibly race-neutral efforts to increase minority 
representation in higher educ:ation ... is that such efforts are themselves race-
conscious state action that may violate the Equal Protection Clause." (citation 
omitted)). 
44. See, e.g. , City of Richmond v. j.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 485-86 (1989) 
(invalidating Richmond's minority subcontracting quota because it was not 
"narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose"). 
45. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("The 
Government unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and 
present discrimination by a state actor."). 
46. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause 
does not prohibit ... narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further 
a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a 
diverse student body."). 
47. Some have argued that the Court did not faithfully apply strict scrutiny in Grutter. 
See, e.g. , Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tel~ Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring after 
Grutter & Gratz, 85 TEx. L. REv. 517, 581 n.223 (2007) ("The extreme deference that 
Justice O'Connor showed to state officials is deeply inconsistent with the whole 
idea of strict scrutiny as an attempt to smoke out unjustified governmental racial 
preferences."). 
48. 570 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
49. After observing that the Ten Percent Plan alone had "resulted in a more raciaJly 
diverse environment," the Court remanded the case because the Fifth Circuit 
failed to perform the "searching examination" of whether adding a race-
conscious component was "necessary ... to achieve the educational benefits of 
diversity." /d. at 2414, 2416 (internal quotation marks omitted); see alsoid. at 2424 
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[D]iversity ... cannot be an end pursued for its own 
sake."); cjSANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 288 (noting that the racial -preferences 
component is "vulnerable even under Grutter" because the University of Texas is 
"one of the few elite universities that already has a facially race-neutral system"). 
50. See, e.g. , Martinez, supra note 42, at 54 (arguing that race-neutral criteria will 
bypass strict scrutiny); KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 176-77 (noting that many "color-
blind immediatists" are willing to countenance race-neutral plans provided they 
"are silent as to race"). 
51. See, e.g. , Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227- 28, 233 (1985) (holding that 
a provision in the Alabama Constitution disenfranchising citizens convicted of 
"crimes involving moral turpitude" violated the Equal Protection Clause because 
the legislature chose crimes that affected ten times as many African Americans 
as whites); see also, e.g. , Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461-62 
(1979) (invalidating several race-neutral actions by the school board, including 
the "use of optional attendance zones, discontiguous attendance areas, ... boundary 
changes[,] and the selection of sites for new school construction" because they 
uhad the foreseeable and anticipated effect of maintaining the racial separation of 
the schools" (footnotes omitted)); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 418 U.S. 189, 201 (1973) 
(holding that "concentrating Negroes in certain schools by structuring attendance 
zones or designating 'feeder' schools" can violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
In voting-district gerrymandering cases specifically, the Court has held that race-
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neutral reapportionment plans animated by race-conscious motivations violate 
the Equal Protection Clause. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546-49 (1999}; 
Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993). 
52. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (citations orniued); accordHunt, 
526 U.S. at 546 ("A facially neutral law ... warrants strict scrutiny ... if it can be proved 
that the law was 'motivated by a racial purpose ... "'). 
53. See Fitzpatrick, Texas Ten Percent Plan, supra note 2, at 314-20, 334-35; Fitzpatrick, 
Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies?, supra note 34, at 284. I say "almost" by 
definition because it is not altogether clear what constitutes a "racial effect" in 
this line of Supreme Court jurisprudence; it all depends on what the baseline of 
comparison is, and the Court has used a number of different baselines over the 
years. See Fitzpatrick, Texas Ten Percent Plan, supra, at 298-306 (discussing different 
forms of "racial effects"). 
54. See Michael C. Dorf, Universities Adjust to State Affinnative Action Bans: Are the 
New Programs Legal? Are they a Good Idea?, FINDLAW's WRlT Uan. 29, 2007), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070129.html ("I would say that the justices 
would not subject [race-neutral affirmative action] to strict scrutiny."). 
55. E.g. , Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) ("The 
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one 
individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If 
both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."); accord Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742 {2007) ("Th[e] 
argument that different rules should govern racial classifications designed to 
include rather than exclude is not new; it has been repeatedly pressed in the past, 
and has been repeatedly rejected." (internal citations omitted)); City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) ("We thus reaffirm the view ... that the 
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the 
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification."). But seeParents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 830-38 (Breyer,]., dissenting) (disputing that the Court has 
ever "repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which seeks to 
exclude and that which seeks to include members of minority races" (citation 
omitted)). 
56. See, e.g., Hunt, 526 U.S. at 546 (applying strict scrutiny to facially neutral law that 
is "'motivated by a racial purpose or object,' or if it is 'unexplainable on grounds 
other than race"' (internal citations omitted)); Miller, 515 U.S. at 911- 13 (holding 
that Georgia's redistrict plan fails strict scrutiny notwithstanding the fact that the 
plan was "race neutral on [its) face"); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653 (instructing the district 
court to apply strict scrutiny if petitioners' allegation of racial gerrymandering is 
not contradicted). 
57. See Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies?, supra note 34, at 291-92. 
58. For a general treatment, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How 
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
59. Seesupra notes 18, 50, & 54 and infra note 62. 
60. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy leaves doubt whether he would continue 
to subject race-neutral affirmative action to strict scrutiny: "[Facially neutral] 
mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on 
a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is 
unlikely any of them wouJd demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible." 551 
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U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, ]., concuning in part and concurring injudgrnent). 
I have explained elsewhere why I do not think Justice Kennedy's opinion should 
be understood to cast doubt on his adherence to precedents in this area, but it 
is admittedly far from clear what he meant here. See Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan 
Universities Use Pro.xies?, supra note 34, at 289-91 ("Although I think one could 
read Justice Kennedy's further dicta here to suggest that he no longer thinks 
that the Constitution is as concerned with racial gerrymandering as it is with 
explicit racial discrimination, .. .in my view, the meaning Justice Kennedy most 
likely intended was one suggesting that, if the Court adopts the 'predominant' 
motivation standard ... , then it will be harder for plaintiffs to make the necessary 
showing to invoke strict scrutiny."). 
61. See, e.g. , Ayres, supra note 43, at 1790 ("[R]ace-neutral classifications seem less likely 
to provoke the kind of racial enmity that would itself undermine the remedial 
purpose of the legislative action."); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 14, at 2371-75 ("Race-
neutral classifications are significantly less likely than racial classifications to 
perpetuate racial stereotypes or racial hostility ... "); Don Munro, Note, The 
Continuing Evolution of Ajfinnative Action under Title VII: New Directions after the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 81 VA. L REv. 565, 606- 07 (1995) ("[C]lass-based preferences 
would provide a less controversial means of achieving minority gains in 
employment."). 
62. Kahlenberg surveys the public's preference for economic affirmative action vis-a-
vis racial preferences: 
In 2003, for example, a Los Angeles Times survey found that Americans opposed (56 
percent to 26 percent) the University of Michigan's racial preference policy, but those 
same Americans supported preferences for low-income students (59 percent to 31 
percent). A Newsweek poll around that same time likewise found that Americans 
opposed preferences for blacks in university admissions (68 percent to 26 percent) 
but supported preferences for economically disadvantaged students (65 percent to 28 
percent). A third poll, by EPIC/MRA, also found that voters opposed the University of 
Michigan's affirmative action plan (63 percent to 27 percent) but supported preferences 
for economically disadvantaged students (57 percent to 36 percent). A subsequent 2005 
New York Times poll put support for socioeconomic preferences at nearly 85 percent. 
l<AHLENBERG, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 6 (footnotes 
omitted). In addition, a 2005 poll found that 82 percent of Texans supported 
the Ten Percent Plan. See Katie Shepherd & Dominique Cambou, Top 10 Percent 
Law Vital For UT, THE DAILY TEXAN, Mar. 28, 2005, available at 
http://www.texastoplO.princeton.edu/publicity/ general/DailyTexan033005.pdf; 
see also supra note 18. 
63. SeeKENNEDY, supra note 7, at 92-94 ("Eligibility rules that say nothing explicitly 
about race but are wealth sensitive wil1 still draw fire from detractors who will 
claim that the rules camouflage a racial Trojan horse ... "). 
64. See Fitzpatrick, Texas Ten Percent Plan, supra note 2, at 323-34 (reviewing the 
legislative history of the Ten Percent Plan and motivation of its proponents). 
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The judicial Repeal of the johnson/ 
Kennedy Administration's "Signature" 
Achievement 
judge Nancy Gertner (Ret.) 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 which has been called "one of the most 
significant legislative achievements in American history,"2 has been gut-
ted. Responsibility lies not with Congress or an executive agency. For the 
most part, it lies with the third branch-the judges of the United States 
courts. Federal judges, from the trial courts to the Supreme Court, from 
one end of the country to the other, of all political affiliations, have inter-
preted the Act virtually, although not entirely, out of existence. 
Many scholars have identified the pattern: plaintiffs in discrimination 
cases tend to lose on summary judgment, more so than any other party 
in any other type of case.3 If they manage to get to trial and, significantly, 
if they convince a jury of their claims, their damage verdicts run a sub-
stantial risk of being reduced by trial judges and their counsel's fees 
slashed-again more than the verdicts or fees of plaintiffs and plain-
tiffs' counsel in any other category of case.4 On appeal, the story is even 
more striking: while summary judgment dismissals are overwhelmingly 
affirmed by appellate courts, even successful plaintiffs' verdicts are 
reversed more than jury verdicts in other types of cases. One has to 
166 A Nation of Widening Opportunities 
pause at that statistic: it is one thing to reject a claim without giving 
plaintiffs the benefit of a jury determination. That result is troubling 
enough since discrimination cases involve the quintessential jury ques-
tion-namely, "What is the defendant's motive in dismissing the plain-
tiff?" "Was the plaintiff denied a promotion 'because of discriminatory 
animus?" But it is even more troubling to reject a jury's determination of 
damages, or worse, overturn its verdicts in a system that ostensibly val-
ues that decision maker above all. 
It is not simply that plaintiffs lose but how they lose-in decision 
after decision that effectively legitimize discriminatory practices and 
behavior that would have been abhorrent when the Civil Rights Act 
was passed.5 In 1976, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis 
was narrowed when the Supreme Court restricted it to intentional dis-
crimination in Washington v. Davis. 6 More recent cases suggest the will-
ingness of the Court to apply the same or similar analysis to statutory 
discrimination claims? But even as limited to intentional discrimina-
tion, current case law is extraordinary. It appears to restrict or even 
reject a range of entirely competent evidence from which discrimina-
tory intent may be inferred. It is ironic: just as the social-psychological 
literature identifies implicit race and gender bias-in organizational set-
tings, in apparently neutral evaluative processes, and among decision 
makers of different races or gender-federal discrimination law moves 
in the opposite direction, trivializing even evidence of explicit bias.8 
I want to understand why. First, is it a matter of ideology, in the sense 
of a system of beliefs fueled more and more by a more conservative 
Supreme Court and adopted by judges across the country? Do they sim-
ply accept the view that we are in a postracial, postgendered society? As 
others and I have described elsewhere, it is as if the bench is saying in its 
opinions: "Discrimination is over. The market is bias-free. The law's job 
is to find the truly aberrant actor who just didn't get the memo."9 The 
phenomenon that is discrimination can be reduced to a simple para-
digm-explicitly discriminatory policies and rogue individuals. If a case 
does not precisely reflect those facts-and few do in the twenty-first 
century-they are without merit. Surely some judges, if pressed, would 
agree with this position, but does it adequately explain the antidiscrim-
ination plaintiff bias across the country, at alllevels-notjust the fact of 
dismissal but the content of the decisions? 
Second, is that ideological perspective in fact true? Are most federal 
cases frivolous, with dismissals roughly commensurate with the num-
bers of insubstantial cases? According to this view, employment discrim-
ination law has worked. The market is bias-free, leaving litigation only 
for the extreme, the explicit, the aberrant cases. judges are appropri-
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ately reflecting the progress that discrimination law has reaped. Statis-
tics about wage disparity as between women and men, blacks and whites, 
about the persistence of the "glass ceiling" for women, about maternal 
discrimination, to name a few, however, suggest otherwise.10 
Or, third, is it simply selection bias in the federal courts? Have decades 
of narrowing discrimination law, rightly or wrongly, led plaintiffs' coun-
sel to choose state court over federal court, thereby skewing the federal 
pool. Recent studies suggest that federal discrimination filings have 
declined; plaintiffs are literally voting with their feet to more responsive 
state courts. II The cases remaining in federal court, according to this 
view, are the least substantial ones. And even among the cases in federal 
court, so the argument goes, the better cases are settled, leaving the 
weak ones at the mercy of summary judgment motions and vulnerable 
verdicts.12 Does selection bias fully account for the numbers of cases 
dismissed, verdicts slashed or overturned, or the reasoning of the deci-
sions in these cases? The substantive law of discrimination-the fact pat-
terns described in the case law and then rejected by the courts as not 
amounting to discrimination even on a forgiving summary judgment 
standard-suggest that something else is afoot. At least as described in 
opinions, many of these cases are not insubstantial for summary judg-
ment purposes. They include, for example, narratives of the use of the 
N-word, of sexual harassment, and even of stalking the plaintiff, which 
a jury might accept or reject or might consider pervasive or minor-yet 
they are rejected by the courts. 
Fo~rth, or is it, as some federal judges have insisted, that the national 
patterns reflect nothing more than their fealty to the law? They maintain 
that the Supreme Court law has set a high bar for discrimination cases 
and that they are just following that lead. With respect to· procedural 
rules, like the standards governing statutes of limitations13 or perfecting 
a claim of sexual harassment-that is, whether the plaintiff complained 
to her supervisor about coworker sexual harassment, 14 they have no dis-
cretion. But the procedural tules that bar the plaintiff's claims do not 
fully account for the national trends-for courts making subjective judg-
ments rejecting sexual harassment claims because they are not suffi-
ciently "severe and pervasive" to be actionable15 or dismissing racist or 
sexist remarks as merely "stray remarks," not reflecting bias. No binding 
precedent obliges a court to minimize such testimony, to "slice and dice" 
evidence of discrimination, and reject it out ofhand.16 
Fina]ly, are there pressures (or implicit biases) that cut across political 
affiliation and ideology to affect judges in their subjective judgments 
about what is or is not discrimination? One pressure is what Professor 
Judith Resnik has called the pressure to be a managerial judge,l7 which 
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has created a culture in which judges are encouraged to resolve cases 
without trials, in which formal opinions are to be avoided, and in which 
the high transaction costs associated with civil litigation may well be 
seen as more important than redressing inequality.18 Put otherwise, 
under this approach to judging, courts are more concerned with false 
positives, the wrongful accusation of bias, and the litigation costs accom-
panying it than false negatives, an unredressed claim of discrimination. 
They are bound to err on the side of rejecting discrimination claims in 
making the judgments the law encourages them to make. 
These patterns are then reflected in, and exacerbated by, a phenome-
non I have described recently as "Losers' Rules": 
• Asymmetric decisionmaking-where judges are encouraged to write 
detailed decisions when granting summary judgment and not to write when 
denying it-fundamentally changes the lens through which employment 
cases are viewed, in two respects. First, it encourages judges to see employ-
ment discrimination cases as trivial or frivolous, as decision after decision 
details why the plaintiff loses. And second, it leads to the development of 
decision heuristics-the Losers' Rules-that serve to justify prodefendant 
outcomes over and over again, exacerbating the one-sided development of 
the law.19 
The law of discrimination becomes more and more skewed now not 
only with procedural rules defining when to sue or to whom to complain 
but aJ.so with substantive standards that judges simply choose to apply 
in ways that disadvantage plaintiffs-doctrines like "stray remarks" that 
excuse explicitly biased statements, "honest belief" in which the court 
characterizes the employer as being in good faith, or judicial determi-
nations of when harassment is "severe and pervasive."20 Make no mis-
take: the law does not mandate any particular outcome in these cases; no 
judge is required by law to trivialize a racist or sexist remark or excuse 
a pattern of conduct. But judges regularly do so, dismissing cases or 
reversing verdicts, and if they do, they are likely to be affirmed by the 
appellate courts. 
If there are nonideological pressures that are skewing the outcomes 
in these cases, how can they be changed? The disclosure of discrimina-
tion patterns on a judge-by-judge basis might well make a difference. 
Take sentencing, for example. Federal judges strongly resisted the dis-
closure of the sentencing practices and patterns of individual judges for 
fear it would unleash a political backlash. The Sentencing Commission 
kept that information, but only provided it when an individual judge 
requested it. Indeed, so resistant were the judges to this disclosure that 
they specifically negotiated with the Sentencing Commission to pro-
tect their confidentiality.21 Looking at civil rights cases, would it mat-
Repeal of the Johnson/Kennedy Admin istration's ''Signature" Achievement 169 
ter to a judge if statistics showed that he or she dismissed 100 percent 
of discrimination cases in a two-year period as one study in the North-
ern District of Atlanta has shown? Or are the discrimination enforce-
ment 'System so skewed and judicial attitudes so ossified that we should 
entirely reconsider the private attorneys' general/private lawyer model 
of enforcement? Should we look again at an adjudicative agency, like 
the National Labor Relations Board, or an executive agency with more 
robust powers than the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission? 
All that is clear is that the current system-private lawsuits, judicial 
enforcement- is flawed.22 
I first outline the data on employment discrimination cases and the 
decisional law. I then consider the various explanations for the patterns. 
And finally, I provide tentative suggestions for change. 
I. The Data 
A. A First Step: The Georgia Study 
The Atlanta firm of Barrett and Farahany commissioned a study of the 
2011 and 2012 employment summary judgment orders from the North-
ern District of Georgia, the results of which surely bear careful consid-
eration. 23 Of the 181 cases (in which the plaintiff had counsel), the Court 
dismissed 95 percent of them at least in part and 81 percent of the cases 
in full. Racial hostile work environment claims were dismissed 100 per-
cent of the time. Data broken down per judge revealed that some judges 
had dismissed all discrimination cases in the two-year period and that 
when the magistrate judge recommended dismissal, the judge followed 
100 percent of the time. Data also suggested that white plaintiffs alleg-
ing reverse discrimination had a better success rate than black plaintiffs 
alleging discrimination. 
To be sure, there are limitations to the study; it is only a starting point. 
The sample was restricted to a two-year period with a relatively small 
number of cases per judge; plainly, a longer-term view is necessary to 
identify meaningful trends. Researchers need to understand the entire 
pool of cases, which cases are settled, and why. Are the better cases 
appropriately resolved by competent counsel, or are they settled "in the 
shadow of"24 a substantive law so skewed against the plaintiff or judicial 
hostility so clear that any settlement is better than nothing. The bottom 
line, however, is that while the numbers for dismissals in the North-
ern District of Georgia were higher than the national figure-namely, 80 
to 100 percent dismissal rates, there is no question that it reflects that 
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national pattern; study after study has shown high dismissal rates across 
the country on summary judgment. 25 
Research is presently underway to look at these issues across a number 
of courts. We plan to evaluate six courts as Farahany and McAdams have 
done in the Northern District of Georgia-namely, Alabama, other dis-
tricts in Georgia, and states without analogous state discrimination laws. 
In addition, we will examine Florida as well as Massachusetts, Chicago, 
and San Francisco. We plan to ask the questions described at the outset 
of this chapter: Are there some district courts that, like the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia, have a 100 percent dismissal rate? Is this true for just 
some district court judges? Are there regional differences? Do caseload 
differences account for these discrepancies as between district courts or 
regions? Does the fact that there is no analogous state discrimination law 
affect these numbers? What if data suggest that precisely in the regions 
of the country with a history of discrimination, the rate of dismissal is 
the highest and the language of the decisions most forgiving? What if 
those patterns are reinforced by decisions of the circuit courts? 
B. Reversals of Trial Verdicts 
Some may say that without carefully evaluating the merits of both the 
dismissed cases and the settled cases, there is no way of knowing if 
the patterns described previously are fair-whether the decisional law 
is appropriately weeding out the insubstantial cases and resolving the 
substantial ones. As I describe in the following paragraphs, an analysis 
of summary judgment opinions surely raises concerns that this is not 
so-that district court judges are drawing lines about what is or is not 
discrimination in a way that fundamentally changes, even skews, the 
substantive law of discrimination against plaintiffs and that substantive 
law plainly has an impact on settlement practices. 
But even if one assumed that settlements and summary judgment dis-
missals appropriately separate the meritorious cases from those that 
are not, the statistics about the judicial treatment of plaintiffs' verdicts 
suggest a different pattern. More discrimination plaintiffs' verdicts are 
reduced on remittitur than verdicts in any other case.26 And this pattern 
continues at the appellate level. Favorable p laintiffs' verdicts fare worse 
on appeal than do other litigants' verdicts, as a 2009 study by Professor 
Kevin Clermont and Stewart]. Schwab found.27 The 2009 Clermont 
and Schwab study of reversal rates reports that "[a]ll the circuits 
showed ... anti-plaintiff effect," and grouped the Tenth, Fourth, Second, 
Ninth, Eleventh, and First as having approximately the same difference 
between defendant and plaintiff dismissals.28 
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That jury losses are affirmed on appeal is not unusual since appellate 
courts will defer to verdicts. More stunning is the fact that appellate 
courts reverse plaintiffs' trial wins far more often than defendants' 
wins.29 
C. Legitimizing Discrimination 
While the rate of losses is important, more critical is the way plaintiffs 
lose. By making pronouncements about what is or is not discrimination 
or a hostile work environment, courts have legitimized practices that 
would have horrified the early supporters of the Act.30 
Consider cases involving the N-word. In Johnson v. Freese, a case in 
the Northern District of Georgia, the Todds, African Americans, sued 
the Whortons, white owners of the nightclub where they worked, for 
creating a racially hostile environment.31 The defendants moved for 
summary judgment, which the judge granted on these facts (considered 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs): at manager meetings, Mr. 
Whorton directed the N-word to the plaintiffs, despite their objections. 
He called a staff meeting to talk about his use of theN-word, explaining 
that he was too old to change and inviting anyone who did not like it to 
quit. He made comments like the following: 
What do your people want? When this was a white club, my customers used 
ashtrays. Ever since then--shave been in the club, the cigarettes have been 
put out on the floor. The difference between blacks and n--s is that n--s 
put their cigarettes out on the floor. 
And, do "days like this [make] you wish you people had stayed in chains?" 
He asked someone wearing a shirt with a monkey on it "Are the Obama 
shirts in?" and complained to Mr. Todd that he could not trust African Amer-
icans . .S2 
But to the Georgia federal court, this was not enough. No reasonable 
jury, the court held, could find a racially hostile environment. In lan-
guage that the supporters of the Civil Rights Act would have found 
shocking, the court added that while "the facts simply show that the 
Whortons are racist, bigoted, and/or offensive people," not all "profane 
or [racist] language or conduct will constitute discrimination in the 
terms and conditions of employment." None of these incidents went 
beyond the "ordinary tribulations of the workplace." The decision, a 
Final Report and Recommendation of a United States Magistrate Judge, 
was adopted by the trial judge without comment, no objections having 
been filed. 
To be sure, there were weaknesses in the case. The setting was a black 
nightclub with white owners, and although the court is not explicit, the 
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clear message is that the owner's language could not have been par-
ticularly shocking to the employees given the language of the patrons. 
Still, the plaintiff could argue that this language coming from a white 
boss had a different resonance to the African American workers than 
the conversation among their peers. Or they could argue that given the 
numbers of comments and their content (about slavery, about President 
Obama), the boss simply went too far. Summary judgment, after all, is 
not supposed to be about screening the cases that-in the judgment of 
the bench-are likely to lose before a jury, making credibility determi-
nations, weighing the evidence in the favor of one party or another. It is 
a lower bar-determining that there is no issue of material fact, after con-
sidering all of the inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.33 
Racist comments in the workplace had been "ordinary" and "com-
monplace" when the Civil Rights Act was enacted. Even if social norms 
have changed in the decades since 1964 and even if language that courts 
once found wholly unacceptable has become regular currency, the law 
was amended in 1991 so that those judgments would be made by ajury.34 
A representative jury was supposed to consider the facts. not a judge 
whose last employment in the private sector may have been decades 
ago, who-looking at the federal bench's composition-was likely to be 
white, male, a former partner in a big law firm, or a former prosecutor. 
In fact, in several cases in which allegations of the use of the N-word 
went to a jury, juries found for the plaintiffs. For example, a Buffalo, 
New York, jury awarded $25 million in damages to a steelworker whose 
coworkers repeatedly called him theN-word and other slurs. The jury 
heard evidence that the employer took remedial action, such as sus-
pending offending employees without pay, installing lights in the park-
ing lot after a toy monkey was hung from a noose beside the plaintiff's 
car, and assigning an escort to protect the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the 
jury elected to award over $25 million in damages against the corporate 
defendant, including $24 million in punitive damages.35 In 2011, a jury 
awarded $300,000 to a personal trainer who claimed that other train-
ers at a sports club had repeatedly called him the N-word.36 The sports 
club presented evidence that it dismissed the plaintiff because the plain-
tiff had used similar racially offensive language against Latino trainers. 
Nonetheless, the jury awarded $300,000 on the hostile work environ-
ment claim. More recently, juries in hostile work environment cases 
have awarded damages in the amount of $300,000 in Bennett v Riceland 
Foods, Inc.,37 more than $300,000 in Weatherly v. Alabama State Univer-
sity,38 and $250,000 in Johnson v. Strive East Harlem Employment Group.39 
By comparison, judges on summary judgment often hold that racial 
epithets did not establish a hostile work environment by characterizing 
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these statements as "stray remarks" or concluding that even repeated 
use of epithets is not evident of "pervasive and severe" racial hostility. 
The Whorton decision, despite its unique facts and unique weaknesses, is 
not an aberration.4° For example, in Oladokun v. Grafton School, Inc.,41 the 
District of Maryland granted summary judgment for the defendant on 
claims of discrimination against African American employees at a pri-
vate school for intellectually and physically disabled children. A super-
visor had told the plaintiff that "I will get you n--s out of here" and had 
also said to a child client at the facility: "Don't slobber on me, slobber 
on that black n-- over there," referring to a coworker. The court held 
that these remarks were not "not sufficient to satisfy the hostile work 
environment test" because they were "not sufficiently pervasive."42 Sim-
ilarly, in Dotson v. Gulf,43 a supervisor told a longshoreman employee 
in response to his leaving early for a lunch break: "You n--s just don't 
want to do right." The supervisor fired the employee immediately on 
the spot, though the employee was later allowed to return to work. The 
court held that these "incidents of a patently offensive slur, while rude 
and upsetting, are insufficient to affect the terms or condition of Dot-
son's ernployment."44 
It is not just racist speech that is acceptable; so is sexist speech. The 
"stray remarks" doctrine trivializes sexist (and racist) comments. They 
are "not evidence of discrimination" at all. Or they are the speaker's 
"personal opinion"-as if that eliminates their poisonous impact on the 
work environment. Or they were not so "severe and pervasive" as to cre-
ate a hostile environment. What kinds of sexist remarks are dismissed in 
this fashion? Where plaintiffs supervisor repeatedly referred to her as, 
among other things, a "dumb sh-t," "whore," "stupid bitch," and "hooker," 
the district court dismissed the case because the conduct was a type of 
"general vulgarity that [the law] does not regulate."45 No hostile work 
environment was found in the case of a female deputy sheriff even 
though, over a four-year period, the supervisor made inappropriate 
comments, invited her to sit on his lap, and kissed her on the buttocks 
(which the court describes as "allegedly kissing her on her dothed back-
side").46 Nor did an employee whose manager "touched her inappropri-
ately on two occasions by putting his hand on her crotch" confront "an 
objectively or subjectively hostile work environment" because there was 
evidence that she herself had "used vulgar, profane language, told dirty 
jokes, graphically discussed her sex life and engaged in sexual banter.''47 
Nor was it a hostile environment in the case of a male coworker who 
called the plaintiff "a perra, a Mexican expletive that translates to 'bitch,' 
'whore,' or 'person paid for sex,' called her stupid, grabbed his crotch, 
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made an offensive hand gesture that signified the 'f word/ and spit on the 
floor."48 
II. Tentative Conclusions 
What is the reason for these patterns? First, as others have written, is 
the problem ideological, the overarching sense that we are at the dawn 
of the postracial, postsexist society? The 1964 Civil Rights Act, while 
once important, is seen as unnecessary today.49 Surely, this is the mes-
sage communicated by the Supreme Court. Have explicit cues from a 
more conservative Supreme Court (Ledbetter, etc.) percolated down to 
the lower federal courts?50 
Second, is it true that the law has done its job? The market works and 
only needs to be tweaked at the margins, as the case law suggests. The 
data are otherwise: "Every measure of economic success reveals signifi-
cant racial inequality in the U.S. labor market."51 Data from 2009 show 
that people of color make up 34 percent of the private sector workforce 
but hold only 11 percent of senior or executive positions.52 In 2010, the 
median weekly earnings for full-time employees varied significantly by 
race and gender: for white men, the average was $850 a week, while for 
black men, that number dropped to $633 and Hispanic men still lower, 
at $560 per week.53 Social psychologists, organizational behavioralists, 
and bbor economists suggest that the reason for these patterns is that 
racial and gender bias-implicit or explicit-continues to play a signifi-
cant role in the allocation of jobs. 
Is it selection bias-not merely the impact of the settled cases on the 
pool of federal cases but also the impact of a more welcoming state court 
on federal filings?54 This would mean that the cases in fedleral court are 
in fact the less substantial ones, brought by counsel who did not realize 
how inhospitable the federal courts were. Whatever the validity of state 
law, it would not apply to the Northern District of Georgia, for exam-
ple, or in Alabama, the other state that does not have a parallel state 
statute prohibiting discrimination by race.55 Second, it does not neces-
sarily account for the facts as reflected in the decisional law-allegations 
of explicit bias rejected by the courts or minimized in the outcome. 
Is it simply a reflection of more unforgiving rules from the Supreme 
Court-quite apart from the ideology these rules reflect? When the 
Northern District of Georgia article was published, one reaction was 
that these cases are dismissed because judges are simply "following the 
law."56 That may well be true, when certain of the Supreme Court's pro-
cedural rules are considered-rules on statutes of limitations in employ-
ment cases and rules requiring reporting harassment to a supervisor 
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before an employer can be held accountable for coworker harassment.S7 
If there are no allegations within the limitations period or the appropri-
ate person did not receive the complaint, the judge has no discretion but 
to dismiss the case.58 During a yearly panel held by the United States 
District Court, a lawyer asked the judges: "Why are the federal courts so 
hostile to discrimination claims?" The judges insisted there was no hos-
tility and that they were just obliged to follow the law. 
But the "law" does not compel the granting of summary judgment in 
many of the reported cases involving "stray remarks" or the standard for 
"severe and pervasive" harassment. Employment discrimination cases 
are factually complex, deal with state-of-mind issues to be proved cir-
cumstantially, and are rarely uncontested. The summary judgment legal 
standards are general, rarely mandating a certain result, as would a claim 
involving a statute of limitations issue or the failure to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies. Judges are deciding these cases not because they are 
forced to do so by precedent but because they choose to do so. 
Is the explanation in the pressures on the bench that cross ideological 
lines, pressures that have fundamentally changed the federal bench and 
have had a singular impact on employment cases? Professor Judith 
Resnik has described the problem of managerial justice.59 Judges are 
encouraged to resolve cases without trials, to use alternative dispute res-
olution, or to mediate the cases themselves. Formal written opinions are 
to be avoided; the author was told during a judicial training session that 
"if you wrote an opinion," you fai led. If you could not settle the case, 
write your decision as a margin note on the pleading or announce it in 
open court-more efficient but hardly creating a meaningful precedent. 
These pressures are mirrored in, and exacerbated by, a phenomenon 
I have described recently as "Losers' Rules." When the defendant suc-
cessfully moves for summary judgment in a discrimination case, the 
case is over, and under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the judge must "state on the record the reasons for granting or denying 
the motion," which means writing a decision. But when the plaintiff 
wins on summary judgment, the judge writes a single word of endorse-
ment-"denied"-and the case moves on to trial. At the same time, 
plaintiffs rarely move for summary judgment. They bear the burden 
of proving all elements of the claim, particularly intent. Thus, to avoid 
summary judgment, a defendant need only show favorable contested 
facts in one element of a plaintiff's claim. 
The result of this practice-written decisions only when plaintiffs 
lose-is the evolution of a one-sided body of law. Decision after decision 
grants summary judgment to the defendant or, more recently, on the 
heels of the Supreme Court's decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly60 
176 A Nation of Widening Opportunities 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,61 dismisses the complaint.62 After the district court 
has described why the plaintiff loses, the case may or may not be 
appealed. 
The structure of summary judgment opinions distorts the precedents 
further. Precedents are necessarily created in the decisional law when 
judges make rules "mappings from the facts of the case ... to outcomes."63 
In writing summary judgment decisions, the court is obliged to sum-
marize the record and, in particular, to highlight the plaintiff's allega-
tions and grant inferences in favor of the plaintiff. As a result, when the 
court characterizes these facts as insubstantial stray remarks or not part 
of a "severe and pervasive" pattern of discrimination, as an example, it 
affects more than the outcome in the case. The decision communicates 
an atmosphere of impunity. Discriminatory behavior will be tolerated 
and will not expose the employer to risk. Over and over, the opinions 
suggest, we will give the benefit of the doubt to the perpetrator, excusing 
his conduct while subjecting the victim's perceptions to a higher stan-
dard.64 
The effects of Losers' Ru1es are exacerbated on appeal. While the 
standard of review of summary judgment orders is de novo, appellate 
courts rarely reverse district courts' decisions. Employers prevailed in 86 
percent of published appellate opinions.65 Indeed, they are even more 
affected by the pool of cases they see-the selection effects of reviewing 
appeal after appeal of plaintiffs' losses. They do not see the strong cases 
that settle. They may see appeals from successful plaintiffs' verdicts, but 
those appeals are few and far between. In fact, their approach to appeals 
from successful verdicts may well reflect skewing I have described. A 
higher percentage of plaintiffs' verdicts are set aside, as Clermont and 
Schwab found. 
To be sure, what this analysis does not include are the cases that are 
settled. Arguably, the better cases are removed from the pool by lawyers 
who have effected settlements for their clients. Marc Galanter has argued 
that because employers are "repeat players" while individual plaintiffs 
are not, the repeat players have every incentive to settle the strong cases 
and litigate the weak ones. 66 But settlements take place in the "shadow 
of the law."67 It is not unreasonable to assume that the evolving case law 
figures into the settlement practices. 
Losers' Rules explain not simply outcomes but also the reasoning 
of the cases. If case after case recites the facts that do not amount to 
discrimination, decision makers have a hard time imagining the facts 
that comprise discrimination. And they believe most of the claims are 
trivial. That attitude further distorts the evolution of substantive legal 
standards. Decision heuristics evolve, the kind of decision heuristics 
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described above. As I described, "[c]ourts create decision heuristics to 
enable them to quickly dispose of complex cases. They then write deci-
sions employing the heuristics and publish their opinions. In short 
order, other courts rely on the heuristics, which become precedent, and 
the process is repeated over and over again."68 Obviously, discrimina-
tion heuristics, like all heuristic devices, run the risk of false positives 
and false negatives. 
When courts believe that most employment claims are meritless, as 
the judges do over time, they will be much more concerned with false 
positives-the wrongful accusation of discrimination-than false neg-
atives, when discrimination is unredressed. Indeed, that con-
cern-wrongful accusations of discrimination and the transaction costs 
associated with it- has come to dominate the decisional law of civil pro-
cedure. 59 
Ill. Conclusion 
Judges have created decisional rules that have gutted Title VII, rules not 
required by the statute (which, after all, says very little), its legislative his-
tory, or the purposes of the Act. The patterns have garnered little atten-
tion from the popular media, and, as a consequence, there is little or 
no pressure for legislative change. Since Title VII was the very model 
of civil rights law reform legislation, it is critical to show how has this 
has happened and, more important, why? How should these patterns 
be addressed? Should Title VII be amended yet again, creating a more 
explicit statute-more code-like than a statement of principles-that 
would cabin judicial discretion? Or would regular monitoring of judicial 
decisions-like the Northern District of Georgia study-make a dif-
ference, letting the judge know the patterns-if not overt the hostil-
ity-their decisions reflect? Or should we consider a new enforcement 
structure beyond the private attorneys' general model of Title VII? For 
example, would a more robust EEOC, with the power to adjudicate dis-
putes and not just the power to investigate, make a difference, staffed by 
hearing officers who can envision what discrimination looks like, in con-
trast to judges who plainly do not? One thing is clear: these patterns and 
the attitudes they reflect should not be ignored. 
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and the court.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court in Iqbal reiterated this 
theme that "[l]itigation ... exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure 
of valuable time and resources" and reasoned that a higher pleading standard was 
necessary to prevent groundless claims from imposing costs on defendants. See 
556 u.s. 662, 685 (2009). 
[9] 




For more than twenty-five years, it has been the practice of federal and 
state judges around the country to throw victims of workplace sexual 
harassment out of court because they have not been harassed "enough." 
The practice is a function of the judicially created doctrine that only 
"severe or pervasive" harassment is actionable under Title VII.1 In New 
York City, however, the "severe or pervasive" requirement has been 
rejected by virtue of case law2 that developed in the wake of the 2005 
Local Civil Rights Restoration Act,3 a law designed to "underscore that 
the provisions of New York City's Human Rights Law are to be construed 
independently from similar or identical provisions of New York state 
or federal statutes"4 in a manner to accomplish the City Human Rights 
Law's "uniquely broad and remedial purposes."5 
This sea change in harassment doctrine is but one of several ways in 
which the Restoration Act has brought new strength to local antidiscrim-
ination provisions. Some of the Act's changes sought to vindicate provi-
sions in the comprehensive 1991 amendments to the City Human Rights 
Law6 that judges had long ignored; others responded to Supreme Court 
decisions hostile to civil rights enforcement that were issued subsequent 
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to the 1991 Amendments. All reflected an intent to develop a distinct -
and distinctly plaintiff-friendly- jurisprudence. 
While the animating perspective of the Restoration Act is a striking 
departure from the norm, the authority of New York City (or any other 
jurisdiction) to forge protections stronger than those provided by federal 
law was not new. From the beginning, Title VII disclaimed preemption, 
stating that: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person 
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or 
future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such 
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would 
be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter? 
Title VII was designed to act as a floor below which civil rights protec-
tions could not fall, not a ceiling above which those protections could 
not rise. Over the decades, this invitation has been used most commonly 
in states and cities around the country to extend employment discrim-
ination protection to workplaces with fewer than the fifteen-employee 
minimum required by Title VII. It has also been used to provide com-
pensatory damages beyond those available under Title VII and to pro-
hibit on a state level additional types of discrimination (such as discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation) beyond that proscribed by Title 
VII. 
It is less common, however, for a state or local law to be designed 
specifically to fight back against the narrowing contours of Title VII, 
especially by means of directing state and federal judges to modify their 
approach to statutory interpretation. Under the Restoration Act, judges 
are required to probe critically the question of whether interpretations 
of federal or state civil rights law provisions genuinely further the pur-
poses of their local counterpart. 8 
This chapter identifies the approach and architecture of the Restora-
tion Act and explains the ways in which the local law's attempt both to 
protect the New York City Human Rights Law against erosion and to 
expand the law's reach still further has begun to have an impact. It then 
illustrates several additional barriers to strong coverage and enforce-
ment that could be tackled if civil rights advocates focused more of 
their efforts on the state and local level. Finally, it offers some observa-
tions about what is needed to deepen the Restoration Act's early success 
locally and to spur efforts like the Restoration Act in jurisdictions across 
the country. 
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I. Why Was a Restoration Act Needed? 
The short answer to the question "Why was the Restoration Act needed?" 
is that courts were not paying heed to either the language of the 1991 
Amendments or the City Council's intention in passing them.9 
Every change made by the 1991 Amendments- whether dealing with 
protected classes, vicarious liability, theories of discrimination, or dam-
ages - had been aimed at augmenting coverage, limiting evasion, or 
otherwise strengthening enforcement. And the City Council's intentions 
had been unmistakable. As then-Mayor David Dinkins stated when he 
signed the bill, the intention was that "judges interpreting the City's 
Human Rights Law ... take seriously the requirement that this law be liber-
ally and independently construed."10 Nevertheless, prior to the Restora-
tion Act, courts were almost universally refusing to do more than engage 
in what I have elsewhere dubbed "rote parallelism,"11 simply assuming 
that the result under the City Human Rights Law would be identical to 
that under federal civil rights law or New York State human rights law. 12 
A year before the enactment of the Restoration Act, New York's highest 
court made plain just how completely it was prepared to ignore the plea 
for independent interpretation that underlay the 1991 Amendments and 
the liberal construction requirement of the City Human Rights Law as it 
existed in 2004. 
The case before the court related to the private right of action that 
had been created by the 1991 Amendments - one that provided for 
uncapped compensatory damages, uncapped punitive damages, and 
attorneys' fees.13 Only that kind of regime allows for the possibility of 
making a victim whole, punishing a wrongdoer sufficiently to create an 
actual deterrent, and providing a sufficient incentive for private coun-
sel to undertake representation. At the time that the 1991 Amendments 
were enacted, the Supreme Court had not yet cut back on the availability 
of fees in cases that resulted in the award of only nominal damages, and 
prevailing doctrine in the Second Circuit was that attorney's fees were 
available in such cases.14 The federal limitation on those fees occurred 
a year later, in 1992, when the Supreme Court issued its 5- 4 decision 
in Farrar v. Hobby and concluded that, where nominal damages are 
awarded, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all."15 
In McGrath v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 16 New York's court of appeals acknowl-
edged that the City Council, in passing the 1991 Amendments, could 
not have had the intention to apply the yet-to-be-decided Farrar doc-
trine but the court imported Farrar nonetheless because of the court's 
"general practice of interpreting comparable civil rights statutes consis-
tently," asserting that policies underlying the City Human Rights Law 
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were "identical" to those underlying federal civil rights statutes.17 In 
importing Farrar, McGrath engaged in no analysis of whether Farrar had 
actually been consistent with either federal or local civil rights policy. 
Perhaps most important, McGrath stated that the City Council's failure 
to take affirmative action to rebut Farrar represented the Council's 
implicit ratification of the importation of Farrar. 18 As such, the protec-
tions of the City Human Rights Law would be subject to being automat-
ically ratcheted down every time federal or state law was narrowed by 
judicial construction. 
Along with this sort of refusal to construe the City Human Rights 
Law liberally, the period between 1991 and 2005 was characterized by 
the wholesale failure of courts to recognize even basic modifications 
in statutory text. For example, it had already been illegal under the 
City Human Rights Law "to retaliate ... against any person," but the 1991 
Amendments modified that language so that it became illegal "to retal-
iate in any manner ... against any pcrson."19 Surely, the addition of the 
phrase "in any manner" was intended to mean and do something. Year 
after year, however, judges failed to appreciate that the legislative change 
had any meaning at all. 
In a particularly acute example of judicial lawlessness in 2003, a state 
appellate court, in the case of Priore v. New York Yankees,20 conjured up an 
entirely imaginary legislative history to get around the fact that the 1991 
Amendments had made individuals liable for their own discriminatory 
workplace conduct. The City Council had taken the phrase common 
to Title VII and many state employment discrimination statutes that it 
was unlawful for "an employer" to engage in certain actions and broad-
ened that to make it unlawful for an employer "or an employee or agent 
thereof" to engage in those actions.21 Mayor Dinkins had explained that 
the 1991 Amendments had taken "the fundamental step of making all 
people legally responsible for their own discriminatory conduct."22 
Several courts had started to abide by the plain language (and plain 
import) of this change.23 All of this, however, was of no moment to an 
intermediate appeals court panel that simply did not want to believe 
that anyone would (or should) want to impose individual liability. To 
achieve its ends, the Priore court claimed that the added language ("or 
an employee or agent thereof') was simply reflecting language that had 
been in a New York State Human Rights Law provision dealing with 
licensing agencies. This was a complete fabrication. The section of the 
City Human Rights Law at issue did not have anything to do with licens-
ing agencies (a different section was created for that), and the added lan-
guage about employees or agents was language not found in the State 
Human Rights Law.24 But the Priore court needed to create a "context." 
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Priore rejected the idea that the change in statutory language "auto-
matically open[s] the door to an entirely new category of defen-
dants"stating that the new language had to be read "in context" (that is, 
the context it had invented) and asserted that there was "no indication 
in the local ordinance, explicit or implicit, that it was intended to offer 
a separate right of action against any and all fellow employees based 
on their independent and unsanctioned contribution to a hostile envi-
ronment."25 For the First Department of the Appellate Division (cover-
ing cases arising in Manhattan and the Bronx), individual liability was 
dead.26 
For civil rights advocates, City Human Rights Law development since 
1991 - or, more precisely, the lack of independent development since 
1991 - meant that the City Council had to send a message to the judi-
ciary that could not be ignored. 
II. A Hybrid Approach 
In some respects, the Restoration Act proceeded conventionally, making 
specific changes to specific provisions. Thus, for example, protection 
against discrimination based on domestic partner status was added to 
the City Human Rights Law's proscriptions against discrimination in 
employment, housing, and public accommodations,27 and the maxi-
mum civil penalty available in a case brought administratively was 
raised to $250,000.28 
The Restoration Act also went back to try to give force to the City 
Council's intent to have a broad antiretaliation provision (the "in any 
manner" language having been insufficient to do the job). It explicitly set 
forth in the antiretaliation provision the proviso that retaliation com-
plained of need not result in either an "ultimate action" or a "materially 
adverse change" in terms and conditions in order to be actionable.29 
In a direct rejection of the Supreme Court's dramatic narrowing of the 
circumstances in which attorney's fees would be available in cases where 
the litigation had acted as a catalyst for a change in policy on the part of 
the defendant, 30 the Restoration Act explicitly declared that fees would 
be available in such cases. 31 
But the most important contribution of the Restoration Act was the 
undoing of rote parallelism. Section 1 of the Restoration Act stated that 
the "sense of the Council that New York City's Human Rights Law has 
been construed too narrowly to ensure protection of the civil rights of all 
persons covered by the law."32 It went on to "underscore" that the law's 
provisions "are to be construed independently from similar or identi-
cal provisions of New York state or federal statutes."33 And, in contrast 
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to McGrath s downward ratchet effect, it created an upward ratchet effect: 
interpretations of the provisions of counterpart federal and state statutes 
could be viewed "as a floor below which the City's Human Rights law 
cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot rise."34 
Section 1 of the Restoration Act set forth its purpose; section 7 did 
the work of amending the construction section of the law. Rather than 
requiring liberal construction to accomplish the "purposes" of the law, 
the Council now required such construction to accomplish the 
"uniquely broad and remedial" purposes.35 Any decision that asserted 
that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law were equivalent to the 
purposes of counterpart statutes simply could not be harmonized with 
this language. 
For good measure, the Council added additional language making 
clear that the liberal construction was required "regardless of whether 
federal or New York State civil and human rights laws, including those 
laws with provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title, have 
been so construed."36 
Each element of the Restoration Act's legislative history focused on the 
importance of independent construction37 and included this statement 
made on the floor of the City Council at the meeting at which it voted 
on the Restoration Act: 
Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will 
safeguard New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights protec-
tions are in jeopardy. 
There are many illustrations of cases, like Levin on marital status, Priore[,] 
McGrath and Forrest that have either failed to interpret the City Human 
Rights Law to fulfill its uniquely broad purposes, ignore the text of specific 
provisions of the law, or both. 
With [the Restoration Act], these cases and others like them will no longer 
hinder the vindication of our civil rights.38 
The question, of course, was whether the courts would heed what the 
Council had done. 
Ill. The Courts Take Notice 
In civil rights, as in other areas of life, victory can be fleeting. Never-
theless, the tentative judgment to be made ten years after the passage 
of the Restoration Act is that an independent City Human Rights Law 
jurisprudence has indeed begun to take shape, despite some continuing 
resistance in the judiciary. Much work remains for the law to fulfill its 
intended potential. Ironically, the greatest need is for civil rights advo-
cates to be willing to take up more wholeheartedly what the Restoration 
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Act has offered through its enhanced liberal construction provision and 
articulate in specific cases the specific reasoning that demands specific 
departures from existing legal doctrine. 
Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, 39 decided early in 2009, 
was not the first case to take account of the passage of the Restoration 
Act, but it represented the most thorough and important exposition by 
any court, let alone an appellate court, of the Act's intent, and demon-
strated how the process of independent construction should proceed. 
The overview from Williams: 
rrJhe Restoration Act notified courts that (a) they had to be aware that some 
provisions of the City HRL were textually distinct from its State and federal 
counterparts, (b) all provisions of the City HRL required independent con-
struction to accomplish the law's uniquely broad purposes, and (c) cases that 
had failed to respect these differences were being legislatively overruled.40 
Reiterating that the Restoration Act had legislatively overruled McGrath, 
the court was careful to point out that the City Council envisioned 
the enhancement of the liberal construction provision as "obviating the 
need for wholesale textual revision of the myriad specific substantive 
provisions of the law."41 The court continued: 
While the specific topical provisions changed by the Restoration Act give 
unmistakable illustrations of the Council's focus on broadening coverage, § 
8-l30's specific construction provision required a "process of reflection and 
reconsideration" that was intended to allow independent development of 
the local law "in all its dimensions ... "42 
The legislative history provided guidance from multiple sources as to 
how courts should proceed to perform the task of deciding how provi-
sions of the City Human Rights Law should be interpreted. All of the 
legislative history pointed in the direction of choosing an interpretation 
that maximized coverage;43 a related lesson was that it would be a mis-
take to imagine that, for City Human Rights Law purposes, the upper 
bound of coverage was in any way a "settled" question. Every provision 
of the law had to be examined in light of the direction to courts to inter-
pret to fulfill the law's uniquely broad and remedial purpose. Consis-
tent with this, the court cited with approval the argument I had made in 
Return to Eyes on the Prize: 
[A]reas of law that have been settled by virtue of interpretations of federal or 
State law "will now be reopened for argument and analysis ... As such, advo-
cates will be able to argue afresh (or for the first time) a wide range of issues 
under the City's Human Rights Law ... "44 
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One of the specific issues before the Williams court was the scope of pro-
tection against sexual harassment, and the court demonstrated how the 
process of "reflection and reconsideration" was supposed to be handled. 
In the first instance, the court, true to the language of the statute before 
it, treated sexual harassment as one type of gender-based discrimination 
in terms and conditions of e.mployment. It then asked "what constitutes 
inferior terms and conditions based on gender."45 
Rather than taking the Supreme Court's approach as the necessary 
answer for City Human Rights Law purposes, Williams stated that the 
"severe or pervasive" doctrine - characterized by the Supreme Court 
as a "middle path"46- hindered those local objectives: "Experience has 
shown;' the court stated, "that there is a wide spectrum of harassment 
cases falling between 'severe or pervasive' on the one hand and a 
'merely' offensive utterance on the other."47 Keeping with its focus on 
whether conduct created inferior terms and conditions, the court got to 
the heart of workplace reality: "It would be difficult to find a worker who 
viewed a job where she knew she would have to cope with unwanted 
gender-based conduct (except what is severe or pervasive) as equivalent 
to one free of unwanted gender-based conduct."48 
Williams concluded that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law 
could best be achieved by allowing severity and pervasiveness to go only 
to the question of damages, not to the question of underlying liability. 
In the ordinary case, therefore, liability is established when there is evi-
dence of an employee being rtreated less well than others because of gen-
der.49 To "narrowly target" concerns about "truly insubstantial" cases, 
the court recognized an affirmative defense "whereby defendants can 
still avoid liability if they provide that the conduct complained of con-
sists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination 
would consider 'petty slights and trivial inconveniences."'50 
Critically, Williams illuminated how to tie an enhanced liberal con-
struction analysis to each of the guideposts for interpretation set out in 
the Committee Report that accompanied the Restoration Act: 
1. "Traditional methods and principles of law enforcement ought to 
be applied in the civil rights context."51 Determining liability by the 
existence of differential treatment without regard to severity or 
pervasiveness creates a greater incentive for employers to "create 
workplaces that have zero tolerance," and, the court ruled, 
maximizing deterrence is a traditional method and principle of law 
enforcement. 52 
2. "Discrimination should not play a role in decisions made by 
employers, landlords, and providers of public accommodation:' 
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The court stated that the "severe or pervasive" rule was inconsistent 
with the "play no role" principle because it means that 
"discrimination is allowed to play some significant role in the 
workplace."53 
3. "Victims of discrimination suffer serious injuries for which they 
ought to receive full compensation." The court stated that "severe or 
pervasiveness" contradicts the principle that discrimination 
injuries, without limitation, are serious injuries.54 It should be 
immediately apparent that this kind of analysis is transferable to 
virtually any issue that would arise in the antidiscrimination law 
context. 
New York's Court of Appeals has grappled with the Restoration Act in 
two important cases. The first was principally a matter of accepting that 
the City Human Rights Law meant what it appeared to say. In Zakrzewska 
v. New School, 55 the court took up the question of whether the Faragher-
Ellerth affirmative defense to employer liability56 applied to employ-
ment discrimination claims in the City Human Rights Law context.57 
The court concluded it did not: section 8-107(13) of the City Human 
Rights Law "creates an interrelated set of provisions to govern an 
employer's liability for an employee's discriminatory conduct in the 
workplace" that "simply doesn't match up with the Faragher-Ellerth 
defense."58 For acts of those employees or agents who exercised man-
agerial or supervisory authority, the section provides for strict liability,59 
and the existence of antidiscrimination policies and procedures can 
only go to the question of whether civil penalties (administratively) or 
punitive damages (in a civil action) should be mitigated.60 The court 
ruled that the statutory text made clear that the provision, contrary to 
the employer's position, applied to all supervisors and managers, 6l a 
very different result from the Supreme Court's decision finding that an 
employee is a "supervisor" for Title VII vicarious liability purposes only 
if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employ-
ment actions against the victim.62 It is only in the context of actions of 
nonsupervisory coworkers that the existence of antidiscrimination poli-
cies and procedures can be considered in determining liability (and only 
where the conduct is not known to managers or supervisors but should 
have been).63 
Beyond the implications of confirming strict liability, the case repre-
sented a belated recognition that the 1991 Amendments (of which the 
addition of section 8-107(13) was part) constituted a "major overhaul" of 
the City Human Rights Law.64 
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New School, of course, represented a circumstance where all the court 
needed to do was resist the Priore-like urge to say, "The statute just can't 
mean what it says." An even more important pronouncement from the 
New York Court of Appeals came the following year (2011) in a retalia-
tion case brought against the New York City Police Department.65 The 
question at issue was the meaning of the term "oppose"-that is, whether 
action was taken against the plaintiff for having opposed discrimination. 
One can say with absolute certainty that, in the pre-Restoration Act, 
McGrath era, the court would simply have looked at how Title VII and 
the State Human Rights Law had interpreted the term. 
Now, however, a unanimous court recognized that the enhanced lib-
eral construction provision introduced by the Restoration Act required 
it to construe the language of the retaliation provision, "like other pro-
visions of the City's Human Rights law, broadly in favor of discrimination 
plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible."66 
This holding could not be more significant. First, the requirement of 
enhanced liberal construction analysis is applicable not only to the term 
"oppose" but also to every term found in the law.67 Second, it captures 
the intent of the Restoration Act to require judges to weigh alternative 
interpretations, not to pick the road that has previously been most fre-
quently selected. Third, it dispenses with the prominent notion in Title 
VII jurisprudence that Congress wanted Title VII tailored to "balance" 
the interests of employers. Fourth, courts are not asked to indulge their 
own policy preferences in rendering interpretations but rather to adhere 
to a policy decision already made by the City Council to take the most 
pro-plaintiff position that is reasonably possible. 
In the case at hand, the only evidence that the plaintiff had opposed 
discrimination was that, at a meeting, she reacted to her supervisor's 
criticism of her recommendation to transfer a third party into the unit 
in which she worked by telling the supervisor that the person she had 
recommended "'was the betil:er candidate for the job'" and that '"[i]f I 
had to do it all again, I would have recommended [the same person] 
again."'68 This is not the usual basis for a finding that discrimination has 
been opposed. But the court found: "While [plaintiff] did not say in so 
many words" that her preferred candidate "was a discrimination victim" 
on the basis of perceived sexual orientation, "a jury could find that both 
[the supervisor and plaintiff] knew that he was, and that [plaintiff] made 
clear her disapproval of that discrimination by communicating to [her 
supervisor], in substance, that she thought [the supervisor's] treatment 
of [her candidate] was wrong_"69 
By the time Albunio was decided, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
had also, separately, provided direction on the Restoration Act. In Loef-
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jler v. Staten Island University Hospitat,7° a public accommodations case, 
the Second Circuit ruled that the Restoration Act "confirm[ed] the leg-
islative intent to abolish 'parallelism' between the City HRL and federal 
and state anti-discrimination law ... .'m The court aptly described the City 
Human Rights Law as having a "one-way ratchet" where state and fed-
eral enactments serve only as a floor for coverage, not the ceiling. 72 Weiss 
v. JPMorgan Chase is an example of a district court following Loeffler's 
command.73 Weiss declined to apply the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services,74 the case that had required a showing 
of but-for causation in age discrimination cases (rejecting what, at least 
in some circuits, had been the use of mixed-motive analysis). Noting 
that the City Human Rights Law does not differentiate between age and 
other types of discrimination claims, the court reasoned that application 
of Gross in an age case would mean that mixed-motive analysis would 
not be available in any employment discrimination claims, including 
those involving protected classes where Title VII provides for mixed-
motive analysis.75 Reducing the City Human Rights Law below that Title 
Vll floor was impermissible, the court ruled, also finding that an inde-
pendent interpretation of the City Human Rights Law allowing liability 
where protected class basis was "a motivating factor" was consistent with 
the law's text.16 
In sum, the application of the Restoration Act has generated a strong 
body of basic case law on which to build. 
IV. Unfinished Business and Attempts at Sabotage 
In many respects, though, the Restoration Act's work has just begun. I 
am not aware, for example, of any case that has specifically recognized 
that Priore's excision-by-fiat of individual liability has been legislatively 
overruled.77 And another element of Williams, that which rejected the 
Supreme Court's limitations on continuing violation doctrine for City 
Human Rights Law purposes,78 has only, to my knowledge, been applied 
by one federal court.79 More broadly, large areas of the law simply have 
not been subject to any reexamination yet. 
The most troubling developments in the last few years are circum-
stances where courts have not very subtly attempted to evade the 
requirements of the Restoration Act. Two areas have stood out: the treat-
ment of sexual harassment claims and the attempt to wall off "proce-
dural" matters from enhanced liberal construction analysis. 
Wilson v. N. Y.P. Holdings, Inc. 80 is a 2009 case out of the Southern 
District of New York that came to be cited repeatedly.81 What did the 
court treat as no more than "petty slights and trivial inconveniences" (the 
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Williams affirmative defense)? Comments that included "training females 
is like 'training dogs'" and "women need to be horsewhipped."82 Among 
the cases citing Wilson is Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreaux North Amer-
ica, /nc.,83 another case where the conduct complained of - which 
included evidence that the chief executive officer "explicitly told [plain-
tiff] that male employees should be respected because they were 'male' 
and thus 'more powerful' than women"84- was found to fit the "petty 
slights and trivial inconveniences" exception.85 The district court's deci-
sion in Mihalik, too, was then cited again and again by other judges in the 
Southern District Court of New York.86 
That these cases contravene Williams (and the intent of the Restoration 
Act) was first pointed out in a remarkably critical footnote reference 
in a subsequent case decided by the appellate court that had decided 
Williams. The principal focus of 2011's Bennett v. Health Management Sys-
tems, Inc. 87 will become clear later in this section, but the court was also 
concerned that the Williams affirmative defense should be treated as the 
"narrowly drawn affirmative defense" it was intended to be, that it was 
important for "borderline" fact patterns to be allowed to be heard by 
a jury, and that it should be understood that one could "easily imagine 
a single comment that objectifies women being made in circumstances 
where [the] comment would, for example, signal views about the role 
of women in the workplace and be actionable."88 The court skewered 
Wilson and Mihalik for, among other things, "ignoring the Williams hold-
ing," relying on cases that "nominally acknowledge Williams but ignore 
its teaching."89 
Two years later, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded Mihalik and 
taught many of the lessons of the Restoration Act again. Specifically in 
the context of sexual harassment, the circuit rejected the district court's 
analysis for placing "too much emphasis on Williams's recognition that 
the NYCHRL should not 'operate as a "general civility code,"' and too 
little emphasis on its exhortation that even 'a single comment' may 
be actionable in appropriate circumstances."90 The question remains 
whether lower courts will take the guidance provided (and the rebukes) 
seriously. 
Another area of resistance or confusion is found in connection with 
what are sometimes called procedural matters. Is the manner in which 
the McDonnell Douglas framework is or is not used a matter beyond 
enhanced liberal construction analysis? Bennett found that it was not: 
"the identification of the framework for evaluating the sufficiency of evi-
dence in discrimination cases does not in any way constitute an excep-
tion to the Section 8-130 rule that all aspects of the City HRL must be 
interpreted to accomplish the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of 
196 A Nation of Widening Opportunities 
the law;' and for the court to "create an exemption from the sweep of the 
Restoration Act for the most basic provision of the City HRL - that it is 
unlawful 'to discriminate' - would impermissibly invade the legislative 
province."91 
Yet a divided panel of the same appellate court later issued a ruling in 
Melman v. Montefiore Medical Center that states that neither the Restora-
tion Act nor the Committee Report "set forth a new framework for con-
sideration of the sufficiency of proof of claims under the [City Human 
Rights Law] or indicates that the McDonnell Douglas framework is to be 
discarded."92 The statement of the Melman majority is a non sequitur: 
that the Restoration Act did not set forth specific modifications to 
McDonnell Douglas does nothing to limit a court's obligation to interpret 
the term "to discriminate" as it must interpret all other terms of the law: 
pursuant to the direction of the enhanced liberal construction provision. 
It is as though that majority could not (or did not wish to) appreciate that 
McDonnell Douglas is not an immutable principle of the physical universe 
that predates all legislation but rather is a judicial creation designed to 
give one of many possible answers to how to give shape to identifying 
what constitutes discrimination.93 
As a practical matter, Melman adhered to Bennett. It was, for example, 
confirmatory of the principle that the City Human Rights Law insists 
that discrimination "play no role" and that mixed-motive analysis is 
applicable to every case. Melman accepted Bennett's direction that sum-
mary judgment of City Human Rights Law claims should only be 
granted if "no jury could find defendant liable under any of the evi-
dentiary routes - McDonnell Douglas, mixed motive, 'direct' evidence, or 
some combination thereof. ... "94 
The Second Circuit in Mihalik also confirmed that the "no evidentiary 
route" principle was to be applied in all City Human Rights Law cases,95 
but observed in a footnote that, comparing Bennett with Melman, "(i]t 
is unclear whether, and to what extent, the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting analysis has been modified for NYCHRL claims.''96 In fact, how-
ever, apart from its opening statement about what the Restoration Act 
had not explicitly done, Melman did not speak to or rebut some of Ben-
nett's other conclusions. 
For example, Bennett had rejected the Reeves standard for failing to 
take sufficiently into account: 
(a) The traditional power to be accorded to the inference of wrongdoing 
that arises from evidence of consciousness of guilt; (b) the importance of 
deterring a defendant's proffer of false reasons for its conduct; and (c) the 
impropriety of a court weighing the strength of evidence in the context of a 
summary judgment motion.97 
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Picking up themes sounded by the dissent in Hicks,98 Bennett had ruled 
that: 
Once there is some evidence that at least one of the reasons proffered by 
defendant is false, misleading, or incomplete, a host of determinations prop-
erly made only by a jury come into play, such as whether a false explana-
tion constitutes evidence of consciousness of guilt, an attempt to cover up 
the alleged discriminatory conduct, or an improper discriminatory motive 
co-existing with other legitimate reasons. 99 
Melman simply did not attempt to articulate a substantive objection to 
Bennett's reasoning or conclusion. 
In light of the dictates of Albunio, it is difficult to imagine that "to dis-
criminate" will be walled off from enhanced liberal construction analy-
sis. Likewise, it is hard to believe that Bennett's interpretation (picking up 
on what was, after all, a four-Justice dissent in Hicks) will be found not to 
fall within a "reasonably possible" pro-plaintiff construction of"discrirn-
ination," but the ultimate willingness of judges to follow Albunio faith-
fully remains to be determined. 
V. How Might Other jurisdictions Proceed? 
I do not suggest that a push for state and local legislation would rep-
resent a cure-all for the problems and limitations in federal antidis-
crimination law doctrine. First, and most obviously, there are many 
jurisdictions that would not be politically congenial to such an effort. 
Second, states and localities are not empowered to undo congressional 
or Supreme Court efforts to stymie state-based remedies. The Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) is a particularly notable example of 
the former; 100 the Supreme Court's repeated expansions of the Federal 
Arbitration Act are examples of the latter. 101 
Nevertheless, the list of nonpreempted problems or limitations in 
antidiscrimination law doctrine is very long indeed; hence, the list of 
ways that state or local legislation can be helpful is very long, too. Some 
are suggested by the kinds of changes made either by the Restoration 
Act directly or by the 1991 Amendments before them,102 but there are 
many more. 
From the point of view of the restoration of rights, an examination of 
closely divided Supreme Court decisions on civil rights is the obvious 
place to begin. Bennett went back to 1993 to draw on the dissent in 
St. Marys Honor Center v. Hicks, 103 but one could just as easily tum to 
the Supreme Court's 2013 decisions in which the term "supervisor" was 
defined extraordinarily narrowly for the purpose of the determination 
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of vicarious liability under Title VII, 104 and plaintiffs were stripped of 
the ability to use mixed-motive analysis in Title VII retaliation cases.105 
Another source for potential state or local legislative activity is legisla-
tion that has been stymied on the federal level. The Paycheck Fairness 
Act, 106 for example, has not been able to get through Congress. It would 
prohibit retaliation against employees for discussing salary information 
and would require the defense to a claim under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act that women were being paid less than men to be a bona fide factor 
other than sex that the employer proves is job related, consistent with 
business necessity, and "not based upon or derived from a sex-based dif-
ferential in compensation."107 
Disparate impact liability is another obvious area for state and local 
legislating. Although national civil rights organizations have, surpris-
ingly, failed to take advantage of it, the City Human Rights Law's pro-
vision is a useful model of a disparate impact scheme more robust than 
provided by Title VII.108 First, it applies to all protected classes and to all 
contexts of discrimination. This avoids (and fixes) the problem that arose 
in Smith v. City of Jackson; 109 it also provides a basis for the building of a 
broader coalition than is offered when legislation extends protection for 
a single protected class group. 
Second, unlike Title VU (even as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991), the City Human Rights Law's disparate impact provision permits 
a plaintiff to identify a group of practices that cause a disparate impact 
without demonstrating "which specific policies or practices within the 
group results in such disparate impact" (something that can be devilishly 
difficult for a plaintiff).1l0 
The City Human Rights Law also gives the concept of less discrimina-
tory alternative an important tweak: where the plaintiff "produces sub-
stantial evidence that an alternative policy or practice with less disparate 
impact is available to the covered entity," the burden is on the covered 
entity to "prove that such alternative policy or practice would not serve 
the covered entity as well."lll There is no limitation on compensatory or 
punitive damages set forth in the City Human Rights Law, either in the 
context of a civil action generally or for disparate impact claims in par-
ticu la r.112 
Robust state and local legislation proscribing conduct that causes dis-
parate impact based on protected class status might also help reduce 
the impact of Ricci v. DeStefano,ll3 the 2009 case in which the Supreme 
Court, treating the desire to avoid race-based disparate impact to be a 
species of intentionally discriminatory action, held that an employer's 
decision not to certify the results of a job examination that it believed 
had a racially disparate impact was "impermissible under Title VII 
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unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had 
it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-
impact statute."114 According to Ricci, "a threshold showing of a signifi-
cant statistical disparity ... and nothing more" is "far from a strong basis in 
evidence that the [employer] would have been liable under Title VII had 
it certified the results."115 
A state or local law that makes disparate impact claims easier to prove 
would likewise make it easier for an employer to have the requisite 
"strong basis in evidence." Such a case would place Title VII's floor-not-
a-ceiling provision under a rare highlight: those in favor of broader 
disparate impact provisions would argue that § 2000e-7 blessed such 
extensions of civil rights protections; those seeking to limit disparate 
impact would argue that disparate impact proscription beyond that pro-
vided by Title VII represented intentional discrimination that§ 2000e-7 
does not permit a jurisdiction to sanction on the basis that such legisla-
tion "purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be 
an unlawful employment practice.''116 
One set of important questions that each state or locality has to answer 
concerns who is proscribed from committing discriminatory conduct, 
who is responsible for such conduct, and what relationship a person 
needs to have with a discriminatory actor to be protected. At the most 
basic level, there is the question of the size at which an employer 
becomes covered. For example, those working at the smallest employ-
ers, while not a large part of the labor force, are not a trivial part, either. 
In California alone, there are more than 1.2 million people working in 
firms with fewer than five employees.117 Should those people not have 
protection against discrimination? Though California has extended pro-
tection against discriminatory harassment to employees of employers of 
all sizes, 118 employers with fewer than five employees are exempt from 
the other employment discrimination provisions (like discriminatory 
hiring and firing). 119 
Decisions as to who is covered are no less subject to political com-
promise than other legislative matters (perhaps more so, given the hold 
that the idea of not "burdening" small businesses has on the American 
imagination). But as a matter of what discrimination law seeks to provide 
baseline protection against, size should not matter. Another context of 
discrimination - that which occurs in public accommodations - pro-
vides interesting perspective on this question. The value sought to be 
upheld in state statutes that commonly have a list of places - bowling 
alleys, ice cream parlors, and so forth - where discrimination shall not 
be allowed is that public life shaH not be polluted by bias, regardless of 
how transitory an interaction might be.120 One's employment- even at 
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the smallest employer - is no less a matter of public life and should not 
be polluted by discrimination. 
Similarly, a person victimized by bias in connection with work is 
harmed regardless of whether the victimizer is an "employer" or the vic-
tim is an "employee" or "independent contractor." California has taken 
some steps here, as well, although only in the harassment context. 
Harassers are individually liable, persons "providing services pursuant 
to a contract" are protected, and extensive vicarious liability is set 
forth.121 Other states have the opportunity to expand coverage as much 
or more, including, for example, considering whether to protect one 
business entity from discrimination by another business entity because 
of the protected class status of the first entity's employers, agents, or 
associates.122 
I would be remiss if I did not touch on one additional prospective 
addition to state and local antidiscrimination statutes. Ever since 1982, 
standing for fair housing organizations and their testers has existed to 
the furthest limits of Article Ill of the Constitution (there are no pru-
dential limitations that may be imposed on standing in this context); if 
a tester has been deprived of accurate information about housing avail-
abilities, that is one injury; if an organization has "diverted resources" 
from nontesting activities, that is another injury.123 Testing is a crucial 
technique: discrimination often will not announce itself to an individual 
victim of a practice. Someone looking for a home, for example, knows 
the listings that he has been shown but very well may not know (even in 
the Internet age) of listings that he has not been shown. 
The utility of testing to ferret out employment discrimination should 
be obvious. An individual is not going to be able to get a picture of hiring 
patterns that exist; with the exception of government entities,124 only an 
organization that engages in testing can decipher the patterns (whether 
based on using names on resumes as proxies for race or otherwise). 
There has not been very much employment testing, however, subse-
quent to Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mar-
keting Corporation in 1994.125 There, the D.C. Circuit denied the testers 
standing altogether, holding that neither Title VII nor § 1981 contem-
plated such standing.126 As for the Fair Employment Council, the court 
reached the same result with respect to § 1981 and only allowed Title VII 
organizational standing as the organization may have proven injuries (a) 
flowing from actions taken against bona fide job applicants (not testers); 
and (b) only insofar as there was "perceptible injury" to the Council's 
nontesting programs (beyond the decision to shift funding from non-
testing to testing activities).127 The hurdles apparent from the preceding 
description make it difficult as a practical matter for an organization 
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to achieve standing with respect to its employment discrimination test-
ing.l28 
As I have argued elsewhere, fair housing injuries are easily concep-
tualized as injuries to the government that warrant the construction 
of a "private attorney general" provision.129 Employment discrimina-
tion injuries should be accorded the same importance. A straightforward 
approach would be to specifically grant organizations standing when 
they are deprived of accurate information about employment openings 
because of the protected status of their agents (testers) or when they have 
expended funds that result in the discovery of discrimination (avoiding 
collateral litigation over whether they have "diverted resources").130 
All of the foregoing discussion in this section has identified various 
substantive goals, but there are important strategic and tactical decisions 
that have to be made when mounting a state or local legislative effort. 
One is the importance of creating as robust a legislative history as possi-
ble.131 The problem of judge incredulity at efforts to maximize coverage 
is not going to disappear, and that legislative history can be an important 
tool to persuade judges that "we really meant it." 
The question that will need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis is 
the extent to which an effort should rely on the adoption of an enhanced 
liberal construction provision and how much on specific changes to a 
law's substantive and procedural coverage. To me, an enhanced liberal 
construction provision that emphasizes independent construction is 
essential to prevent retrogression. Beyond that, a legislative direction to 
reexamine how a statute should be interpreted can empower civil rights 
advocates who are seeking to explain to courts the reasons a variety of 
provisions deserve a broader reading than they have gotten. This can be 
especially important in connection with matters that may seem techni-
cal to legislators - the ability to inspire a layperson to focus on who 
bears the burden of persuasion, for example, is not unlimited132- but 
have tremendous practical importance on the ability of victims of dis-
crimination to achieve redress. 
If specific changes are made, it is crucial that the legislation state 
explicitly that the changes are not intended to ratify prior judicial con-
struction of provisions not modified (again highlighting the importance 
of having an enhanced liberal construction provision to reference). 
VI. Closing Observations 
The promise of expanding civil rights at the state and local level - or, 
one migh t say, the expedience of doing so given the political and judicial 
environments that currently exist in Washington - is unmistakable.133 
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But efforts to make this sort of change have been sporadic. An informal 
survey of the websites of several major national civil rights organizations 
reveals relatively little attention being paid to this area (legislative advo-
cacy with respect to marriage equality is an important exception to the 
rule). Why isn't more being made of the political space that is available? 
Especially given the trajectory of marriage equality, why wouldn't the 
model of seeding an effort in the most congenial jurisdictions first be 
more generally appealing? 
I am acutely aware that civil rights organizations and their allies do not 
have limitless funds, but my own experience over the last twenty-seven 
years as a civil rights lawyer tells me that limited funding is only a small 
part of the problem. 
Many of the issues discussed in this chapter - the nuts and bolts 
of employment discrimination litigation over the decades - are not 
among the areas seen as either new or exciting (in the academy, among 
civil rights organizations, and elsewhere) and thus are not ranked as high 
priorities. Some of the problem comes from a habitual distaste among 
some civil rights lawyers to have to be litigating in state court instead of 
federal court. Another element of the problem is the failure to take the 
time to study and appreciate how much stronger nonfederal causes of 
action can be. 
Many civil rights organizations and advocates focus attention on only 
one protected class and, sometimes, on one context of discrimination. 
It should not be difficult to appreciate that a coalition seeking to make 
changes across the lines of protected class (e.g., those affecting age, gen-
der, race, and disability) and across the lines of discrimination context 
(e.g., changes affecting both employment and housing) will generally be 
able to bring more pressure on a legislative body than a single-issue 
group acting alone. But despite frequent invocations of the importance 
of coalition, its practice-both in developing multi-issue legislation and 
in terms of coordinating advocacy-has remained more the exception 
than the rule. 
In my own judgment, the single most important factor is that most 
attorneys have not considered, or are uncomfortable with, the idea that 
it is still possible to write on a clean slate. I have seen this reticence hin-
der the development of the City Human Rights Law as broadly as it oth-
erwise could be,134 and I think the same reticence does a lot to explain 
the paucity of similar efforts elsewhere. 
It is surely more difficult to accomplish one's goals when judges have 
to be directed to take an active role in developing a statute to its full 
potential than when there are judges already inclined to do so. But it is 
worth thinking about state and local legislation as in many ways being 
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at the earliest stage of development, comparable to where Title VII was 
immediately after its passage more than fifty years ago. Neither McDon-
nell Douglas, nor Griggs, nor any other case came packaged with the law; 
advocates had to see the potential, imagine the doctrines needed, and 
marshal evidence and reason to get those doctrines established as best 
they could. Those kinds of efforts are needed at the state and local levels 
today. 
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On turning fifty, a friend of mine said: "You can't pretend you are young anymore." 
I. Introduction 
As the Civil Rights Act turns fifty, antidiscrimination law has become 
unfashionable. For those commentators and reformers who concern 
themselves with addressing racial, ethnic, and gender disparities, 
antidiscrimination law occupies a less central role than it did fifty years 
ago, perhaps even a marginal one. The core problem, it seems, is that 
discrimination is a limited explanation for current forms of contempo-
rary inequality. Discussing race, economist Glenn Loury has argued that 
discrimination should be "demoted, dislodged from its current promi-
nent place in the conceptual discourse on racial inequality in American 
life." Richard Ford and Richard Banks offer a similar assessment, arguing 
that if "we are legitimately concerned about substantive disparities," then 
the "goal of eliminating discrimination is too modest, not ambitious 
enough."1 It is not uncommon to speak of remedying discrimination 
as separate from a larger goal of addressing inequality. And civil rights 
strategies are posited as not up to the serious task of improving mobil-
ity for low-wage workers or providing access to entry-level employment. 
The antidiscrimination approach, it is said, is "based on the princi-
ple of freedom of individual opportunity," which necessarily helps the 
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more advantaged and better trained, and is thus inadequate for reduc-
ing substantive inequality in our society.2 If one is seeking innovations 
to address poverty and inequality or to promote economic and social 
opportunity, much commentary suggests that antidiscrimination law is 
not the place to find them. 
It is not hard to harness reasons to demote "discrimination" in con-
temporary inequality discourse. Discrimination remains prevalent in 
our society and continues to explain extant disparities between groups.3 
However, there is much to suggest that addressing contemporary 
inequities teq_uites confronting the full range of mechanisms that dis-
parately affect racial and ethnic minorities and women, including 
improving education and training of minority workers,4 the decreasing 
fortune of less-skilled workers,5 the effects of immigration status on 
social mobility, and how geography and place structures opportunity.6 
Given the complex reasons for contemporary inequality, social reform 
is less likely to center merely on questions of individualized bias, but 
on social welfare and education programs, interventions to improve the 
economic status of unskilled and semiskilled workers, and strategies to 
diminish spatial segregation and improve the conditions facing com-
munities of concentrated poverty. Contemporary advocates might now 
organize their work around narratives of social inclusion,7 or addressing 
spatial inequities in the distribution of opportunity. 8 
Yet there is a danger in casting aside the Civil Rights Act as one charts 
this new course. For one, as I discuss in Part I, such a move misun-
derstands the force of the antidiscrimination directive that undergirded 
the Act, one that is not limited to formal discrimination or bias and 
that drew on a broad set of private and public implementation tools 
to respond to evolving problems of exclusion. Reminding ourselves of 
the implementation strategies that emerged in the first decade after the 
Act produces a richer account of what we mean by "discrimination" and 
attunes us to a broader set of implementation tools than is convention-
ally associated with antidiscrimination law. Second, as I show in Part II, 
the Civil Rights Act continues to sustain an important set of strategies to 
promote inclusion. In that Part I, discuss the emergence of strategies to 
address contemporary disparities under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 
as well as emerging efforts under Title VII-reminiscent of Title VII's 
early years-to make Title VII more responsive to contemporary forces 
shaping exclusion in labor markets. 
Part III concludes with the value of retaining hold of this civil rights 
infrastructure, even as reformers develop other tools and strategies for 
promoting equity and inclusion. My argument here is that the Act pro-
vides an important regulatory framework for addressing problems of 
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exclusion facing a broad range of groups (including women and racial 
and ethnic minorities), across a range of domains (education, employ-
ment, transportation, environment, agriculture, and more) and using a 
range of potentially powerful public and private enforcement strategies. 
Transformative statutes do not come to us every day. For pragmatic as 
well as expressive reasons, it is worth continuing to consider what one 
might wrest from the Act's great aspirations and powerful design. 
1. Revisiting Ambition 
Antidiscrimination is at the core of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While 
the Act uses a range of terms-Title VI of the Act provides that "[n]o per-
son in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance"9 and Title VII prohibits discrimination as 
well as segregation and classification in ways that deprive employees of 
opportunities10- our collective shorthand for the Act is that it prohibits 
"discrimination." 
Among those concerned! with addressing contemporary race, ethnic, 
or gender disparities or with promoting economic inclusion, the antidis-
crimination approach typified by the Act is often framed as inadequate.11 
In part, this assessment ste·ms from a determination that discrimination 
is either in significant decline or a fairly marginal explanation of con-
temporary disparities.l2 In part, this assessment also represents a cri-
tique of the strategies underlying civil rights law: the antidiscrimination 
approach is seen as intertwined with an emphasis on litigation at the 
expense of other approaches.13 The thrust of these critiques is that the 
antidiscrimination idea centers on formal, market discrimination and 
bias, and is thus not sufficiently robust to be relevant today. 
However, I urge caution in characterizing the 1964 Act as centered 
on formal or explicit discrimination. Rather, one can fairly characterize 
the Act's regime as seeking to address a range of institutional practices 
that disadvantaged blacks (the main target at the Act's inception). By 
"regime," I mean to emphasize both the Act as apparently contemplated 
by its initial drafters and legislative and executive proponents but even 
more by the private and public enforcement structure that emerged in 
the years after its enactment. 
The statutory history-which has been much pored over in the half 
a century following passage of the Act-shows the breadth of the Act's 
goals. In finally announcing support for civil rights legislation in 
employment and education, President john F. Kennedy promoted such 
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efforts as necessary to ensure full equality in American society and par-
ticipation in economic life.14 In his address on the floor of the U.S. 
House of Representatives introducing the legislation, Kennedy cast fair 
employment laws as part of a quest to end racial disparities in unem-
ployment, en route to the larger goal of assuring full employment for all 
workers.15 Introducing Title VI, which prohibited discrimination in fed-
erally funded programs, Kennedy expansively defined the antidiscrim-
ination idea underlying the legislation, declaring that: "[S]imple justice 
requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, 
not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or 
results in racial discrimination."16 "Indirect discrimination" through sub-
sidization, Kennedy emphasized, is "invidious" discrimination.17 
Legislative history from the House and Senate speaks to the goals of 
this new legislation.18 The House Report to one of the bills that would 
culminate in the Civil Rights Act declared that discrimination is an 
"urgent and most serious national problem" requiring extensive action 
to eradicate exclusion in voting, public accommodation, federal finan-
cial assistance, and employment.19 Recognizing that states had initiated 
important civil rights legislation, the House Report nevertheless recog-
nized the need for national action: "in the last decade it has become 
increasingly clear that progress has been too slow and that national leg-
islation is required to meet a national need."2021 In addition, the legisla-
ture identified goals that went beyond market discrimination, emphasiz-
ing that discrimination was not limited to explicit exclusionary actions 
but "ranges in degrees from patent absolute rejection to more subtle 
forms of invidious distinctions."21 As an example, this House Report 
alluded to the effect of seemingly racially neutral practices such as "last 
hired, first fired" and to the relegation of minorities "to 'traditional' posi-
tions and through discriminatory promotion practices."22 Occupational 
segregation was achieved through "traditional expectations" as well as 
the segregation of minorities in "involuntary part-time work."23 Dis-
crimination could be subtle: the House Report noted that while employ-
ment agencies often engaged in "outright refusal to deal with minority 
group applications," as prevalent was the refusal to refer minorities due 
to "expressed agreements, tacit understandings, and assumptions based 
on traditional practices:'24 In this congressional history, labor and entry-
level jobs emerge as a particular point of focus. The House Report refers 
to efforts to improve opportunities in construction unions and ensure 
access to apprenticeship training programs often run by labor unions 
because of the crucial role these pathways played in "improving the 
skills, knowledge and capability of" workers.25 
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To be sure, key portions of the legislative history of the Act reveal 
legislative concerns about avoiding race-conscious action or intrusions 
into the "prerogatives" of management (prefiguring subsequent debates 
in Title VII over the extent to which the Act should be interpreted 
to allow disparate impact or affirmative action).26 And forces aligned 
against the Act sought to minimize administrative power to implement 
Title VII, most notably succeeding in diminishing the powers of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.27 Yet this journey into 
the statutory history is meant to check modern characterizations of the 
antidiscrimination goal as. aimed at simply removing explicit or bla-
tant barriers or as disconnected from the goal of economic opportunity. 
Instead, the legislative history offers a more richly conceived notion 
of the degree to which discrimination was embedded in employment 
and credentialing institutions such as unions, the range of explicit and 
implicit barriers to inclusion, and the connection between the antidis-
crimination method and achieving fuller economic participation. 
The ambition of the Act is further revealed when we consider the Act's 
implementation context-the strategies that public and private actors 
undertook to implement and enforce the Act. Implementation would 
come to include strategies (1) defining the Act broadly to reach more 
than intentional discrimination; (2) leveraging administrative and pri-
vate resources for systemic enforcement; and (3) requiring regulated 
actors to take affirmative inclusionary steps. 
The move beyond intentional discrimination is seen most sharply in 
the public and private implementation of the Act to reach actions with 
an unjustified disparate impact. Within a year after passage of the Act, 
federal agencies charged with implementing Title VI of the Act inter-
preted the provision to reach not just actions by funding recipients that 
were intentional but also those that had the "effect of subjecting individ-
uals to discrimination."28 (Notably, these regulations were drafted by the 
agencies, with the involvement of private actors and the White House, 
and formally approved by the president.) What we now understand as 
the disparate impact standard in employment grew in part out of the 
guidelines issued by the EEOC on employment tests, in response to the 
adoption by Southern employers of formally race-neutral practices that 
operated to discriminate.29 Two years after passage of the Act, the EEOC 
issued guidance instructing employers to administer an occupational 
test only where it "fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by 
the particular job or class of job."30 A few years later, the EEOC issued 
additional guidelines requiring that employers using tests have "avail-
able 'data demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly cor-
related with important elements of work behavior which comprise or 
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are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evalu-
ated."'31 It was in giving "substantial deference" to the EEOC in Griggs v. 
Duke Power that the Supreme Court allowed that the Act prohibited in 
some cases employers' facially neutral practices that in fact are "discrim-
inatory in operation."32 
Commentators have debated whether the EEOC's move interpreting 
the Act to reach disparate impact claims was distorting the meaning of a 
statute centered on disparate treatment and color-blindness, or whether 
this move was supported by the language and prevailing understandings 
of "discrimination."33 Regardless of the position one takes on fidelity 
to the language or the original legislative deal, the point here is that 
these early moves by the EEOC implement the Act in ways that reached 
beyond thin notions of formal discrimination. Instead, the meaning of 
antidiscrimination emerges in response to the efforts to address the 
evolving barriers facing workers. 
Second, public and private enforcement strategies focused on opening 
up large-scale institutions to black workers by targeting salient industries 
and leveraging systemic tools such as regulatory guidance, investiga-
tions, and hearings, and using litigation mechanisms such as the class 
action device and pattern and practice authority. As other commen-
tators have shown, the EEOC adopted structurally oriented strate-
gies--interpreting language in Title VII to permit it to collect data on 
the racial composition of employers34 and using this data to system-
ically publicize and investigate problems of labor market discrimina-
tion in particular regions, sectors, and industries.35 Private enforcement 
also followed a systemic approach that targeted particular industries, 36 
employed the class action device,37 and sought to take aim at a range of 
exclusionary practices, in particular the use of non-job-related occupa-
tional tests38 and exclusionary seniority practices.39 As former NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund (LDF) attorney Robert Belton has explained: "by 
1965 overt discrimination on the basis of race was not fashionable.''40 
Instead, LDF harnessed an approach to challenge "superficially neutral 
practices, such as testing and educational devices or seniority systems 
that appeared facially neutral or color-blind but operated to perpetuate 
the effects of past discrimination"41 and "systemic discrimination 
imbedded in basic personnel policies or organizational structures of 
companies and unions."42 
Third, the enforcement agency used its regulatory power to promote 
goals apart from the litigation context. Although the EEOC (designed 
to be a weak enforcement agency) lacked (and still lacks) power to issue 
binding substantive regulations to enforce Title VII,43 the agency devel-
oped guidelines on how to avoid discriminatory practices such as 
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seniority systems and, most famously, on the use of occupational tests. 
Robert Lieberman has described these guidelines as emerging out of the 
EEOC's investigation and conciliation power-an attempt by the EEOC 
to provide a guide for "employers and employees about what practices 
the commission would find acceptable and unacceptable in probable 
cause determinations."44 
This implementation context reveals a robust conception of the 
antidiscrimination directive at the core of the Act-one that reaches 
beyond explicit practices to attain subtle, embedded mechanisms that 
excluded or inhibited opportunities for black workers. In addition, this 
review of the implementation context makes clear that reformers 
employed a range of strategies to move the Act beyond the redress of 
individual claims. This is manifest in the leveraging of federal contract-
ing and spending power, the requirement of affirmative inclusionary 
strategies, the reliance on administrative investigations and regulatory 
guidance, the use of the class action device, and the attempt to con-
nect the work of private litigators and community-based organizations. 
Finally, this context reveals that antidiscrimination strategies would be 
cognizant of the realities of the industrial economy at that time and con-
nected to core questions of social and economic equality. For instance, 
the paradigm beneficiary of Title VII was the blue collar worker, evident 
in reformers' focus on manufacturing and construction industries and 
on organized labor. In its goals and implementation, the Act centered on 
opening up access to jobs with training and career ladders and on pro-
viding avenues for the acquisition of skills. 
By some key accounts, this enforcement approach contributed signif-
icantly to improving the social and economic status of blacks in the late 
1960s and early 1970s45 and to substantial progress in the desegregation 
of schools.46 However, I do not want to overstate the success or ambition 
of these public-private strategies47 or to ignore the possibility of even 
more transformative paths that might have been pursued, particularly 
with regard to reform of labor inslitutions.48 What I propose is in the 
spirit of correcting how we often regard "antidiscrimination" today-a 
useful ch eck on our modern tendency to characterize the antidiscrimi-
nation idea at the center of the Act as limited to a concern about indi-
vidual bias, as too court-centered, insufficiently structural, or attenuated 
from core questions of access to opportunity. 
II. Claiming Relevance 
Today, much of how commentators understand the relevance and 
capacity of antidiscrimination law is shaped by regimes of court 
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enforcement and by Title VII litigation in particular. Title VII generates 
more litigation than any other portion of the Act. Title VII cases are 
more frequently heard at the Supreme Court than litigation involving 
other provisions of the Act (or other civil rights statutes).49 And Title 
VII commands the greatest share of commentary about the Act in the 
legal academic literature. Title VII's rise and prominence has coincided 
with a move away from the earlier more systemic or "structural" focus 
of the Act. For instance, while individual Title VII cases have continued 
to rise since the Act's inception, pattern and practice and class action 
litigation has fallen. 5° And, even as the overall volume of litigation has 
increased, litigation has shifted away from the hiring discrimination 
cases that prevailed in Title VII's earlier years, which sought to open 
up opportunity for previously excluded workers in economically salient 
industries toward more individual claims of termination. This is a trend 
that researchers identified in the early 1990s before passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 (which, through damages and other mechanisms, 
increased incentives to bring Title VII claims),51 and that has continued 
in the subsequent years. 52 Attorneys on the ground have noted the irony 
of this interplay between the Civil Rights Act of 1991's strengthening of 
Title VII through a damage regime and the decline of systemic reform 
litigation. 53 Some of these changes in the shape of litigation no doubt 
reflect Title VII's success in creating incentives for fairer employment 
practices and the provision's salience.54 Still, with the individual Title VII 
case in mind, one might come to understand the Act as centered on indi-
vidual bias; one might have reason to question the Act's broader rele-
vance to contemporary forces and patterns of exclusion. 
Yet focusing on Title VII's enforcement in individual cases pays insuf-
ficient heed to other provisions of the Act, such as Title VI, which do not 
operate primarily in courts or as a tool for redress of individualized bias 
claims. In addition, emphasizing court enforcement in individual cases 
overlooks the broader regulatory tools of the Act-in both Title VI and 
Title VII-that can reach beyond ex post court enforcement in individual 
cases and that can operate to promote or encourage inclusion and dis-
rupt patterns of exclusion. 
To begin with Title VII, as the story of the 1964 Act's early history 
shows, effective implementation of Title VII depended not just on litiga-
tion in individual cases but also on use of a broad set of tools, including 
private class action and agency pattern and practice litigation, regulatory 
guidance, industry targeting, data analysis, and investigations. Further-
more, implementation of Title VII depended not only on narrow con-
ceptions of discrimination centered on market bias or prejudice but also 
on the use of these hybrid enforcement tools to address a set of on-the-
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ground, evolving practices that inhibited opportunity for workers and to 
open up key institutions and industries. 
At the outset, it is worth noting even as Title VII litigation today is hob-
bled by significant doctrinal constraints,55 such litigation has continued 
capacity to address patterns of group exclusion and reform organiza-
tional practices. Class actions, pattern and practice, and hiring cases may 
have declined relative to the early years of Title VII enforcement, but 
they are not extinct. In recent years, privately initiated Title VII litiga-
tion has sought to address exclusionary employment practices by public 
agencies that exclude minority workers56 and practices such as steer-
ing and downward channeling that perpetuate occupational segrega-
tion in lower-skilled, service sector employment. 57 Litigation in this vein 
maintains relevance by taking aim at systemic practices and targeting 
pathways, training institutions like public employment and unions-a 
traditional focus of Title VII-as well the service sector in which large 
numbers of women and workers of color are employed (though often in 
the lowest ranks). 
Moreover, innovative litigation stems from important collaborations 
between antidiscrimination lawyers and groups that organize not 
around questions of discrimination but toward the goals of improving 
the condition of workers within particular industries. One group that has 
received some attention in the academic literature in recent years is the 
Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY), which seeks to 
improve the working conditions and pay of restaurant workers in fine 
dining establishments in New York City. The group organizes restaurant 
workers to address wage and hour violations by employers and improve 
benefits like sick or parenting-related leave.58 Yet central to the group's 
mission is addressing what the group sees as pervasive discrimination 
and occupational segregation in the restaurant industry. Much as pub-
lic and private implementers used the data collected by the EEOC to 
highlight the exclusion of black workers by Southern manufacturers, 
ROC-NY also publicizes practices in the restaurant industry that limit 
opportunity for women, immigrant workers, and workers of color.59 
ROC-NY relies on audit testing-that classic tool of antidiscrimination 
enforcement used most extensively in the fair housing context60-to 
document discrimination in hiring for particular restaurant positions. 61 
In addition, although the group's strategies center on organizing and 
policy reform, ROC-NY partners with private attorneys to litigate dis-
crimination cases, securing remedies in individual and group litigation. 
Significantly, ROC-NY leverages its investigations into discriminatory 
practices, its deep knowledge of the industry, its representation of work-
ers, and its litigation successes to publicize exclusionary practices (such 
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as the lack of formal and transparent practices for hiring, training, and 
promotion). It advocates for specific reform interventions and celebrates 
and involves employers that perpetuate best practices in the industry. 62 
There is evidence, too, of revitalization of the type of public systemic 
enforcement that gave Title VII its salience in the early years of the 
Civil Rights Act. The EEOC has long been seen as a broken enforcement 
agency. Historically overtaxed and underresourced, the increase in Title 
VII and other employment discrimination cases in the 1990s created 
additional pressures on the EEOC since Title VII and most other 
employment claims must first be filed with the agency.63 And there are 
serious questions about whether the agency has adapted to accommo-
date this crush of complaints. Indeed, if the early EEOC sought to move 
away from the volume of individual complaints by focusing on sys-
temic remedies and investigations, accounts of the EEOC in the 1990s 
and 2000s suggest an agency paralyzed by processing individual com-
plaints. 64 The EEOC, too, has recognized its need to enhance its sys-
temic litigation program. 65 
But rather than wholly abandon the prospect of wresting more from 
this flawed public enforcement mechanism, it seems worth devoting 
creative attention to strategies for strengthening the regime. After all, 
the EEOC has formal tools and capacity unavailable to private litigants. 
Unlike private litigants, the EEOC can maintain systemic litigation with-
out meeting the requirements of class action Rule 2366 (the difficulties 
in meeting the rule's requirements have hampered private class actions 
in recent years67). The EEOC can also pursue investigations without an 
actual complainant by filing a commissioner's charge.68 More, the EEOC 
can pursue conciliations, hold hearings to investigate patterns of dis-
crimination, collect data, and issue regulatory guidance. 
To reverse its slide away from systemic litigation, the EEOC has 
recently announced a renewed focus on systemic discrimination, devel-
oping a plan for doing so after extensive consultation with experts and 
advocates. 69 Indeed, in the last few years, the EEOC has begun to bring 
more pattern and practice litigation; in 2012, it significantly increased 
its recoveries against employers in systemic discrimination cases over 
prior years.70 The EEOC has announced an increased emphasis on pre-
venting employment discrimination through education and outreach, 
including by partnering with community groups to focus on the most 
disadvantaged workers and underserved communities?1 And the EEOC 
has instituted important regulatory guidance on current barriers facing 
workers, notably revising its prior guidance on best practices in con-
sidering an applicant's criminal history.72 Further, the EEOC could uti-
lize its existing powers more effectively. For instance, the EEOC might 
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increase its ability to identify industries with discriminatory employ-
ment practices and to analyze the EE0-1 and other data that it collects 
on private employers.73 The EEOC could use data to hold hearings on 
problematic industry practices, disseminate information and best prac-
tices, generate regulatory guidance, and pursue litigation. Another tool 
th~ EEOC might deploy, perhaps in conjunction with nongovernmen-
tal organizations and nonprofits, is the use of audit studies to iden-
tify hiring discrimination. Although courts are not settled on the ability 
of employment testers to recover damages and injunctive relief,74 the 
results of audit studies might still prove useful for conducting investi-
gations and providing insight into industry practices.75 But the agency's 
current emphasis recaptures the focus on systemic discrimination-it 
attunes us to the possibilities that might still remain in a Title VII that 
moves beyond a focus on individual litigation. 
The other key provision of the Act-Title VI-has also served as an 
important location in recent years for addressing contemporary prob-
lems of exclusion. Title VI differs from Title VII in that its central 
enforcement target is not private industry but federal agencies and 
grantees. Its key mode of enforcement is not litigation but administra-
tive regulation, backed by the threat of funding withdrawal. In recent 
years, regulatory enforcement of Title VI has yielded an important array 
of regulations that place affirmative requirements of inclusion on 
grantees. Implementing Title VI, the Department of Agriculture 
requires federal agencies administering agriculture, forestry, food, and 
nutrition programs to undertake ongoing analyses to ensure that 
minorities benefit from these federally funded programs.76 Federally 
funded public transit and highway programs must take affirmative steps 
to assess the impacts of their programs on minorities and persons with 
limited English proficiency, adopt mitigating alternatives, and include 
minority groups in their planning.77 In an account of these directives in 
mass transit, I showed how they required grantees to incorporate impact 
assessments in their planning, engage in best practices for ensuring par-
ticipation of covered groups, and design inclusionary alternatives.?8 
These Title VI directives bear on the debate about the relevance of 
discrimination law today: they extend beyond individual bias, and their 
implementation depends not on ex post enforcement by courts (although 
litigation may sometimes play a role in enforcement) but on imple-
mentation by regulated actors. In addition, these directives intervene 
in regulatory domains that are linchpins for determining inclusion and 
opportunity distribution today. For instance, mass transportation policy 
and design have strong effects on economic mobility-high minority 
and poor communities are often disconnected from important job cen-
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ters-and access to transportation is a key determinant of the distrib-
ution of resources and patterns of racial segregation and concentrated 
poverty across a metropolitan region.79 By encouraging inclusion of the 
needs of minority communities in design decisions, promoting ongo-
ing equity assessments, and mitigation, Title VI mass transit directives 
seek to interrupt the reproduction of existing, unequal patterns of trans-
portation access and the attendant spatial inequalities. In addition, as in 
the employment example described above, these Title VI directives are 
harnessed by groups that do not centrally organize around questions 
of antidiscrimination-but who instead organize their advocacy around 
the problems of particular geographic communities or on a specific pol-
icy problem (such as transit equity). 80 
Perhaps even more than Title VII, Title VI makes plain the risk ofleav-
ing the Act behind as reformers focus on questions of mobility, oppor-
tunity, and spatial equality. Because Title VI commands attention to race 
and ethnicity in a vast number of federal programs involving billions of 
dollars, its regulatory infrastructure is too powerful not to employ as a 
tool for advancing reform. 
Ill. Antidiscrimination's Place 
As a way of defining a problem, and as a legal intervention, antidis-
crimination is no doubt less central than it once was. In education, dis-
criminatory discipline, racialized tracking, and discriminatory student 
assignment, policies may remain problems, but reformers' attention 
is understandably attuned to addressing disparities through reforms 
to improve the quality of educational interventions. In employment, 
important concerns about discrimination and occupational segregation 
in labor markets might be overtaken by the fate of workers in an econ-
omy that leaves little room for less-skilled and semiskilled workers.81 
Those interested in inclusion and particularly in reducing racial and 
ethnic disparities would be gravely wrong to frame their claims solely 
in terms of discrimination (whether a thin or robust account) without 
engaging a broader set of reform strategies. 
Still, the Civil Rights Act has an important role to play in these 
domains. Understanding the Act's place requires recovering the Act's 
central ambition as well as innovating to make the Act responsive to con-
temporary problems. Some may argue that the Act in its current formu-
lation is not worth such sustained attention. After all, much innovation 
might be accomplished through new regulation and new statutes at the 
federal, state, and local levels. Such innovation is reflected in statutes 
requiring targeted attention to the progress of racial and ethnic minori-
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ties in education82 or by requirements that state actors address racial 
disparities in their juvenile justice systems.83 Innovation is evident, too, 
in efforts to intervene to address practices that may have a particular 
impact on minorities or women but that address the declining fates of all 
lower-wage workers, such as skills training, the expansion of school-to-
work and apprenticeship programs, wage reform, reentry programs, the 
creation of new collective bargaining regimes for low-wage workers,84 
child care and sick leave policy85 or reform of the inappropriate uses of 
employment background checks.86 
The reasons for continuing nevertheless to ask how the Civil Rights 
Act can bear on contemporary questions are both pragmatic and expres-
sive. The pragmatic argument is that it is hard to make progress on 
inequality without attention to questions of how status-race, ethnicity, 
and gender-structure opportunity in d istinct ways. The Civil Rights Act 
contains one of the few places in American law that directs attention 
to these categories, and that provides mechanisms for disrupting long-
standing patterns of exclusion. More, it provides an expansive, if imper-
fect, public and private regulatory infrastructure for advancing these 
goals. The second perhaps more expressive reason is that the Act was 
never simply about antidiscrimination in the narrowest sense. Even if 
so conceived by some of its drafters, it has absorbed a meaning through 
implementation and cultural salience that gestures toward broader 
claims of citizenship and inclusion. 
IV. Conclusion 
As the Civil Rights Act of 1964 turns fifty, I am sympathetic to the idea 
that we should demote discrimination. Recognizing this, social reform-
ers increasingly organize their equality claims around questions of 
opportunity, economic mobility, and diminishing disparities based on 
geography and place. Yet the meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is not 
limited to narrow notions of discrimination; it still has a role to play 
in structuring claims and advancing reforms in these new domains. As 
reformers design new strategies, the Act's initial structural reform ambi-
tions are worth remembering. 
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A Signal or a Silo? Title VII's Unexpected 
Hegemony 
Sophia Z. Lee 
In February 1976, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) 
held hearings on whether to continue denying its services to unions that 
discriminated on the basis of race or sex.1 Board members, like adminis-
trators at a number of the major federal regulatory agencies, had under-
stood the 1964 enactment of Title VII to empower them to adopt its 
equal employment mission as their own. The Board's greatest cham-
pion of this effort, Member Howard Jenkins Jr., believed the Board was 
uniquely situated to provide "meaningful answers to the interrelated 
problems of race relations and industrial relations."2 But after twelve 
years of expanding the scope of the Board's antidiscrimination policies, 
its members had doubts. Rather than harmonizing civil and labor rights 
as jenkins had hoped, these policies, members feared, were undermin-
ing the right to collective action that the Board was designed to protect.3 
The Board's 1976 hearing only exacerbated these concerns. Attorneys 
for the AFL-CIO warned that employers "seek to defeat organization 
through any weapon put at hand," and the Board's policies were a 
weapon whose "one cutting edge directed at the 'right to self-
organization."'4 That employers were the only parties urging the Board 
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to more fully import Title VII standards confirmed the labor lawyers' 
concern.5 
For scholars attuned to labor and civil rights, as for the Board mem-
bers convening that 1976 hearing, Title VII has had a mixed legacy. On 
the one hand, as historian Nancy MacLean has demonstrated, Title VII 
transformed the workplace, not only opening jobs but also empowering 
workers and forging new political coalitions among women and com-
munities of color.6 Labor scholar Benjamin Sachs has noted ways that 
Title VII facilitates collective action today at a time when traditional 
labor law is "ossified."7 Others have sought to revitalize the labor move-
ment by reframing labor rights as civil rights and amending Title VII to 
prohibit discrimination against union organizing.8 
Yet Title VII's triumphs have come, other scholars note, at a steep 
cost to unions. To some, Title VII was based on an individual rights 
regime that was fundamentally adverse to the collective rights on which 
New Deal labor laws such as the Wagner Act were premised.9 To others, 
the early EEOC staff and plaintiff-side lawyers were insensitive to how 
unions worked and unreasonably destructive in their demands.10 In 
BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, political scientist Paul Frymer 
argues that decades of inaction (or insufficient action) by Congress, the 
executive branch, and the labor movement led to a bifurcated legal 
regime in which the NLRB protected labor rights while the federal 
courts implemented Title Vll. The courts ended up being much more 
effective at integrating unions than anyone had anticipated. But this 
approach left union discrimination in the hands of officials, attorneys, 
and judges who were neither familiar with unions nor motivated to 
accommodate civil and labor rights. The unfortunate result, Frymer 
argues, was a court-based civil rights regime that gravely weakened labor 
policy and the labor movement.11 
I have suggested elsewhere that a more unified legal regime was both 
more vigorously sought and more complicated to achieve than existing 
scholarship recognizes.12 I explain my skepticism at far greater length 
in my book, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO 
THE NEW RIGHT, by demonstrating that efforts to fuse labor and civil 
rights faced daunting political and legal hurdles from the inception of 
the New Deal labor regime.13 For this fiftieth anniversary of Title VII, 
however, I focus on that law's relationship to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) during Title VII's first fifteen years. As the opening 
vignette suggests, efforts to charge the NLRB with Title VII's implemen-
tation as a means to strengthen employment discrimination law while 
better harmonizing it with labor rights turned out to be as, if not more, 
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detrimental to unions than Title VII's enforcement by the courts. Court 
enforcement of Title VII dominates employment discrimination today 
partly as a result of efforts to protect workers' right to collective action. 
Below I trace an impulse I call "Title VII as signal," showing how Title 
VII was initially understood to instantiate a broader constitutional oblig-
ation to ensure workplace equality and to simultaneously heighten the 
federal government's duty to fulfill that obligation. This penumbra ema-
nating from Title VII encouraged the NLRB during the 1960s and 1970s 
to expand its antidiscrimination policies. In the latter half of the 1970s, 
however, Title VII was reconceived as a silo in which antidiscrimina-
tion efforts should be consolidated. This was in part because of concerns 
that the NLRB's antidiscrimination policies came at too great a cost to 
its primary mission of ensuring workers' right to self-organization. By 
1979, employment discrimination enforcement was concentrated in the 
agency Title VII created, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), and Title VII litigation in the courts had achieved preem-
inence within that enforcement regime. This history casts doubt on the 
viability of a more harmonized labor and civil rights regime, then, and 
offers a cautionary tale to those eager to fuse the two regimes today. 
I. Title VII as Signal 
When Title VII was enacted in 1964, about one in four nonfarm Amer-
ican workers belonged to a union. 14 While this represented a drop-off 
from the midcentury peak of one in three workers, unions were still 
powerful actors-so powerful, in fact, that their support was pivotal to 
Title VII's passage.15 Similarly, the NLRB, although a political punch-
ing bag for business interests and anti-New Deal conservatives, was a 
powerful, closely watched regulatory agency. Indeed regulatory agencies 
generally loomed much larger then, presiding over major monopolized 
industries-gas and electric utilities, airlines, telecommunications- that 
have since been broken up and deregulated. These agencies were seen as 
potential agents of reform: when consumer advocate Ralph Nader sent 
armies of law student interns out to change the world in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, they wrote carefully researched manifestos about agen-
cies like the Interstate Commerce Commission.16 There was one promi-
nent exception to this era of regulatory prowess: the EEOC. Indeed, so 
weak was the EEOC and the statute it was created to implement that civil 
rights advocates sought to strengthen the employment discrimination 
regime by disseminating Title VII's enforcement throughout the federal 
government. 
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A. Title VII's Formal Weakness 
For the thirty years prior to Title VII's enactment, moderate and con-
servative Republicans, to the extent that they supported a federal fair 
employment law, favored one that relied on voluntary compliance or 
at most would be enforced by the judiciary.17 Civil rights advocates' 
experience with unions' duty of fair representation under the federal 
labor laws, a court-enforced protection that African American workers 
won in 1944, made them leery of this approach.18 As they frequently 
told Congress, litigation had proved "expensive and cumbersome" as 
well as "inadequate."19 Instead, civil rights and labor advocates as well 
as their congressional allies countered that any federal fair employment 
law should be enforced by an agency like the NLRB that had the power 
to adjudicate and remedy discrimination claims.20 Title VII, however, 
had required moderate and conservative Republicans' support and thus 
adopted their preferred court-enforced approach. In the opinion of the 
law's civil rights supporters, this was a significant compromise.21 
Title VII's first years only aggravated civil rights advocates' concerns. 
The EEOC quickly earned a reputation for ineffectiveness. Dernand out-
stripped the agency's resources. The EEOC's tiny staff received nearly 
nine thousand complaints in its first year alone, developing a backlog 
that neared two thousand. Furthermore, at first, the EEOC made only 
limited use of the resources and power it had, its efforts stymied by 
internal strife and rapid staff turnover.22 And even after the EEOC got 
around to investigating and conciliating a complaint, the wait was not 
necessarily over. If this approach failed, complainants had to find an 
attorney to file a private lawsuit and then engage in just the kind of 
drawn-out litigation that had proved so "inadequate" in duty of fair rep-
resentation cases. In 1967, two years after filing a complaint with the 
EEOC, workers at the El Dorado, Arkansas, Monsanto plant reported 
having gained only "a feeling of depression, real low down."23 
The federal courts surprised everyone with their robust enforcement 
of Title VII, but civil rights advocates still worried about the law's weak-
nesses.24 In some industries, most employers were too small to be cov-
ered by Title VII, for instance.25 Even where Title VII applied, advocates 
lamented aspects of the law's approach. There were "major limitations 
upon relying on law suits as the sole or even principal instrument of 
implementing fair employment policy," advocates insisted in 1972.26 
They contended that courts lacked expertise in industries' business prac-
tices, hampering their ability to determine whether employment qual-
ifications that tended to exclude African Americans were justified. Law-
suits also affected only a single employer, while industry-wide consent 
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decrees required copious time, effort, and expense. Advocates sought a 
means to instead "induce a great deal of voluntary compliance."27 
B. Title VII's Penumbral Strength 
For those who thought lawsuits were not the best, or at least should 
not be the exclusive, way to counter workplace discrimination, Title 
VII nonetheless held promise. Even before Title VII's passage, some 
government officials acknowledged a national policy against employ-
ment discrimination that derived from the Constitution.28 Although 
Congress technically relied on the Commerce Clause to authorize Title 
VII, the law was believed by many to also codify this constitutionally 
grounded antidiscrimination requirement. 29 Officials argued that Title 
VII strengthened this national policy against discrimination and indi-
cated that all government officials should implement its aims.30 At the 
same time, Title VII's constitutional roots meant that government actors 
were not bound by the law's formallimits.3LTitle VII, the justice Depart-
ment advised, did not "circumscribe the authority of Fe~eral agen-
cies ... to regulate employment practices."32 Agencies were instead free to 
regulate in Title VII's name, even if they exceeded its formal provisions. 
C. Title VII's Dissemination 
Federal officials made use of Title VII's penumbra. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted 
rules requiring all broadcasters and common carriers to adopt equal 
employment policies. Broadcasters had argued that Congress in Title 
VII delegated "regulatory power over civil rights" to the EEOC, not the 
FCC.33 The FCC disagreed, reasoning that the "national policy against 
discrimination in employment" was "particularly embodied" in Title VII 
but was not limited to its provisions.34 The agency therefore imposed 
equal employment requirements, including on broadcasters too small 
to trigger Title VII coverage.35 At the Federal Power Commission (FPC), 
attorneys likewise argued that the agency's duty to regulate in the public 
interest obligated it to consider the national policy against discrimina-
tion when licensing or certificating utilities. As at the FCC, they reasoned 
that because Title VII embodied but did not delimit this policy, the FPC 
could demand equal employment even from utilities that were not tech-
nically violating Title VII.36 Similar arguments were made by officials 
from numerous federal agencies. 37 
Other than the FCC, the agency that made the most use of Title VII's 
penumbra was the NLRB. The Board had long policed some types of 
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racism in the workplace, prohibiting unions from designating the group 
of workers it would represent (called a "bargaining unit") based solely 
on those workers' race and regulating the use of racially charged speech 
during union election campaigns.38 If a union demonstrated sufficient 
worker support, the NLRB would "certify" it as the exclusive represen-
tative of all workers in the bargaining unit. In the 1940s, the NLRB 
promised to rescind the certification of any union that failed to fairly 
represent the African Americans in its bargaining unit, but the Board 
defined fair representation narrowly. As the NAACP's Labor Secretary 
quipped in 1949, under the Board's policy, "[u]nions may exclude col-
ored people from membership, they may segregate them into separate 
locals and they may refuse to let them share in the full benefits of the 
union, but no union may discriminate against them because of race."39 
In the 1950s, spurred in part by Brown v. Board of Education, the Board 
put more teeth in its existing antidiscrimination policies.40 In the early 
1960s, even before Title VII was enacted, it further strengthened them, 
including by finally decertifying a union for segregating its member-
ship by race-a decision it symbolically released the same day President 
Johnson signed Title VII into law.41 
Title VII's enactment did not dampen the Board's policy innovations. 
One member contended that the law had affirmed the Board's obligation 
to police racial discrimination.42 Others, faced with charges that Title 
VII, once enacted, became the exclusive basis for policing workplace 
discrimination, insisted that it "had not ... limit[ed] the Board's duty or 
authority in this area."43 Over the next ten years, the Board found 
repeatedly that unions' racially discriminatory practices violated their 
duty of fair representation and constituted an "unfair labor practice" 
under all three of the possible statutory provisions.44 The latter legal 
tools were the most union-friendly because they allowed the Board to 
order a union to remedy its discriminatory practices without threat-
ening its status as the bargaining unit's representative. The Board also 
extended its antidiscrimination policies to reach employers who were 
complicit in unions' discrimination or who failed to bargain in good 
faith about their own discriminatory policies.45 In 1974, the Board, after 
much internal deliberation and dissensus, established its most aggressive 
antidiscrimination policy yet. In Bekins Moving & Storage Co., the Board 
refused to certify a union that had won an election on the grounds that 
it had in the past demonstrated a "propensity" to discriminate.46 
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II. Title VII as Silo 
Even as Title VII fed equal employment policy innovation in federal 
agencies, some officials pushed back against the trend. The FPC, for 
instance, recognized in 1970 the "national policy that discrimination in 
employment is to be eliminated by all elements of our society, public 
and private."47 But it contended that it was not authorized to require 
equal employment from the utilities it regulated because employment 
discrimination was not sufficiently related to any of its regulatory pur-
poses.48 Several years later, its lawyers asked the Supreme Court to "set 
the fences" between the nation's antidiscrimination and economic reg-
ulatory statutes.49 Agency oversight of utilities' employment practices, 
they argued, would draw the FPC into a "hopeless morass ... of litiga-
tion" it was ill equipped to handle.50 The FPC declined to adopt equal 
employment policies because its leadership's politics changed after 
Richard Nixon's election in 1968. Nixon appointees to the NLRB, in con-
trast, embraced their agency's antidiscrimination duties. Yet they too 
began to see the need to set some fences between the NLRA and Title 
VII. 
A. Title VII and Mission Preservation 
Edward MiJJer, Nixon's choice for NLRB chairman, was enthusiastic 
about the Board's antidiscrimination responsibilities. In the early 1970s, 
Miller undertook an ambitious effort to develop a comprehensive policy 
for handling claims of union discrimination51 and gave speeches touting 
the Board's antidiscrimination responsibilities.52 He insisted that Title 
VII "had not .. .limit[ed] the Board's duty or authority in this area."53 But 
he worried about making the Board, which already suffered from an 
infamous backlog, too attractive an alternative to Title VII. 
During the latter half of the 1960s, when the Board innovated and 
Title VII disappointed, commentators praised the Board's policies and 
argued that they were superior to Title VII.54 One author lauded the 
NLRB's well-established administrative machinery, experienced staff, 
and swifter, more economical approach.55 The Board had "sharper 
enforcement teeth than Congress has provided minority workers in 
recent civil-rights legislation," another observed.56 The free legal ser-
vices the General Counsel's office provided and the public hearings the 
Board held could also draw complaints to the NLRB and away from 
the EEOC. 57 Indeed, African Americans were reportedly "claim[ing that] 
their demands for equal job opportunities have been frustrated under 
both the law [Title VII] and agency [EEOC] specifically created by Con-
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gress to deal with race bias."58 After a federal appeals court ruled that the 
Board could sanction employer discrimination even in nonunion work-
places, one government official predicted that the Board "could put the 
[EEOC] ... out of business."59 
This was an outcome Miller wanted to avoid. He worried that if the 
Board's policies were coextensive with Title VII, it would be "so inun-
dated with cases that its procedures would bog down in a hopeless 
morass."60 As a result, he implemented more narrow antidiscrimination 
policies than Title VII required. In 1968, a federal court remanded a 
case to the Board to determine whether an employer engaged in a "pat-
tern or practice" of racial discrimination (a term lifted straight from 
Title VII) and therefore should be subject to an unfair labor practice 
order for "interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing] or coerc[ing] employees in the 
exercise of their rights" to self-organization under the NLRA.61 Such a 
policy could empower the NLRB to remedy employer discrimination 
at the vast majority of nonunionized workplaces. Miller rejected the 
court's premise that any pattern or practice of discrimination would be 
grounds for an unfair labor practice order. Instead, the Board would 
issue such orders only where there was a "direct relationship between 
the alleged discrimination" and workers' exercise of their rights under 
the NLRA.62 He also rejected the disparate impact standard the Supreme 
Court adopted under Title VII, finding that racial imbalance or disparate 
effects alone were insufficient to prove union and employer discrimina-
tion.63 
B. Title VII and Employer Pretext 
In addition to bureaucratic overload, Board members worried that their 
antidiscrimination policies were facilitating employer intransigence. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, resisting unionization at all costs became a main-
stream business position. A new "union avoidance" industry of lawyers 
and consultants advised employers to delay elections and, if unsuccess-
ful, put off signing a contract as long as possible.64 An employer could 
accomplish both aims by charging the union with discrimination, either 
to prevent its certification as representative or as grounds for the Board 
to deny the union an order requiring the employer to bargain in good 
faith. Chairman Miller's replacement, Betty Southard Murphy, was the 
Board's first female member, the only woman at the helm of a major 
regulatory agency, and a strong proponent of "civil rights and equal 
employment opportunity for workers."65 Worried about "employer[s] 
raising for pretextual reasons ... that a union discriminated racially;· how-
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ever, she called the 1976 Board hearings to reconsider her agency's 
antidiscrimination policies.66 
The employers who appeared at the hearing underscored the prob-
lem. Bell & Howell claimed a union's sex discrimination barred it from 
representing the company's all-male stationary engineers. Trumbull 
Asphalt Company, Inc. accused a Teamsters local organizing its all-white, 
all-male truck drivers of race and sex discrimination. 57 At the time of the 
hearings, these unions' petitions were already two to three years old. 
"[I]t is just outrageous for an employer who was the discriminator" to 
be bringing these charges, the Teamsters' lawyer charged at the Board's 
1976 hearing.68 
Meanwhile, civil rights advocates had abandoned these claims. From 
the 1940s to the 1960s, the NAACP waged a decades-long fight to con-
vince the Board to police discrimination more aggressively. Although 
it greeted enthusiastically the Board's early 1960s decision to do so, by 
the 1970s, it had all but ceased bringing discrimination charges before 
the Board. When the NLRB issued an open call to participate in its 1976 
hearings, no one from the NAACP responded. The most obvious expla-
nation would seem to be that the NAACP had decided Title VII litigation 
in the courts was a more fruitful avenue. Yet the NAACP continued to 
pursue equal employment policies before other regulatory agencies.69 
With its labor allies concerned that the Board's antidiscrimination poli-
cies would give union opponents "an opportunity to destroy collective 
bargaining in this country," the NAACP likely decided that the NLRB 
remedies were not worth defending.7° 
C. The Three Branches Disentangle Title VII 
During the second half of the 1970s, the Supreme Court, Congress, 
and the president enclosed Title VII-and employment discrimination 
policy more generally-in a legal and institutional silo. The Court was 
first to act. In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court disentangled Title VII 
from the Constitution and federal regulatory statutes such as the NLRA. 
In its 1975 Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organiza-
tion decision, a nearly unanimous Court ruled that the NLRB did not 
have to protect employees discharged for protesting employer discrim-
ination after they rejected working through their union to redress it?1 
Employees' right to be free from discrimination "cannot be pursued at 
the expense of the orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated 
by the NLRA," the Court held.72 The fact that Title VII's antiretaliation 
provisions may have protected the employees did not mean that the 
NLRA had to. Read most broadly, the Board appeared under no duty to 
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counter discrimination if doing so would frustrate its core statutory mis-
sion.73 
The next year, the Court further disentangled Title Vll. NAACP v. Fed-
eral Power Commission reaffirmed and refined the principle the Court had 
laid down in Emporium Capwell. Again, a unanimous Court rejected the 
premise that regulatory agencies had a broad mandate to implement 
the national policy against discrimination. "Setting the fences" just as 
the FPC had asked, the Court ruled that agencies need only implement 
antidiscrimination if it was related to their primary statutory mission.74 
Further undermining agencies' authority to diffuse Title VII's antidis-
crimination mandate throughout the federal bureaucracy, the Court 
erected a similar boundary between the Constitution and Title VII in 
Washington v. Davis?5 Contrary to the assumption of federal courts and 
government officials, the Court declined to hold that the "constitutional 
standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is 
identical to the standards applicable under Title VII."76 Henceforward, 
only Title Vll would protect against nonintentional discrimination. 
During 1977 and 1978, the executive branch and Congress similarly dis-
entangled employment discrimination policy from the federal bureau-
cracy and consolidated it under the EEOC. In February 1977, President 
Carter announced that he intended to concentrate implementation of 
federal employment discrimination policies.77 One year later, he sent a 
plan to Congress that centralized enforcement of nearly forty different 
equal employment requirements handled by nearly twenty different 
agencies under the EEOC?8 "Fragmentation of authority among a num-
ber of federal agencies;' Carter contended "has meant confusion and 
ineffective enforcement for employees, regulatory duplication and 
needless expense for employers.''79 That summer, Congress allowed the 
plan to go into effect.80 With "[v]irtually all the groups protected by Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act ... support[ing]" the plan, the era of policy dis-
semination was over. 8l 
D. The NLRB Reverses Course 
With pressure to incorporate employment discrimination into Board 
policy removed, the Board rejected the policies it found most likely to 
hurt its primary statutory mission. In 1977, the Board decided the cases 
that had been the subject of its hearings. Denying certification or bar-
gaining orders to discriminatory unions, the Board held, gave employ-
ers "an incentive to inject charges of union racial discrimination into 
Board ... proceedings as a delaying tactic ... rather than to attack racial dis-
crimination."82 These policies thus "significantly impair[ed] the national 
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labor policy of facilitating collective bargaining, the enforcement of 
which is our primary function," the Board concluded, and denied work-
ers' right to a representative of their choosing.83 
The Board noted that the Supreme Court's fence-laying decisions sup-
ported its decision. When enforcing the challenged policies, a federal 
appellate court had previously required the Board to assess discrimina-
tion using the same statistical methods that courts used when they were 
applying Title VII. The appellate court had done so, however, because it 
held that the NLRB was constitutionally obligated to police discrimina-
tion and assumed that Title VII established the standard for this consti-
tutional duty. The appellate court's approach, the Board now found, had 
not survived Washington v. Davis, which, the Board observed, had sep-
arated the two. The Board was thus free to reject the Title VII eviden-
tiary standards the appellate court preferred. The Board also reasoned 
that Emporium Capwell had recognized that the Board must interpret 
the NLRA in light of "the national labor policy" but had rejected the 
proposition that the NLRA "should give way to the paramount value 
of combating racial discrimination." NAACP had further clarified that 
when implementing national antidiscrimination policy, "consideration 
must be given to whether such action promotes or runs counter to 
the [NLRA's] basic policies and purposes." Because the certification and 
bargaining policies the Board was reconsidering impeded its "primary 
function" of "facilitating collective bargaining," the Board found that it 
was justified in rejecting them.84 
The NLRB faced no resistance for this turnaround. Congress's 
approval of Carter's reorganization plan in 1978 ratified the spirit of the 
NLRB's approach. In 1979, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals put the judi-
ciary's more specific stamp of approval on the Board's decision to care-
fully limit its antidiscrimination policies. In Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 
the court found that the Board's statutory purpose gave it a role in coun-
tering discrimination. The court nonetheless found this obligation bet-
ter satisfied by the postcertification remedies the Board developed in 
the 1960s, such as issuing unfair labor practice orders against unions 
that violated their duty of fair representation or possibly decertifying 
them. These, the court held, were more "consistent with the other poli-
cies of the" NLRA. 85 Henceforth, the NLRB would police discrimination 
only in unionized workplaces and only according to its more narrowly 
defined notion of discrimination. The days of it serving as a serious 
competitor to the EEOC were over for good. 
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Ill. Conclusion: Title VII's Unexpected Hegemony 
Scholars today write wistfully of an alternate legal regime that could 
have better harmonized antidiscrimination with labor law's recognition 
of workers' right to organize and bargain collectively. During Title VII's 
uncertain first fifteen years, advocates, legislators, administrators, and 
workers sought to disseminate enforcement of Title VII's mandate 
throughout administrative agencies, pursuing a more powerful Title VII 
and one more harmonized with labor rights. But empowering Title VII 
via dissemination proved less effective than its proponents expected, 
while achieving a more harmonious regime was more complicated than 
is currently thought. Title VII litigation's domination of employment 
discrimination law today was not inevitable, immediate, or particularly 
desired at the law's inception. Fifteen years on, however, it had become 
the consensus position across government, as well as among civil rights 
and labor advocates. 
While only speculative, this history should give pause to those who 
advocate incorporating labor rights under Title VII. Just as incorporating 
antidiscrimination into labor law threatened workers' right to organize 
in the 1970s, incorporating labor rights into Title VII in the twenty-first 
century might threaten what is left of antidiscrimination law today. The 
EEOC is already overloaded-perhaps even more than the NLRB was 
in the 1970s-while the courts have steadily weakened Title VII.86 Yet 
employers have gutted labor law with greater vigor and coordination 
than they have employment discrimination law.87 Indeed, as this history 
shows, employer hostility to unions has at times fostered support for 
antidiscrimination laws.88 Given the challenges already facing employ-
ment discrimination law today, it might be best to keep the two regimes 
separate, especially if Title VII is currently proving a useful tool in orga-
nizing campaigns. 89 
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Labor Unions and Title VII: A Bit Player at 
the Creation Looks Back 
Theodore J. St. Antoine 
During the debates over what became Title VII (Equal Employment 
Opportunity) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 I was the junior partner 
of the then General Counsel of the AFL-CIO,]. Albert Woll. There were 
only three of us in the firm. The middle partner, Robert C. Mayer, han-
dled the business affairs of the Federation and our other union clients. 
Bob was also the son-in-law of George Meany, president of the AFL-
CIO, which gave us a unique access to Meany's thinking. The Federa-
tion had only one in-house lawyer, Associate General Counsel Thomas 
Everett Harris. Tom was an aristocratic Southerner and a brilliant lawyer 
who had clerked for Justice Harlan Fiske Stone on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. He and I were the labor law technicians, and we briefed and occa-
sionally argued the court and administrative cases in which the Federa-
tion became involved, usually in an amicus capacity. 
The often-fraught relationship of organized labor and the civil rights 
movement is a well-known story.2 Before Title VII, African Americans 
were openly excluded from membership in most railroad unions, and 
their numbers were sharply limited in the skilled construction trades, 
even though all those unions eventually had the legal obligation to pro-
vide "fair representation" of any minorities who did manage to get jobs 
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within the unions' jurisdiction.3 Given the mores and culture of that 
time, it was probably inevitable that many if not most rank-and-file 
union workers placed their perceived economic self-interest above any 
concerns about promoting racial equality. Yet the story is more compli-
cated than that of white workers simply taking advantage of discrimi-
nation against black workers, and the other side of the story needs to 
be remembered. Union leadership took a more principled position, and 
ultimately the official policy of the AFL-CIO was to support passage 
of the Civil Rights Act, including the prohibition of discrimination in 
employment by both employers and unions. 
The initial bill proposed by the Kennedy administration would have 
concentrated on voting rights, access to public accommodations, and 
public school desegregation.4 A fair employment practices (FEP) pro-
vision was considered too controversial and likely to doom the entire 
package. Two very different men, Walter Reuther and George Meany, 
played the key roles in shaping organized labor's response and helping 
to secure the addition of the Title VII that was finally adopted. Reuther, 
president of the United Automobile Workers and head of the AFL-CIO's 
Industrial Union Department (largely the former CIO unions before 
the merger), had long been a champion of black workers' civil rig.hts, 
including equal job rights, and was a member of the NAACP's board 
of directors. He was an eloquent speaker and a charismatic, sometimes 
imperious leader who on occasion could strain the patience even of his 
natural allies. On june 13, 1963, he and other labor leaders met with Pres-
ident Kennedy, and Reuther made an "impassioned plea" for the inclu-
sion of an FEP title in the administration's civil rights bill.5 About a week 
later, Reuther joined a group of top civil rights leaders to see the presi-
dent at the White House to reiterate the demand. 6 Reuther also partic-
ipated in the March on Washington in August 1963, becoming the sole 
white union speaker when Martin Luther King delivered his famous "I 
Have a Dream" oration? 
In personality, AFL-CIO President George Meany and Walter Reuther 
were almost polar opposites. Reuther resonated to abstract principles 
and noble causes. Meany, who hailed from the Plumbers Union in New 
York City, was a cautious, crafty politician, struggling to hold together 
a highly divergent coalition of labor adherents. In contrast to Reuther's 
vaulting, evangelical speaking style, Meany's oral presentations were 
clear, methodical, down-to-earth. Yet Meany could also be moved by 
the plight of black workers. Although he would not have the AFL-CIO 
endorse the March on Washington, he set out on his own to convey 
the message to the White House that an FEP provision was essential, 
including coverage of labor unions. As reported through my partner, 
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Bob Mayer, President Kennedy responded: "George, I didn't think we 
needed one. I thought you could keep your troops in line." At this point 
Reuther might have delivered a sermon on the evils of racial discrimi-
nation. Meany's riposte was characteristically hard-nosed and lacking in 
self-righteousness: "Mr. President, that's exactly the problem. I can't keep 
the troops in line. I need a law I can blame!" More formally, Meany told 
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee in july 1963: "We need 
the power of the federal government to do what we are not fully able to 
do [by ourselves)."8 
It can be argued whether the Meany or Reuther style was ultimately 
more effective. It is certainly true that at least for some significant listen-
ers, Reuther's moralistic hectoring could wear thin over time. When the 
March on Washington leaders met afterward with president Kennedy, 
Martin Luther King modestly sought to divert attention from his own 
great speech by asking the president whether he had heard Reuther's 
excellent address. Kennedy replied dryly, "Oh, I've heard him plenty of 
times."9 Numerous persons who found Reuther more congenial philo-
sophically wound up fonder of Meany personally. How might that affect 
persuasiveness? What is most important in the long run, however, is 
that these two men, Meany and Reuther, in their diverse ways, united 
in getting the labor movement officially to back the cause of an equal 
employment opportunity title. It is still debatable just how critical union 
support was. At least one reasonably disinterested observer, Professor 
Nelson Lichtenstein, then at the University of Virginia, declared flatly: 
"The trade union movement, both the AFL-CIO and the UAW, was 
primarily responsible for the addition of FEPC, now rechristened the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), to the original 
Kennedy bi11."10 But Herbert Hill, former labor secretary of the NAACP, 
has bitterly attacked this view, insisting that it exaggerated the position 
of organized labor as a progressive social force and overlooked massive 
union efforts to marginalize the effects of Title VII as finally enacted.11 
The AFL-CIO's leadership endorsement of an FEP or EEO provision 
did not end the matter, however, in the eyes of much of the rank-and-
file. Senator Lister Hill of Alabama was an ardent segregationist but an 
economic populist. He somehow obtained the addresses of about sev-
enty thousand local unions affiliated with nationals belonging to the 
AFL-CIO. He wrote them, warning that passage of the civil rights bill 
would destroy one of their most prized possessions, seniority. Seniority 
reflects time with a particular employer or in a particular job or depart-
ment. It can determine priority in layoffs, recalls, promotions, and fringe 
benefits like vacations. In many locations, especially in the South, black 
workers were deprived of access to the better job lines and the seniority 
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attached to them. As a result of Hill's intervention, AFL-CIO headquar-
ters was inundated with outraged cries from local memberships, protest-
ing this threat to their precious seniority rights. I was assigned to draft 
the Federation's response. 
My thoughts were as follows, although the exact wording was the result 
of refinement by several hands: 
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is 
prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been 
discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working force, 
when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply 
to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be 
obliged-or indeed, permitted- to fire whites in order to hire Negroes or to 
prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired to give them 
special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier. 
That language was later adopted, after extensive negotiations by AFL-
CIO representatives and the legislation's sponsors, by Senators Joseph 
S. Clark (Democrat of Pennsylvania) and Clifford P. Case (Republican of 
New Jersey), in an "Interpretive Memorandum" on Title VII, for which 
they were the "bipartisan captains" in the Senate.12 The Justice Depart-
ment submitted a rebuttal to the arguments of Senator Lister Hill to the 
same effect.13 
Once the 1964 Civil Rights Act was safely passed and Title VII became 
law, civil rights groups understandably downplayed this particular leg-
islative history and insisted that the "current perpetuation" of past dis-
crimination in seniority constituted a present violation of the statute. 
As one African American lawyer friend put it to me: "Ted, I was not 
part of whatever compromise may have been struck in getting Title VII 
enacted, and as a good advocate I am going to push the statutory lan-
guage as far as I think it should go." As it turned out, that was quite a way. 
Until the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the issue, six courts of appeals 
in more than thirty cases held that seniority systems that perpetuated 
the effects of pre-Act discrimination did violate Title VII.l4 Two other 
courts of appeals were in accord in dicta.15 In International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States,16 however, a 7-2 Supreme Court majority ruled 
that § 703(h) of Title VII (and the legislative history previously cited) 
immunized bona fide seniority systems from liability under the CRA. 
Naturally, I believe the majority got it right. Section 703(h) provides in 
pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards 
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which 
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measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees 
who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the 
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
. al . . 17 nation ongm ... 
Civil rights proponents protested, not unreasonably, that the inevitable 
tendency of the seniority cases was to lock a whole generation of African 
American workers into the less desirable jobs to which pre-Title VII 
discrimination had confined them. Even if they somehow managed to 
move into the higher-level jobs that were now theoretically available to 
them, they would wind up at the very bottom of the seniority ladder for 
those positions or departments. They would thus risk being the first laid 
off and the last recalled in the event of any economic downturn, as well 
as losing other benefit priorities. Those were indeed the regrettable facts. 
But labor leaders wishing to support Title VII also faced some harsh 
realities. The rank-and-file were up in arms over what they perceived 
(correctly, as it first developed) to be a serious threat to their valuable 
seniority. Union officials must face elections, and the 1960s were a time 
of flux, when numerous incumbents were voted out of office. The 
Kennedy administration was initially opposed to an FEP or EEO title, 
with the Justice Department calling labor-liberal efforts to add one "a 
disaster."18 Under all those circumstances, it seems entirely sensible for 
Title VII supporters among the labor leadership to feel they had to mol-
lify their memberships by preserving seniority rights as they did. In 
effect, postponing for a generation the full promise of Title VII's nondis-
crimination strictures may well have been the price that had to be paid 
to get an EEO title. By its very nature, of course, a bona fide seniority 
plan can hold back only about one generation when it is set in the con-
text of a law prohibiting discrimination in hiring, promotions, and other 
terms and conditions of employment. 
Retired federal District Judge Nancy Gertner has asserted: "Federal 
judges from the trial court to the Supreme Court have interpreted the 
[Civil Rights] Act virtually, although not entirely, out of existence."19 
Judge Gertner places much emphasis on the actual experience of dis-
crimination plaintiffs compared to other plaintiffs in the litigation 
process, from summary judgment through trial through appeal. In what 
is surely the single most important judicial gloss on Title VII, however, 
the Supreme Court came out most favorably for alleged victims of dis-
crimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2° Chief Justice Burger spoke 
for a unanimous Court in holding that the statute was violated not only 
by intentional discrimination but also by the use of any job qualifica-
tion-such as a high school education or passing a general intelligence 
test-that disproportionately disqualifies a particular protected group 
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and is not shown to be significantly related to successful job perfor-
mance. 
Griggs thus introduced the now famous "disparate impact" theory of 
discrimination, as distinguished from the more conventional "disparate 
treatment" or intentional theory. Subsequently, the Court acknowl-
edged: "Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil 
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII."21 The Court went on 
to state that disparate impact claims "involve employment practices that 
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but that in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another, and cannot be justified 
by business necessity .... Proof of discriminatory motive .. .is not required 
under a disparate-impact theory."22 
For someone like me, who was concededly only a bit player in this 
great undertaking but who nonetheless had a ringside seat at it, it is sig-
nificant that I cannot ever recall during the endless discussions of Title 
VII any explicit reference to something like the "disparate impact" the-
ory. Moreover, despite the Griggs Court's tussle with the legislative his-
tory, I find nothing there that clearly and positively supports disparate 
impact.23 Chief Justice Burger invoked a striking image when he said: 
"Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or 
promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense 
of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox."24 But the artistry 
cannot conceal the conclusory, unproven nature of the proposition. Sec-
tion 703(h), the one provision expressly dealing with testing, states in 
pertinent part: 
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give 
and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test pro-
vided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not 
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin. 25 
Chief Justice Burger found comfort in the word "used" in the sentence 
dealing with ability tests; it does not appear in the part of the same sec-
tion dealing with seniority and merit systems. That can be scored as a 
good debater's point. But in the absence of any further explanation of 
its significance in the legislative history, one has to wonder about how 
much weight to attach to that single generalized word. Would Congress 
have been that indirect or circumspect in promulgating a whole new 
theory of discrimination? 
How necessary was the disparate impact theory, anyway? Section 
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits "discrimination ... to 
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."26 In 
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NLRB v. Brown, the Supreme Court concluded that "Congress clearly 
intended the employer's purpose in discriminating to be controlling."27 
But then the Court immediately added: 
[W]hen an employer practice is inherently destructive of employee rights 
and is not justified by the service of important business ends, no specific evi-
dence of intent to discourage union membership is necessary to establish a 
violation of§ 8(a)(3). This principle, we have said, is "but an application of the 
common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences 
of his conduct."28 
As I see it, most if not all of what the Court accomplished in Griggs 
through enunciating the new disparate impact theory under Title VII 
could have been achieved less controversially by an application of the 
commonsense principle that persons may be held to have intended the 
natural consequences of their actions.29 Does anyone have any seri-
ous doubts about what Duke Power was up to when it instituted new 
job qualifications on the very day Title VII went into effect? At most, 
disparate treatment analysis would seem to permit a challenged party 
one free pass on a claim of business necessity as a defense. Once that 
defense was overcome and the consequences known, any continuation of 
the practice could appropriately be regarded as an intentional violation. 
One can safely say that even the present conservative Supreme Court 
would be reluctant to back away from the unanimous decision in Griggs. 
Moreover, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress confirmed the exis-
tence of disparate-impact violations by spelling out their manner of 
proof in a new§ 703(k).30 Nonetheless, in a concurring opinion in Ricci v. 
DeStefano, justice Scalia warned that the Court's disposition of that case 
"merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront 
the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact pro-
visions of Title Vll...consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal 
protection?"31 justice Scalia elaborated his position: 
[T]itle VII's disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, 
often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, 
and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That 
type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.32 
Professor Richard Primus suggests a means of defending disparate 
impact analysis. 33 He starts by spelling out what he calls the Ricci 
premise: the City of New Haven's suspension of a written job test 
because of its disproportionately adverse effect on African American 
firefighters "would constitute disparate treatment under Title VII unless 
suspending the test were justified by Title VII's provisions regarding 
disparate impact."34 Primus concedes that if the emphasis is placed on 
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the race conscious action of a public employer (subject to constitutional 
limitations) in implementing a disparate impact remedy, which is how 
justice Scalia sees it, disparate impact doctrine is likely to be in "fatal" 
conflict with equal protection's requirement of racial neutrality.35 
Primus insists, however, that there are two other ways of viewing the 
situation. First, there is an institutional difference between the roles of 
public employers and courts.36 Courts are authorized to remedy racial 
discrimination and they cannot assess any kind of discrimination claim 
without knowing the race of the parties. Public employers are pre-
cluded from such race-conscious decision making. Second, the atten-
tion may focus on the visible victims.37 In Ricci, Primus points out, New 
Haven's decision "disadvantaged determinate and visible innocent third 
parties-that is, the white firefighters," while "(m]ost disparate impact 
remedies avoid creating such victims."38 Primus concludes that the con-
stitutionality of disparate impact doctrine may turn on the particular 
lens through which the Court subsequently views such equal protection 
claims-and the skill of advocates in bringing the right case before the 
Court.39 My own conclusion is that the Griggs Court could have avoided 
these problems by a more generous and realistic reading of Congress's 
actual design-to prohibit intentional discrimination in all its manifes-
tations. 
The problem of disparate impact pales by comparison with the prob-
lem of "affirmative action"-conceptually, ethically, and sociologically. 
Affirmative action-racial or other preferences among human 
groups-to achieve some seemingly desirable or compelling public 
interest is well covered by other contributors to this volume.40 I will 
therefore limit myself to a few brief personal observations. The first and 
most obvious is that the primary, abiding theme of both the text and the 
legislative history of Title VII is color-blindness (or equivalent blindness 
regarding gender and other protected categories). The Clark-Case Mem-
orandum filed by the senators who were in effect floor managers for the 
EEO provision is replete with such references. It is a model of the "plain 
meaning" approach to language: 
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it 
is dear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to make 
a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinc-
tions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by section 
704 [now 703] are those which are based on any five of forbidden criteria: 
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.41 
Congress, like the rest of us promoting equal employment opportunity, 
was very naive-or else we all affected naivete. It was as if the magic 
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wand of one federal statute could erase three hundred years of bondage, 
degradation, and exclusion. At least by hindsight, we know it did not 
work. 
Justice Brennan showed more sophistication when he wrote for the 
Court in the Weber case: 
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over 
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who 
had "been excluded from the American dream for so long," constituted the 
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to 
abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.42 
In Weber, a 5-2 Court upheld the legality of a union-employer affirma-
tive action plan that reserved 50 percent of the openings in a plant's 
craft training program until the percentage of black craft workers in the 
plant was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor 
force.43 Yet however much one might wish to applaud the result in Weber 
on the basis of policy, it contained a very serious analytical flaw. Justice 
Brennan never came to grips with the meaning of the critical word, "dis-
criminate." 
The Clark-Case Memorandum equated "discriminate" with "distin-
guish" on certain specified grounds. That reading, if straightforwardly 
applied, would have been fatal to the Weber approach. But there is 
another way to interpret "discriminate." One of the great federal judges, 
Henry Friendly, had this to say: "Although '[i]n common parlance, the 
word (to discriminate) means to distinguish or differentiate,' ... it more 
often means, both in common and particularly in legal parlance, to 
distinguish or differentiate without sufficient reason."44 That could have 
opened the door to a more capacious interpretation than a strictly literal 
reading. Once Justice Brennan had accomplished that, his reliance on 
the spirit rather than the letter of the law, and his use of somewhat 
strained but favorable portions oflegislative history, would have seemed 
more acceptable. 
Another aspect of Weber has always seemed anomalous to me as some-
one who is not a constitutional specialist. Justice Brennan emphasized it 
right at the outset of his analysis: "Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not 
involve state action, this case does not present an alleged violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."45 The implica-
tion is that equal protection would have been a more stringent standard 
for a valid affirmative action plan. Indeed, subsequent decisions invali-
dating the plans of governmental bodies appear to bear that out.46 Yet 
it is Title VII that defines the prohibited conduct so explicitly as "to dis-
criminate ... because of ... race."47 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
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does not even mention race and speaks very broadly: "[N]or shall any 
State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws."48 If one emphasizes the text, "equal protection" is surely 
the more flexible test. And a philosopher whose mind was uncluttered 
by vacillating judicial pronouncements might well conclude that a state 
is not denying equal protection when it treats differently-and pref-
erentially-groups of persons who are in fact differently-and 
unequally-situated.49 Those unequal situations could be the result of 
hurricanes, earthquakes, plagues, or physical or mental disabilities. Why 
not generations of racial discrimination? 
I hardly expect a return to such a pristine concept at this relatively 
advanced stage in the development of equal protection theory. But the 
more we recognize that the equal treatment of unequals may not be the 
best way to ensure the "equal protection of the laws," the more we may 
be ready to extend such established doctrines as "compelling state inter-
est" as a qualification on the prohibition of racial distinctions. 
A half-century ago, many of us, those in the civil rights movement 
and union supporters alike, shared Martin Luther King's "dream." The 
"dream" was a dream of genuine integration-the existence of all races 
in our society on a plane of equality. We felt Title VII was our vehicle. Yet 
fifty years after the passage of Title VII, the median household income 
of blacks is $33,321 while that of whites is $57,009, or 71 percent more.50 
The unemployment rate of blacks is 12.5 percent, or double that of 
whites at 6.2 percent:S1 We may have come a long way in certain respects 
since 1964. But to fulfill that dream, we still have a very long way to go. 
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justice Ginsburg's Umbrella 
Ellen D. Katz 
I. Introduction 
Near the end of her dissent in Shelby County v. Holder, 1 Justice Ginsburg 
suggested a simple analogy to illustrate why the regional protections 
of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) were still necessary. She wrote that 
"[t]hrowing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to 
work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your 
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet."2 
The image .went viral in the aftermath of the decision. It appeared 
in media accounts, academic commentary, fundraising appeals, and 
sundry blogs. And for good cause. The image crisply captured why the 
VRA's supporters3 believed the preclearance regime remained necessary 
and why they thought scrapping it would be so damaging. It is still rain-
ing, they had been urging, and the umbrella the VRA offers continues to 
provide critical protection. Throw out that umbrella, the argument went, 
and lots of people are sure to get soaked.4 
Curiously, the Shelby County majority seemed to agree. Chief Justice 
Roberts's opinion for the Court held § 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional 
and thereby rendered the preclearance regime inoperative.5 But while 
the Chief Justice discarded the umbrella Justice Ginsburg deemed so 
important, he never disputed the consequences she said would follow 
from doing so. Indeed, the reasons he provided for shutting down the 
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preclearance regime suggested that he, too, expected that many people 
would get wet as a result of the decision. 
It turns out that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg disagreed 
about a different point entirely. To belabor the analogy-something, be 
warned, this chapter will do repeatedly-the justices disagreed about 
whether getting wet was worse than carrying an umbrella. For the Chief 
Justice, carrying an umbrella, at least one like the VRA's preclearance 
regime, is an extremely costly and damaging activity. By contrast,Justice 
Ginsburg viewed getting wet as the more damaging experience. She rec-
ognized that carrying an umbrella may be inconvenient and even costly 
but, in her view, well worth the bother. Keeping dry should be the prior-
ity. 
The "umbrella" at issue in Shelby County was, without doubt, an unusual 
one. With its regionally applicable, burden-shifting requirements, the 
VRA's preclearance regime has long been understood to be an "excep-
tional" and "extraordinary" statute.6 Disagreement among the Justices 
about its continued use might accordingly be minimized or even dis-
missed as a regime-specific dispute. And yet, I will argue that the differ-
ent ways in which the majority and dissent in Shelby County valued get-
ting wet and staying dry exposes a more foundational and far-reaching 
disagreement. 
Specifically, this chapter presses the idea that Chief Justice Roberts's 
willingness to discardJustice Ginsburg's umbrella reveals a distinct con-
ception of federal antidiscrimination law. It is a conception that sees the 
existing regime to be a source of unjust enrichment to its beneficiaries. 
Under this view, the regime does not simply make victims of undeni-
able discrimination whole but instead places a host of interested parties, 
victims included, in a decidedly better position than they would have 
been had the discrimination never occurred. For this reason, the regime 
is viewed to be a costly and damaging enterprise that should be limited 
at every opportunity. 
Notably, this conception of federal antidiscrimination law does not 
deny the persistence of discrimination, and indeed, discrimination of 
the old-school, unconstitutional variety. To be sure, adherents of this 
view continue to be concerned that the linkage between challenged con-
duct and invidious intent has become too attenuated in some, and per-
haps most, cases? But their more pressing worry is that the regime today 
does more harm than the discrimination it presently addresses, even 
when that discrimination is indisputably unconstitutional or otherwise 
invidious in nature. 
Put differently, the issue disputed in Shelby County, and in a host of 
other contemporary civil rights cases, is not about whether people are 
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still getting wet but whether it is worth it to keep them dry. And for 
a majority of the present Court-and a majority for some time 
now-keeping dry is no longer cost-justified. 
*** 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part I explores why the Shelby County 
majority discarded Justice Ginsburg's umbrella. Specifically, it argues 
that Chief Justice Roberts did not mistake dry conditions for a problem 
solved but instead implemented a considered preference for getting 
wet. Part II situates this preference in a larger jurisprudence, in which 
a majority of the Court has limited the use of the umbrella provided 
by federal antidiscrimination law even as it acknowledged the rain to be 
ongoing. Part III argues that these cases represent a distinct strand in the 
Court's long-standing antipathy to federal antidiscrimination law, one 
that seeks to limit the regime based on the belief that it is more costly 
than the discrimination it presently addresses. 
II. Was It Raining in Shelby County? 
Much of the debate preceding the Court's decision in Shelby County 
focused on the conditions for political participation in covered jurisdic-
tions. No one disputed that these conditions had improved markedly 
since Congress first crafted the statute and that the VRA itself was largely 
responsible for these improvements.8 What was disputed was the extent 
to which these improvements were dependent on the VRA's continued 
operation and the degree of backsliding that would occur if the regime 
were scrapped. In other words, the dispute concerned whether or not 
the rain had stopped. 
Justice Ginsburg's umbrella analogy captured what supporters of the 
VRA had been arguing-namely, that the improved conditions in cov-
ered jurisdictions existed only because the preclearance regime actively 
blocked misconduct where it applied. Under this view, the VRA was not 
only responsible for improved conditions in covered jurisdictions, but 
its continued operation was essential to maintaining those conditions. 
As Justice Ginsburg explained, do not mistake dry conditions under the 
umbrella for a sunny day. 9 
The regime's critics countered that conditions in covered jurisdictions 
looked better because they were better and that preclearance no longer 
had much to do with it.10 After all, some rainy days turn into sunny ones, 
and when they do, putting away the umbrella makes a lot of sense. It 
was, notably, this view that animated Chief Justice Roberts's suggestion 
in 2009 that the preclearance regime might be nothing more than an 
elephant whistle, shooing away a nonexistent threat. II 
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And yet, the Chief justice's opinion in Shelby County did not pursue this 
line of argument. True, it dismissed a defense based on deterrence as 
analytically flawed, explaining that deterrence could always be invoked 
to justify the regime even if evidence on the ground suggested the risk 
of backsliding was negligible.12 What the opinion did not do, however, 
was take issue with justice Ginsburg's argument that severe backslid-
ing would occur absent the preclearance regime. Indeed, Chief Justice 
Roberts declined to dispute Justice Ginsburg's characterization of the 
evidence. He did not question the scope of unconstitutional conduct she 
described or the consequences she said would follow from the Court's 
ruling in Shelby County. 
Justice Ginsburg described that evidence in detail, and her description 
made clear that she thought the evidence left no doubt that it was still 
raining in places like Shelby County, Alabama. She cited numerous 
examples in which covered jurisdictions violated both the VRA and the 
Constitution.13 She observed, moreover, that contemporary unconsti-
tutional conduct in covered jurisdictions remained remarkably wide-
spread even as the evidence showed that the preclearance regime 
worked to deter and block a good deal of misconduct in covered juris-
dictions.14 Put differently, the evidence showed how preclearance, much 
like a real umbrella, operated imperfectly as a shield against the rain and 
that this imperfect protection provided a good indication of what would 
follow should the umbrella be discarded. 
The Shelby County majority likely viewed the evidence justice Ginsburg 
cited more equivocally. Much of it involved dilution claims stemming 
from redistricting disputes of the sort that once prompted the Chief 
Justice to lament this "sordid business, this divvying us up by race."15 
More broadly, the Shelby County majority no doubt suspected that many 
of the examples cited by Justice Ginsburg and collected in the congres-
sional record sounded more in discriminatory effect than intent or sim-
ply tracked a jurisdiction's inability to disprove animus rather than its 
affirmative existence. 
But insofar as the Justices in the majority held these suspicions, Chief 
Justice Roberts opted not to voice them.16 Rather than take issue with 
justice Ginsburg's characterization of the evidence, the Chief Justice 
concluded that the discrimination she described as she described it was 
legally insufficient to justify the statute's continued regional applica-
tionP As explanation, he observed that this discrimination was not as 
severe as it was when Congress first crafted the regime in 1965; that it had 
not led Congress to alter the statute's preexisting coverage formula; and 
that it encompassed subjects different from the ones that Congress listed 
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in the coverage formula when it first subjected places to the regime's 
requirements.18 
I have explained elsewhere why these observations, all of which are 
true, should have been insufficient to render preclearance obsolete-and 
indeed should have been irrelevant-under applicable doctrine that the 
Shelby County majority did not purport to displace.19 For present pur-
poses, however, the doctrinal inadequacy of these observations matters 
less than what they expose about the Court's toleration for unremedied 
or inadequately remedied discrimination, including, notably, discrimi-
nation that violates the Constitution. And it turns out that the Court is 
willing to tolerate quite a bit. 
For example, Chief Justice Roberts observed that the discrimination 
documented in the 2006 record was not as severe as the discrimination 
that first led Congress to enact the VRA. As he noted, the record evidence 
did not "showO anything approaching the 'pervasive,' 'flagrant,' 'wide-
spread,' and 'rampant' discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and 
that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the 
Nation at that time."20 
The Chief Justice was certainty correct about this. The 2006 record 
documented a host of ugly incidents but nothing that rose to a level 
equivalent to the systemic, brazen defiance of constitutional norms that 
defined the pre-VRA South. Even with the aggressive backsliding now 
under way in places like Texas and North Carolina, no one expects con-
ditions to deteriorate to the level that prompted Congress to enact the 
statute in the first place. 
That's good news, as far as it goes, but it does not explain why contem-
porary, persistent, and prevalent unconstitutional discrimination in cov-
ered jurisdictions should not be remedied in the manner in the manner 
Congress had selected. The Warren Court had recognized Congress to 
possess close to plenary authority when crafting remedies for unconsti-
tutional racial discrimination in voting.21 And even when the Rehnquist 
Court pulled back, requiring a tight connection between remedies and 
unconstitutional conduct, it never suggested that some constitutional 
violations were more worthy of remedy than others. 22 That Court's con-
cern was with remedies that targeted conduct that was not itself uncon-
stitutional rather than with gradations among constitutional injuries. 
Shelby County, by contrast, appears to stake out a distinction between 
discrimination of the extreme Jim Crow variety, and the more contained 
type of unconstitutional conduct we see today. And it suggests that Con-
gress may not select what it reasonably believes is the most effective way 
to remedy unconstitutional racial discrimination when that discrimina-
tion falls short of the type that defined Alabama in 1965. 
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Chief Justice Roberts, however, makes clear that the discrimination 
Justice Ginsburg described was insufficient not simply because Jim 
Crow-era discrimination was worse. I Ie explained that it was also flawed 
because it involved problems that were different in kind from those that 
first prompted Congress to enact the regime. He wrote, "The dissent 
relies on 'second-generation barriers,' which are not impediments to 
the casting of ballots, but rather electoral arrangements that affect the 
weight of minority votes."23 In other words, the discrimination that Jus-
tice Ginsburg described differed from the type of discrimination cap-
tured by the original coverage formula, which was "based on voting tests 
and access to the ballot, not vote dilution."24 This difference, apparently, 
renders contemporary discrimination legally insufficient to justify Con-
gress's decision to retain the original coverage formula.25 
Much like the observation that contemporary discrimination is not as 
rough as the Jim Crow variety, the Chief Justice's suggestion that second-
generation barriers are off-point demands more explanation than he 
provided. It is true, of course, that the coverage formula invalidated by 
Shelby County made no mention of so-called second-generation prob-
lems, such as the practice of manipulating district lines to inhibit minor-
ity influence, and was based instead on the use of tests and devices and 
low voter participation.26 But that fact hardly means that the practices 
grouped as "second-generation" are unrelated to the concerns Congress 
meant to target when it crafted the coverage formula. In fact, just the 
opposite is true. 
So-called second-generation practices predate the VRA by decades 
and stand with the white primary, the literacy test, the poll tax, and other 
tactics that were used concurrently in the Jim Crow South to ensure 
that Mrican American citizens lacked the ability to cast "meaningful"27 
ballots and to "strip" them "of every vestige of influence" in selecting 
public officials. 28 True, Congress relied on the use of tests and devices 
as the "trigger" for the original coverage formula, but it did so not in 
order to limit the statute's reach. Instead, it selected the specified trigger 
because it captured with remarkable accuracy the places that engaged in 
the broader range of conduct (including "second-generation" conduct) 
that had rendered the Fifteenth Amendment a nullity throughout the 
pre-VRA South. 29 The statutory trigger linked tests and devices to low 
participation, but the statute's target was never so limited.30 
T he Supreme Court itself recognized as much in 1969.31 Justice Harlan 
disagreed at the tirne,32 and Justices Thomas and Scalia would do so 
later.33 But a m ajority of the Court has repeatedly recognized congres-
sional intent for the VRA to apply to these practices and confirmed 
Congress's power to deploy the VRA in this way. Chief Justice Roberts's 
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opinion in Shelby County nevertheless suggested otherwise but did not 
explain why. 
What is clear, however, is what the opinion as written accomplished. It 
brought the preclearance regime to an immediate and, perhaps perma-
nent, 34 halt, even as it countenanced evidence of widespread and ongo-
ing discrimination. This discrimination, to be sure, fell short of the Jim 
Crow norm and did not directly involve those "tests or devices" listed in 
the original coverage formula. It was discrimination, nevertheless, and 
a good deal of it ran afoul of the Constitution. Critically, Chief Justice 
Roberts never suggested otherwise. Indeed, he seemed to agree with Jus-
tice Ginsburg when she wrote that it was still raining in covered jurisdic-
tions and that it would continue to rain, predictably, for some time to 
come. At a minimum, the Chief Justice said nothing that called her fore-
cast into question. 
Therein lies Shelby County's significance. The decision displays the 
Court's willingness to discard an umbrella on a rainy day with full 
knowledge that rain will continue. It may have been raining harder in 
the past, and the present rainstorm may (or may not) differ in other ways 
from what came before. Regardless, the Shelby County majority opted to 
toss out an umbrella in the middle of a rainstorm, fully aware of what it 
was doing. 
The umbrella at issue in Shelby County was an unusual one, and it is 
certainly arguable that the Court's willingness to discard it rested on its 
distinctive features. Long considered strong medicine, the VRA's pre-
clearance requirement reversed the presumption of validity that typ-
ically attaches to legislative and administrative action, and presumed 
instead that public officials in places subject to the requirement were 
engaged in discrimination unless and until they could convince a federal 
official otherwise.35 
It turned out, however, that this defining aspect of the preclearance 
regime was less controversial in Shelby County than the regime's limited 
geographic reach. The fact that the preclearance obligation existed in 
some places but not others has always bristled,36 but it had also been 
thought to contribute to the regime's legitimacy. Far from a blanket 
obligation, preclearance had long been seen as a targeted remedy, apply-
ing only in places where the need for it was most acute. Indeed, geogra-
phy was one reason justice Kennedy once cited the VRA as the paradig-
matic example of congruent and proportionallegislation.37 
That, of course, was nearly two decades ago, and times change, as the 
Chief Justice has reminded us.38 Ultimately, it was the regime's limited 
geographic application that contributed more directly to its downfall in 
Shelby County than its burden-shifting requirements.39 A majority of the 
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Justices found themselves unconvinced that places subject to the statute 
were sufficiently different from other places to justify their being sub-
jected to the statute's distinct requirements. And it was this skepticism 
that may best explain the Court's willingness to scrap the regime. 
If so, the Shelby County majority's willingness to discard preclearance 
in the face of persistent, documented discrimination might be dismissed 
as a regime-specific move to secure a desired end. Whether the Court 
was more troubled by the regime's geographic selectivity or the burden-
shifting obligations it imposed, it was convinced that preclearance had 
to go. Under this view, the holding is consequential, to be sure, but only 
because the specific statute the decision incapacitated was itself a conse-
quential one, in terms of both its real world effect and the salient place it 
occupied in the public's imagination. 
And yet, this reading of Shelby County is not, in my view, the best read-
ing of the decision. Rather than simply charting a one-time path to a 
desired destination, the Court's willingness to discard an umbrella in 
the rain is better understood within a broader jurisprudence, described 
below. 
Ill. Is It Raining Elsewhere? 
Far from unique, Shelby County's tolerance for ongoing discrimination 
represents a common stance in modem civil rights law. In numerous 
cases, the Court has limited federal antidiscrimination measures such 
as the VRA, Title VII , and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) in the face of uncontested evidence of discrimination of the sort 
the statutes at issue were designed to address. These cases, moreover, all 
generated dissenting opinions, often written by justice Ginsburg, which 
disputed both the holdings and the analytical moves used to reach them. 
Situated within Justice Ginsburg's Shelby County construct, these dissent-
ing opinions all argued that an umbrella should be used in the rain, 
while a majority, time and again, sided with getting wet. 
Consider a few eclectic but representative examples. 
Nassar and Gross: Two days before the Court handed down Shelby 
County, it held that an employee alleging retaliation under Title VII 
needed to show that the complaints he lodged about status-based dis-
crimination not only contributed to his being denied a coveted transfer 
but also were the but-for cause of that denial. University of Texas South-
western Medical Center v. Nassar-40 relied heavily on the Court's 2009 rul-
ing in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., which applied the same rule to 
an employee alleging age discrimination under the ADEA.41 Both deci-
sions deemed the employees involved to be ineligible for the more for-
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giving "motivating factor" analysis Congress set forth in § 703m of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.42 The Court split 5-4 in both cases, with dis-
senting opinions by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens challenging the way 
the majority understood relevant precedent, the purpose and structure 
of the 1991 CRA, and applicable agency action.43 
Amid this disagreement, however, all of the Justices seemed to 
agree-or, at least, no one denied-that the plaintiff-employees who 
brought both cases had been subjected to intentional discrimination of 
the sort the statutes at issue targeted44-namely, that Naiel Nassar's com-
plaints about disparate treatment based on his Middle Eastern descent 
contributed to his being denied a transfer/M and that Jack Gross's age 
contributed to the restructuring of job responsibilities he challenged.46 
In both cases, then, the Justices seemed well aware and willing to accept 
that intent-based discrimination had occurred. They split over whether 
the employees should be entitled to relief given this discrimination. 
Put differently, no one doubted that the employees who brought these 
cases had been caught in the rain. What they disagreed about was 
whether they were entitled to the umbrella provided by Title VII and the 
ADEA. And a majority held they were not. 
Coleman: A year before Nassar, the Court struck down a provision of 
the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) that guaranteed twelve weeks 
of unpaid medical leave to eligible employees suffering from serious 
medical conditions.47 Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion ·in Coleman v. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland argued that the sex-neutral "self-care" pro-
vision constituted an essential part of a comprehensive statutory regime 
that included the family care provisions that the Court had already 
upheld.48 She explained that Congress crafted this regime to address the 
pervasive discrimination women confronted in the workplace stemming 
from pregnancy-related issues and more general sex stereotypes about 
family care responsibilities.49 
Justice Ginsburg did not invoke umbrella imagery in Coleman, but she 
might easily have employed it. Her argument, at bottom, was that the 
umbrella provided by the FMLA would have a gaping hole in it without 
the statute's self-care provision. The self-care provision, she explained, 
"serves to blunt the force of stereotypes of women as primary caregivers 
by increasing the odds that men and women will invoke the FMLA's 
leave provisions in near-equal numbers.''50 
A majority of the Court, however, was unmoved. Justice Kennedy's 
plurality opinion held that the relationship between the self-care pro-
vision and the discrimination Justice Ginsburg described was too com-
plex and attenuated to satisfy constitutional scrutiny.51 And yet, much 
like Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Shelby County, Justice Kennedy's 
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opinion in Coleman did not question the prevalence of the discrimina-
tion justice Ginsburg described. 52 Like the Chief justice, moreover, jus-
tice Kennedy opted to discard the umbrella Congress crafted to address 
that discrimination. 
Ledbetter: In 2007, a majority of the Court held that an employee's 
claim for sex-based wage discrimination was time barred because she 
filed suit long after the employer's initial discriminatory wage decision. 
justice Alito's majority opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co.53 held that the statute of limitations ran from that initial decision 
rather than from the issuance of subsequent paychecks, the amount of 
which reflected the initial discrimination.54 
justice Ginsburg's dissent argued that the statute was better read to 
allow Ledbetter's suit to proceed, an argument she might easily have 
bolstered by invoking the umbrella image she employed in Shelby 
County. Indeed, justice Ginsburg's dissent made clear that Goodyear had 
been raining on Lilly Ledbetter for a very long time and that Title VII 
should be available to provide her relief. justice Ginsburg closed her 
opinion calling for a statutory amendment to reverse the majority's rul-
ing, a call Congress heeded.55 
The majority in Ledbetter was not persuaded by Justice Ginsburg's 
argument, but it never questioned that Goodyear had intentionally dis-
criminated against Ledbetter based on sex by paying her less than both 
similarly situated and less-qualified male colleagues. justice Alito 
expressed no doubt about this point. But in his view, Ledbetter's failure 
to use the Title VII umbrella at the beginning of the storm precluded her 
from using it later. 
Bossier Parish: Like Ledbetter, Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board was 
reversed by subsequent statutory amendment (albeit one that was later 
ruled to be unconstitutional).56 Back in 2000, Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion held that the VRA permitted implementation of a districting 
plan in which African American voters constituted a majority in none of 
the plan's twelve electoral districts. It was alleged and, somewhat surpris-
ingly, stipulated that the School Board had refused to draw a majority-
minority district because it wanted to prevent an African American 
candidate from being elected to the board. 57 
justice Scalia's majority opinion held that the redistricting plan could 
be implemented notwithstanding this discriminatory purpose. The 
opinion explained that § 5 of the VRA did not block implementation of 
electoral changes enacted with discriminatory intent. Instead, it blocked 
only that subset of electoral changes enacted with "retrogressive" 
intent-that is, the intent to make things worse for the minority group 
in question. Mere animus would not suffice.58 The opinion, moreover, 
274 A Nation of Widening Opportunities 
suggested any rule to the contrary would raise a serious constitutional 
question. 59 
Justice Souter's dissent argued that electoral changes enacted with 
a discriminatory, albeit not "retrogressive" purpose, fell within the § 
5 proscription. As he put it, blocking implementation of unconstitu-
tional conduct of this sort-the rain Justice Ginsburg subsequently 
described-was precisely what Congress had designed§ 5 to address and 
what Congress, in his view, had ample power to mandate.60 
Thirteen years later, Shelby County made clear that Congress lacks this 
power. The decision viewed Congress's 2006 decision to adopt Justice 
Souter's Bossier Parish reading as evidence of constitutional overreach. It 
thereby suggested Congress had no power to include within the statu-
tory proscription conduct that was unconstitutional.61 
Bossier Parish, Ledbetter, Coleman, Gross, and Nassar are, without doubt, 
distinguishable from one another on numerous grounds. Yet they share 
a defining characteristic that makes them representative examples of 
a more general stance in federal civil rights law. Like Shelby County, 
these decisions all circumscribe the federal regime in contexts in which 
the occurrence of intentional, invidious, and even unconstitutional con-
duct is left unquestioned. Placed within Justice Ginsburg's Shelby County 
framework, these cases all involved rain; the Court knew it, and a major-
ity was nevertheless steadfast that an umbrella should not be used. 
Admittedly, likening the discrimination observed in these cases to rain 
is a contestable move. My premise is that discrimination may be dis-
tinguished from liability, at least in certain contexts, and that we learn 
something by making this distinction. That premise accordingly rejects 
the idea that discrimination is necessarily or most usefully understood 
as a legal conclusion that is coextensive with liability. Instead, it posits 
that people like Naiel Nassar and Lilly Ledbetter found themselves in the 
rain even though the Court ruled against them. They lost despite the fact 
that it was raining and decidedly not because the Court thought the sky 
was clear. 
Understanding the cases in this manner-that is, by parsing discrim-
ination from liability-brings into focus a distinct strand of civil rights 
jurisprudence. To be sure, judicial skepticism toward the federal civil 
rights regime is nothing new, and the Court has long sought to scale back 
federal antidiscrimination law. Decisions that do so in the face of uncon-
tested evidence of intentional discrimination are undoubtedly part of 
this effort. And yet, my claim is that they are a distinct component of 
it. Unlike those cases that deny relief by deeming challenged conduct to 
be nondiscriminatory, these decisions discard the umbrella even as the 
need for it persists. The suggestion is that the federal civil rights project, 
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while hardly complete, is no longer worth pursuing. Rather than a mis-
sion accomplished, it is a mission abandoned. 
Of course, not every decision circumscribing the federal civil rights 
regime falls decisively into one group or the other. Some deny the rain, 
or at least express skepticism about it, but also voice mistrust about 
using the available umbrella should the rain alleged actually be falling. 62 
Elsewhere, however, the distinction is clear, with a growing number of 
decisions displaying a willingness to discard the umbrella in the rain 
knowing full well people will get wet as a result. 
Shelby County's willingness to immobilize § 5 of the VRA without dis-
puting the discriminationjustice Ginsburg described is part of this latter 
group of decisions. Far from unique, Shelby County stands with a host of 
other decisions that acknowledge discrimination persists and yet posit 
that core elements of the federal civil rights project are no longer worth 
pursuing. The next section explores why this sensibility drives so much 
of contemporary antidiscrimination law. 
IV. On Unjust Enrichment and Harmless Error 
Decisions that limit federal antidiscrimination law typically view the 
regime's broader application as deeply problematic. Among the con-
cerns most often cited is the worry that an expansive approach to the 
regime encourages frivolous lawsuits, exposing employers and other 
defendants to wasteful litigation costs and spurring inefficient defensive 
decision making.63 Curb the regime, it is argued, lest undeserving plain-
tiffs be unjusdy enriched at the expense of diligent defendants and, in 
many circumstances, the rest of us. 
Animating this concern is the suspicion that frivolous claims outnum-
ber legitimate ones and that the discrimination federal antidiscrimina-
tion law was crafted to address is largely a thing of the past. Unsurpris-
ingly, decisions that find challenged conduct to be nondiscriminatory 
highlight this sensibility, with the dispute at hand seen either to involve 
a frivolous claim or to suggest circumstances in which one might find 
expression.64 
Less expected, decisions that deny relief in the face of uncontested 
discrimination also voice concern that frivolous claims are rising as 
genuine discrimination declines. These decisions acknowledge the rain 
but deem it insufficiently worrisome to warrant use of the umbrella at 
issue.65 More. pressing is the. nee.d to check the regime and guard against 
its unjustified application. 
Under this view, victims of documented discrimination might be 
understood or even dismissed as unfortunate, but unavoidable, collat-
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eral damage sacrificed for the greater good. And yet, it is not the 
unpleasantness of the image that keeps it off the pages of U.S. reports but 
instead the belief that the victims of discrimination in these cases have 
not be~n significantly damaged at all. True, they have been caught in the 
rain, but these decisions suggest that getting wet may not be as damag-
ing as some seem to think. In fact, they suggest it might not be damaging 
at all. 
With this suggestion, Shelby County and cases like it shift the terrain on 
which civil rights disputes have long been fought. Rather than contest 
allegations or evidence of discrimination, they dismiss discrimination 
itself as inconsequential. They reject Justice Ginsburg's belief that get-
ting caught in the rain is the source of enduring damage and, in its place, 
insert the idea of harmless error into civil rights jurisprudence. 
That idea, in turn, has led the Court to view much of federal antidis-
crimination law as providing a windfall to its beneficiaries. Far from 
making victims of discrimination whole, the regime is seen as leaving 
them in a decidedly better position than they would have been had they 
never gotten wet. The umbrella Justice Ginsburg thinks provides vital 
protection is seen instead to be a source of unjust enrichment to those 
it shields. The resulting project consequently becomes one dedicated to 
limiting use of the umbrella whenever possible, rain notwithstanding. 
Hence, the recent mixed-motive decisions requiring plaintiffs to show 
"but-for" causation work hard to make sure that getting wet is not the 
vehicle for getting ahead. These decisions hold that if, absent the dis-
crimination alleged, the plaintiff would have been denied the disputed 
promotion or transfer, the discrimination itself should not be the source 
of liability.66 Because Title VII's "motivating" factor rule a11ows for lia-
bility in such circumstances,67 Nassar and Gross rejected it, finding the 
plaintiff-employees ineligible for both the acknowledgment of wrong-
doing a liability ruling embodies and the attorneys' fees that accompany 
it. Of no moment was the fact that the rejected approach barred injunc-
tive relief when the desired transfer or promotion would have otherwise 
been denied.68 
As telling, and perhaps even more so, is a little noted aspect of Chief 
Justice Roberts's opinion in Shelby County, in which he described the 
2006 amendment overruling Bossier Parish to "prohibit laws that could 
have favored [minority voters] but did not do so because of a discrimina-
tory purpose."69 The words "could have favored" are revealing. Far from 
unartful drafting, they suggest that the Bossier Parish School Board did 
not injure minority voters when it adopted a districting plan avowedly 
designed to prevent the election of an African American representative. 
Instead, Shelby County suggests that the school board's unconstitutional 
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conduct only blocked adoption of a plan "that could have favored" black 
voters. The broader suggestion is that unconstitutional discrimination 
does not necessarily deny minority voters an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in the political process but instead may simply deprive them of 
favored or preferential treatment. 
That suggestion is a remarkable one, and one that documents the 
extent to which the locus of civil rights jurisprudence has shifted. A long-
standing worry in this realm has been the concern that the prohibition 
on disparate impact would devolve into a mandate for affirmative action 
and prompt potential defendants to adopt preferential policies in order 
to shield themselves from liability?0 To guard against this result (and its 
apparent conflict with explicit statutory language), the Court has long 
refused to read bans on disparate impact expansively. 
But now, this concern about preferential treatment is also shaping 
the Court's approach to discriminatory intent. In a growing number 
of cases, it has read the VRA, Title VII , and other federal civil rights 
measures narrowly in contexts where animus was evident (or at least 
evidence of it went unchallenged), and it has done so because more 
expansive statutory readings were thought to yield unwarranted prefer-
ential treatment. Notably absent from these cases is a well-intentioned 
defendant laboring to comply with a statutory mandate. Instead, the 
Court has come to see federal antidiscrimination law itself as the source 
of damaging preferences. Even the prohibition on invidious intent, the 
core tenet of federal civil rights law, has evolved into a problem and 
hence a target. It is what needs to be constrained, if not eliminated, while 
the conduct the regime once targeted is dismissed as harmless and those 
once understood as victims are transformed into the unjustly enriched. 
V. Conclusion 
The Court has long sought to scale back the federal civi l rights regime 
and has typically done so by characterizing challenged conduct as 
nondiscriminatory. This chapter tracks a distinct line of cases that are 
undeniably part of the larger effort but that limit the regime while rec-
ognizing discrimination rather than denying it. These decisions throw 
ou t an umbrella in a rainstorm, knowing full well it is raining and that 
the rain will continue. They accordingly posit that the rain does less 
damage than the umbrella, at least in certain circumstances, and that the 
Court is institutionally able to figure out the circumstances in which the 
umbrella should be discarded. 
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Disparate Impact Abroad 
julie Suk 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned discrimination in various realms 
of social and economic life. Title VII, prohibiting discrimination in 
employment, gave rise to an innovative body of jurisprudence theo-
rizing the very concept of discrimination. For the past five decades, 
Title VII doctrine has influenced not only the American workplace but 
also the growth of antidiscrimination law throughout the world. Several 
European jurisdictions took inspiration from Title VII to develop a body 
of equality law that appears more robust today than its American 
cousins. On the occasion of Title VII's fiftieth anniversary, this chapter 
reflects on this alternative trajectory of the disparate impact theory, Title 
VII's most ambitious and contested doctrine. European "indirect" dis-
crimination law is a notable legacy of Title VII that raises hard questions 
about the future of the American Civil Rights Act. 
Citations to Griggs v. Duke Power Company, the U.S . Supreme Court's 
landmark disparate impact case, can be found in the decisions of English 
courts, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) elaborating the doctrine of "indi-
rect'' discrimination. Griggs was transplanted into soil that had already 
been fertilized by similar legal reasoning in an earlier line of cases devel-
oped by the CJEU in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s on the free 
movement of workers. European treaties guaranteed free movement of 
workers by dismantling employment practices that favored a nation's 
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own citizens. In early cases construing free movement of workers, the 
CJEU understood that barriers to the shared treaty goal of a common 
European market could arise from existing policies that indirectly dis-
advantaged nonnationals of any given member state. These cases draw 
out aspects of disparate impact doctrine that have not been fully appre-
ciated in the United States. The comparison highlights the significance 
of pursuing a substantive shared goal, such as a single, common, inte-
grated European labor ntarket, in giving coherence to disparate impact 
theory. It points to a question that must be confronted in the next fifty 
years of antidiscrimination law in the United States: What, if anything, 
does this body of law aspire to achieve? 
I. The Civil Rights Act and the Rise and Fall of Disparate Impact 
Discrimination 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company1 was the first decision in which the 
Supreme Court repudiated an employer practice as a violation of Title 
VII. As is well known, the Duke Power Company required a high school 
diploma and a cutoff score on a general ability test for workers 
employed in any department other than its Labor Department.2 Prior to 
the adoption of these requirements, which coincided with the effective 
date of Title VII, the Duke Power Company had segregated its workers 
on the basis of race: black workers could only be assigned to the Labor 
Department and could not be transferred or promoted to the better-
paid jobs in the company's other departments.3 In Griggs, the Supreme 
Court held that, even though the new criteria appeared racially neu-
tral, they violated Title VII because they disproportionately disqualified 
blacks and were not shown to be significantly related to successful job 
performance. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Burger explained: 
"[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-
in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job 
capability."4 Justice Burger also blessed consequentialist thinking about 
Title VII: "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences 
of employment practices, not simply the motivation."5 In a subsequent 
paragraph, Justice Burger generally challenged traditional indicators of 
accomplishment: 
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general test-
ing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed 
measures of capability. History is filled with examples of men and women 
who rendered highly effective performance without the conventional badges 
of accomplishment in terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas 
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and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense 
proposition that they are not to become masters of reality. 6 
For decades, scholars have debated the theory underlying the disparate 
impact definition of discrimination? On one end of the spectrum, the 
disparate impact is regarded primarily as an evidentiary dragnet for 
intentional discrimination. In the facts of this case, the Duke Power 
Company had been discriminating overtly on the basis of race until it 
was no longer lawful to do so, so it is perfectly plausible that the new 
facially neutral policy was a covert way of continuing the same racial 
discrimination. On the other end of the spectrum, the disparate impact 
theory articulates a principle that goes far beyond the elimination of 
intentional discrimination and its lingering effects. Individual employ-
ees are entitled, under a disparate impact theory, to consideration for 
jobs based on rational criteria that correspond to successful job perfor-
mance and not based on arbitrary indicators of past privilege. 8 
During the years immediately following Griggs, as Reva Siegel has 
eloquently exposed, a majority of the federal courts of appeals used 
disparate impact frameworks to interpret equal protection, viewing a 
policy's racial effects as evidence of presumed purposes.9 The Supreme 
Court, however, limited the disparate impact theory in at least three dif-
ferent phases. First, in the late 1970s, the Supreme Court declined to 
extend the disparate impact theory to the Equal Protection Clause, hold-
ing that the Constitution only proscribes intentional discrimination.10 
Second, in the 1980s, the Court heightened the burdens on Title VII 
plaintiffs seeking to establish disparate impact discrimination.l1 Third, 
in the past decade, the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano has limited the scope of 
employers' permissible actions to avoid racially disparate outcomes by 
holding such actions to be intentionally discriminatory.l2 The Obama 
administration has embraced the disparate impact theory as a construc-
tion of discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act.l3 Although 
the Supreme Court has recently validated the disparate impact theory 
under the Fair Housing Act, its decision sustained disparate impact in 
its modern weakened form. The Court has noted that disparate impact 
must be "properly limited in key respects that avoid the serious consti-
tutional questions that might arise .. .if such liability were imposed based 
solely on a showing of a statistical disparity."14 
Even as disparate impact continues to be used in the United States, 
the Supreme Court's construction of it in Title VII cases has limited 
its potential. The second phase-by which U.S. courts heightened the 
burdens of proving the prima facie case for disparate impact plaintiffs 
and deferred to the justifications for disparate impacts proffered by 
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defendants-brings out the contrast between American and European 
courts' approaches. The U.S. Supreme Court has required plaintiffs to do 
more than simply point to statistical disparities between groups to shift 
any burden, whether it is a burden of production or persuasion, to the 
employer. The plaintiff must identify a specific practice or requirement 
and show that it causes the disparity alleged to be discriminatory. 
In Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, cannery workers had sought to estab-
lish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by relying on 
statistics showing a high percentage of nonwhite workers in certain jobs 
and a low percentage of nonwhite workers in better jobs.l5 The Supreme 
Court held that a prima facie case could not be established by these facts 
alone, noting that "[i]f the absence of minorities holding such skilled 
positions is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for rea-
sons that are not petitioners' fault), petitioners' selection methods or 
employment practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on 
nonwhites."16 In short, statistical disparities had to be accompanied by a 
causal theory about a practice undertaken by the employer that caused 
the disparity. In this decision, the robust prima facie case was purport-
edly necessary to avoid a world in which 
any employer who had a segment of his work force that was-for some rea-
son-racially imbalanced, could be hauled into court and forced to engage 
in the expensive and time-consuming task of defending the 'business neces-
sity' of the methods used to select the other members of his work force.17 
In that landscape, the Court predicted, the "only practicable option for 
many employers would be to adopt racial quotas." 18 And since quotas 
were "expressly rejected" by the drafters of Title VII and would be "far 
from the intent of Title VII," the Wards Cove Court concluded that sta-
tistical disparities alone could never be enough to force an employer to 
articulate some explanation or justification for those disparities.19 
After Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts have consis-
tently required plaintiffs to identify the specific employment practice 
that caused the disparate outcomes that are being challenged. 20 In Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court rejected the class certification of plain-
tiffs' disparate impact claims by invoking the disparate impact plaintiff's 
burden of identifying a specific practice to establish the prima facie 
case.21 The Court noted: "Other than the bare existence of delegated 
discretion, respondents have identified no 'specific employment prac-
tice'-much less one that ties all their 1.5 million claims together."22 
And even when the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate 
impact discrimination, the burden that shifts to the employer is not par-
ticularly demanding. Once a prima facie case is established, the plaintiff 
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wins unless the employer can prove that the specific practice is justi-
fied by business necessity. The employer must show a legitimate busi-
ness purpose for the policy that causes a disparate impact, and the 
employee can then point to alternative means of achieving that pur-
pose that have less of a disparate impact. Wards Cove had held that 
the employer merely had a burden of production, not persuasion, in 
response to the plaintiff's prima fade case of disparate impact discrim-
ination.23 Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to overrule this aspect of 
Wards Cove. 24 So, for the past two decades, employers have the burden of 
showing business necessity once a prima facie case of disparate impact 
has been made. Yet, following the 1991 Act, courts accepted reasonable 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons as meeting the "business neces-
sity" standard required by the statute.25 As Michael Selmi notes, "courts 
readily accept most proffered justifications."26 The weakness of U.S. dis-
parate impact doctrine comes into clearer focus when encountering the 
development of disparate impact doctrine abroad. 
II. The Migration of Griggs 
While the evolution from Griggs to Ricci is a story of disparate impact's 
decline in the United States, Griggs migrated and followed an alternative 
trajectory in Europe, by way of Britain. Griggs influenced the drafting 
of the United Kingdom's Sex Discrimination Act. Roy Jenkins, the U.K. 
Home Secretary, made a visit to the United States in 1974, when the gov-
ernment was proposing a new law on sex discrimination.27 Jenkins was 
accompanied by Anthony Lester, a lawyer who had been active in lit-
igating on behalf of discrimination plaintiffs under the Race Relations 
Act.28 Shortly before their visit to the United States, the government had 
published a white paper, Equality for Women, largely drafted by Lester. 
The white paper had proposed that unlawful discrimination should only 
include intentional discrimination: "In the absence of any intention (or 
inferred intention) to treat one person less favourably than another on 
the grounds of sex or marriage, there will be no contravention of the 
proposed Bill."29 However, after Jenkins's visit to the United States, the 
Sex Discrimination Act was redrafted to include indirect discrimination, 
an idea that was directly shaped by the Jenkins's and Lester's encounter 
with Griggs. Lester recounts: 
We were much influenced in determining the content of the sex and race 
equality laws by the U.S. civil rights law, including the crucial concept of dis-
parate impact discrimination articulated by the American Supreme Court in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. in 197l....We learned about that concept when we 
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visited the United States in December 1974; but it was expressed in unneces-
sarily restrictive language in section l(l)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act.30 
Thus, the line of influence between Griggs and the indirect discrimina-
tion provision of the Sex Discrimination Act was conscious and direct. 
The Sex Discrimination Act, like the Race Relations Act of 1968, begins 
by defining discrimination as less favorable treatment: 
(l) In any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of 
this Act...a person discriminates against a woman if-
a. On the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he 
treats or would treat a man.Bl 
But after Jenkins's and Lester's encounter with Griggs, the proposed 
statute that eventually passed also included the disparate impact provi-
sion at section l(l)(b), which then influenced a revision of the Race Rela-
tions Act in 1976: 
b. [H]e applies to her a requirement or condition which applies or 
would apply equally to a man but-
i. which is such that the proportion of women who can com-
ply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of 
men who can comply with it, and 
ii. which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the 
sex of the person to whom it is applied, and 
iii. which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with 
it.32 
Anthony Lester also invoked the indirect discrimination idea when lit-
igating cases arising under the British Equal Pay Act. Lester's litigation 
strategy involved requests to English courts to refer the disparate impact 
construction of the Equal Pay Act to the European Court of Justice, 
with the aim of bringing the disparate irnpact theory to European Com-
munity law and then harmonizing EC law with English law.33 Thus, 
Griggs's disparate impact theory migrated yet again to the European 
level, and it is in the jurisprudence of the CJEU that the law of disparate 
impact, through the doctrine of indirect discrimination, has been given 
an expansive scope, both in terms of the doctrinal bases for liability and 
in terms of the transnational diffusion of legal norms. 
In 2003, further amendments to the British Race Relations Act height-
ened the justification requirement in the standard for indirect discrim-
ination. The statute required employers to show not only that the jus-
tification is unrelated to the sex or race of the persons involved but 
also that the justification is proportionate to a legitimate aim. In addi-
tion, the Race Relations Act's definition of indirect discrimination was 
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broadened: to include a "provision, criterion, or practice," not merely a 
"requirement or condition": 
A person also discriminates against another if...he applies to that other a pro-
vision, criterion or practice which he applies or would apply equally to per-
sons not of the same race or ethnic or national origins as that other, but: 
(a) which puts or would put persons of the same race or ethnic or 
national origins as that other at a particular disadvantage when com-
pared with other persons, 
(b) which puts or would put that other at that disadvantage, and 
(c) which he cannot show to be a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim. 34 
The 2003 Amendment to the Race Relations Act was adopted in order 
to comply with the European Union's Race Equality Directive of 2000. 
The Race Directive required all member states to adopt antidiscrimina-
tion laws that included a prohibition of indirect discrimination subject 
to a proportionality test: 
(b) [I]ndirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently 
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or eth-
nic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless 
that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim 
and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.35 
This same definition of indirect discrimination was applied in the EU's 
Framework Directive on Equal Treatment, which prohibits and defines 
discrimination on the basis of religion, disability, age, and sexual orien-
tation.36 The U.K. statutory framework has been revised again, unifying 
the Sex Discrimination Act, the Race Relations Act, and other antidis-
crimination statutes under a single Equality Act. The Equality Act retains 
the basic definitions of the 2003 Race Relations Act on indirect discriin-
ination. It provides that a "provision, criterion or practice" is indirectly 
discriminatory in violation of the Act when the following four condi-
tions are met: 
a. A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the 
characteristic, 
b. it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a 
particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does 
not share it, 
c. it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and 
d . A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim.37 
Scholars of antidiscrimination law in Britain have acknowledged the 
influence of Griggs on the Sex Discrimination Act, the Race Relations 
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Act, and decisions of the European Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Human Rights.38 
Ill. The Disparate Lives of Disparate Impact 
In the last thirty years, the CJEU has developed an indirect discrimi-
nation doctrine that diverges in at least four significant respects from 
American disparate impact law. First, the indirect discrimination idea 
emerged to construe a treaty guarantee of "equal pay for male and 
female workers for equal work."39 By contrast, in the United States, the 
Supreme Court declined to import the disparate impact theory into its 
construction of the Equal Pay Act.40 Second, the outcomes reached in 
CJEU cases are arguably more protective of women workers than are 
those reached by U.S. courts interpreting Title VII. For example, U.S. 
courts have declined to extend disparate impact theory to proscribe dis-
crimination against part-time workers.41 In Europe, early cases estab-
lished that discrimination against part-time workers disproportionately 
burdened women, as women were statistically more likely than men 
to be engaged in part-time work. Thus, the CJEU drew on the concept 
of indirect discrimination to instruct national tribunals to scrutinize 
the justifications employers gave for any policies that treated part-time 
workers worse than full-time workers. Third, the CJEU's case law enables 
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case more easily than American 
courts have permitted. A series of CJEU cases of the 1980s and the 1990s 
permit the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of indirect discrimi-
nation by presenting a disparity between the advantaged and disadvan-
taged group, without proving the disparity to be caused by a specific 
identifiable practice. Thus, the burden on the employer is more easily 
triggered. Finally, the employer's burden in European indirect discrim-
ination cases is heavier than that in U.S. disparate impact cases. Accord-
ing to the CJEU, the employer must defend a specific practice if one is 
identified by a plaintiff, or must prove that the disparity was caused by 
an employer policy with a legitimate aim and that the means of pursuing 
that aim were necessary and appropriate. The CJEU applied proportion-
ality analysis to the employer's "business necessity" defenses, making it 
more difficult for the employer to defend itself in the face of a prima 
facie case. 
This evolution appears to have been catalyzed by Griggs. The CJEU 
first cited Griggs in Jenkins v. Kingsgate Clothing Productions, Ltd., in con-
struing the equal pay guarantee of Article 141 of the EC Treaty (then Arti-
cle 119 of the EEC Treaty).42 The application of disparate impact theory 
to an equal pay case is itself an interesting contrast with the American 
Disparate Impact Abroad 291 
doctrinal landscape, as the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly declined 
to extend Griggs to construe the Equal Pay Act.43 The CJEU heard the 
equal pay case through a p reliminary reference from the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal of the United Kingdom, before which Anthony Lester 
had brought an equal pay claim on behalf of Mrs. jenkins under English 
law as well as EC law.44 Mrs. Jenkins was a part-time employee, and her 
rate of pay was 10 percent lower than full-time employees performing 
the same work.45 All the male employees except one worked full-time, 
and four of the five part-tirr1e employees were women. In the prelimi-
nary reference proceedings before the CJEU, Lester argued that paying 
part-time workers a lower rate than that paid to full-time workers for 
the same work constituted sex discrimination because of its disparate 
impact on women, unless such a policy could be objectively justified.46 
The CJEU highlighted Jenkins' reliance on Griggs in its decision: 
Mrs. Jenkins also refers to the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 US 424 (1971), according to 
which what must be prohibited are not merely practices which are intended 
to discriminate, but equally those which are discriminatory in their effect, 
irrespective of the intentions of their authors.47 
Although the Jenkins decision does not elaborate on the meaning and 
scope of Griggs, the Advocate General's opinion in that case is illumi-
nating. It is obvious that Advocate General Warner's understanding of 
Griggs was shaped by Lester's submissions: 
At the hearing Counsel for Mrs[.] Jenkins explained that what that proposi-
tion meant "in plain language" was that if, as was clearly the case, women 
were less able to work 40 hours a week than men, because of their family 
responsibilities, the requirement that an employee should work 40 hours a 
week to earn the full hourly rate must obviously hit, in a disproportionate 
way, at women, compared with men. That did not necessarily mean that 
there was discrimination, but it did mean that there was prima-facie dis-
crimination in effect, which required "some special justification from the 
employer." Counsel called this the "Griggs approach" after the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971), 
401 us 424.48 
Griggs facilitated the expansion of the discrimination concept to include 
employment practices that disadvantaged women because of their fam-
ily responsibilities. Jenkins was the first in a line of CJEU decisions that 
used the indirect discrimination concept to scrutinize employers' poli-
cies toward part-time workers. The court concluded that, where unequal 
treatment of part-time and full-time workers had a disproportionate 
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impact on women, such treatment had to be "objectively justified" based 
on reasons other than sex.49 
From the beginning, the European notion of "objective justification" 
had some teeth. The employer purported to have a commercial interest 
in encouraging its employees to work longer hours. The CJEU acknowl-
edged that this interest could constitute an objective justification and left 
it to national courts to scrutinize whether an employer's allegation of 
such an interest was convincing in any individual case. At the same time, 
the court expressed some skepticism of the proffered business justifica-
tion in this case: "If an employer wished to encourage his employees 
to work longer hours, he should pay a suitable overtime rate and not 
reduce the pay of those working part-time.''50 Thus, an objective justifi-
cation required consideration of other ways of achieving the purported 
legitimate aims, without the disadvantaging effect on women. 
Griggs provided European courts with inspiration and transnational 
authority to develop an indirect discrimination doctrine that would 
scrutinize employer policies that disadvantaged women with family 
responsibilities. Two subsequent cases, both involving unequal treat-
ment of part-time workers, developed this idea. In Bilka-Kaujhaus GmbH 
v. Weber von Hartz, the CJEU confronted the question of whether a Ger-
man department store had violated the equal pay provision of the EEC 
Treaty by refusing to pay a pension for employees who had not worked 
full-time for a minimum of fifteen years.51 Karin Weber von Hartz, a 
woman who had worked for the department store part-time for fifteen 
years, argued that the pension policy placed women workers at a disad-
vantage "since they were more likely than their male colleagues to take 
part-time work so as to be able to care for their family and children."52 
The CJEU built on the logic of Jenkins v. Kingsgate and concluded 
that excluding part-time workers from the occupational pension scheme 
would violate the equal pay provision where, "taking into account the 
difficulties encountered by women workers in working full-time, that 
measure could not be explained by factors which exclude any discrim-
ination on grounds of sex" but rather by "objectively justified factors."53 
Bilka, the department store, argued, as Kingsgate had, that its policy 
was justified as a discouragement of part-time work.54 Weber von Hartz 
pointed out that Bilka could discourage part-time work simply by refus-
ing to hire part-time workers, and the European Commission urged the 
court to adopt a test that would require pay practices to be "necessary 
and in proportion to the objectives pursued by the employer"55 to com-
port with the treaty's equal pay provision. Here, the CJEU spelled out a 
proportionality standard, strongly implied in Jenkins, for the employer's 
justification of policies that disadvantaged women. It required the 
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national courts to find "that the means chosen for achieving that objec-
tive correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, are appro-
priate with a view to achieving the objective in question and are neces-
sary to that end."56 
While making the justification burden on the employer heavier, the 
CJEU stopped short of reading the equal pay provision as imposing pos-
itive duties on employers to accommodate workers' family responsi-
bilities. The court concluded: "Article 119 does not have the effect of 
requiring an employer to organize its occupational pension scheme in 
such a manner as to take into account the particular difficulties faced by 
persons with family responsibilities in meeting the conditions for enti-
tlement to such a pension."57 Advocate General Darmon, in denying the 
existence of employers' positive duties in this regard, affirmed the exis-
tence of positive duties on the part of the state in compensating for the 
disadvantages caused by family responsibilities: "[A]n employer cannot 
be required to take over the role of the authorities in constructing a pen-
sion scheme which will compensate for the special difficulties faced by 
workers who have family responsibilities.''58 AG Darmon also suggested 
that such positive duties, on the part of the state, could even be located 
in the equal pay provision of the treaty: "Article 119 lays positive duties 
only on the Member States and not on commercial undertakings, which 
are subject, within the limits described above, only to an obligation not 
to discriminate.''59 
Seven years later, in Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority, 60 the CJEU 
strengthened the proportionality requirement in the indirect discrimi-
nation standard in a case challenging the pay inequality between speech 
therapists and pharmacists employed by a state health authority. Phar-
macists, who were predominantly male, were paid more than speech 
therapists, who were predominantly female. In this case, the state health 
authority gave two justifications for paying pharmacists more than 
speech therapists. First, the rates of pay had been determined through 
collective bargaining processes conducted by the same trade union, and 
second, the pay reflected, in part, the shortage of candidates for phar-
macist positions and the need to attract them with higher salaries. 61 
In Enderby, the CJEU concluded that a prima facie case of indirect dis-
crimination could be established by a statistical showing that a job with 
lower pay is predominantly occupied by women, while a comparable job 
with higher pay is predominantly occupied by men. 62 Once this prima 
facie case has been made, the burden of proof shifts to the employer, 
who must then show that the difference in pay is based on "objectively 
justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex."63 
Enderby requires national courts to apply the principle of proportion-
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ality to determine "whether and to what extent the shortage of candi-
dates for a job and the need to attract them by higher pay constitutes an 
objectively justified economic ground for the difference in pay between 
the jobs in question."64 In addition, the mere fact that any pay rate was 
produced by collective bargaining could not be accepted as an "objective 
justification" for a difference in pay. 
As Advocate General Lenz makes clear in his opinion, the Enderby 
decision does not require complainants to point to a specific require-
ment or practice of the employer that causes the disparate impact. 65 It 
appears sufficient for the female plaintiffs to have established through 
statistics that jobs predominantly held by women are paid less than 
those held by men in order to make out a prima facie case of indirect 
discrimination, which then places a proportionate objective justification 
burden on the employer. 
Griggs thus invigorated the evolution of a European doctrine of indi-
rect discrimination, primarily in cases construing the meaning of equal 
pay between men and women. But Griggs's influence, both directly and 
by way of CJEU case law, was not limited to the gender context. The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cited Griggs in its landmark 
2007 ruling, D.H. & Others v. Czech Republic,66 which recognized an indi-
rect discrimination theory to find a violation of the equality guarantee 
in Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with the Article 2 
Protocol 1 right to an education.67 The claimants argued that a Czech 
government's disproportionate assignment of Roma children to special 
education programs constituted a form of indirect discrimination in 
violation of Article 14. 
In issuing its final decision in that case, the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR closely followed the approach developed by the European Court 
of justice. The ECtHR began to scrutinize the Czech government's poli-
cies and justifications for them after the claimant's presentation of offi-
cial statistics documenting a racial disparity in assignments to special 
school.68 The claimants had shown that Roma children were grossly 
overrepresented in special schools, where they received an inferior edu-
cation. But the claimants had not made any showing that any specific 
policies, such as the particular psychological exams employed, caused 
the disproportionate outcomes. The statistical disparity was sufficient 
to require the Czech government to justify its entire scheme of special 
education assignment. Based merely on the presentation of undisputed 
reports that Roma children had constituted 70 to 90 percent of students 
in special schools since the 1990s, the ECtHR concluded: 
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In these circumstances, the evidence submitted by the applicants can be 
regarded as sufficiently reliable and significant to give rise to a strong pre-
sumption of indirect discrimination. The burden of proof must therefore 
shift to the Government, which must show that the difference in the impact 
of the legislation was the result of objective factors unrelated to ethnic ori-
gin.69 
Following the CJEU's approach, the ECtHR applied a proportionality 
test to the government's proffered justifications. The Czech government 
explained the disparities by claiming that they were the result of legit-
imate attempts to adapt the education system to the capacities of chil-
dren with special needs. Specifically, they argued that the disparities 
resulted from the use of psychological tests that measured children's 
capacities, which were used to make school assignments. Once the 
assignments were made, the parents consented. Thus, the government 
attributed the disparities to the intellectual capacities of Roma children 
and parental consent. The government claimed that parental consent 
was "the decisive factor without which the applicants would not have 
been placed in special schools."70 The court rejected the government's 
submissions, first by raising the possibility that the tests were biased or 
that their "results were not analysed in the light of the particularities and 
special characteristics of the Roma children who sat them,'>71 and sec-
ond, by holding that parents could not validly consent to discriminatory 
treatment, which would amount to an impermissible waiver of a Con-
vention right?2 
The ECtHR's approach in D.H. & Others v. Czech Republic illustrates 
the gulf between current European jurisdictions' "indirect discrimina-
tion" concept and disparate impact doctrine in the United States. In 
Europe, discrimination plaintiffs can shift the burden of justification to 
the alleged discriminator simply by pointing out a disparity and alleg-
ing that the defendant is responsible for it. It is then for the defendant to 
explain the causes of the disparity, specifically that the disparity results 
from the pursuit of legitimate aims, and that the means utilized are nec-
essary and appropriate toward achieving those aims. In the absence of 
this "objective justification," disparate outcomes are presumed to indi-
cate discriminatory causes. The ECtHR's indirect discrimination frame-
work has become firmly established in subsequent cases. In two similar 
decisions challenging the overrepresentation of Rorna children in spe-
cial schools for the mentally disabled or academically challenged, the 
ECtHR has required the state to justify the overrepresentation after a 
statistical showing of disparity, and has then rejected the state'sjustifica-
tions.73 
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IV. Indirect Discrimination before Griggs: Free Movement of 
Workers of All Nationalities within the European Community 
Despite the embrace of Griggs in the CJEU's early indirect discrimina-
tion decisions, the European concept of disparate impact discrimination 
was not merely transplanting American antidiscrimination law. In fact, 
Griggs was imported to strengthen and give structure to a concept of 
discrimination that the CJEU had developed in 1969 to enforce a treaty 
provision guaranteeing the free movement of workers. In this context, 
the norm against discrimination on the basis of nationality within the 
European Economic Community was not primarily a protection of indi-
vi duals from the dignity-harms of unequal treatment. Rather, the EC 
Treaty prohibited discrimination on the basis of nationality to enable 
the members of the European Economic Community to work toward 
the primary goal of their treaty: the creation of a single European mar-
ket. 
The influence of the free movement cases is subtle but explicit in 
Advocate General Warner's opinion in Jenkins v. Kingsgate. In that opin-
ion, AG Warner distinguished between the so-called Griggs approach 
and that advanced by an English case, Clay Cross (Quarry Services) Ltd. v. 
Fletcher.74 Warner read Clay Cross as developing an effects-based test for 
discrimination as an evidentiary dragnet for intentional discrimination 
and suggested it was inapplicable to the instant case. He then went on to 
embrace the Griggs approach instead, reading Griggs as allowing a prima 
facie case to be established by evidence of disproportionate effects of an 
employer policy on men and women and then requiring the employer 
to provide some special justification.75 At that point, he noted: "I draw 
similar comfort from the fact that that conclusion accords with a famil-
iar line of authority in this Court, Case 152/73 Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost 
[1974], I ECR 153, Case 61177 Commission v Ireland [1978] ECR 417 and Case 
237178 CRAM v Toia [1979] ECR 2645."76 
Article 48 of the EEC Treaty (EC Treaty article 39, and currently Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union art. 45) provided: "Freedom 
of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community" and 
specified that "[s]uch freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of 
any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Mem-
ber States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions 
of work and employment."77 Additionally, a Council regulation adopted 
in the 1960s, addressing terms and conditions of work as well as unem-
ployment and dismissal procedures, stated: "A worker who is a national 
of a Member State may not, in the territory of another Member State, 
be differently treated from national workers by reason of his national-
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ity ... "78 The common market created by the treaty in 1958 was based on 
four fundamental freedoms: free movement of persons, services, goods, 
and capital. These freedoms were delineated as essential to the creation 
of a single economic area. 
In Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost,79 the first free movement case men-
tioned by the Advocate General in Jenkins, the CJEU developed the con-
cept of "indirect" discrimination in the context of interpreting Article 
48 of the EEC Treaty. Mr. Sotgiu was an Italian citizen working in Ger-
many for the German postal service. Postal workers in Germany who 
were employed away from their place of residence received a separa-
tion allowance. However, the separation allowance was higher for work-
ers whose residence at the time of their initial employment was within 
the Federal Republic of Germany than for workers whose residence at 
the time of their initial employment was abroad. But the policy did 
not obviously treat German nationals differently from foreign nationals. 
The policy did not use the nationality of workers as a criterion for differ-
ent treatment. An Italian national who was already residing in Germany 
before taking the job with the German postal service would get the same 
separation allowance as a German national in the same situation, and a 
German national who was residing abroad before taking the job with the 
German postal service would get the same reduced allowance paid to 
foreign nationals living abroad before the initial employment. 
Nonetheless, the CJEU concluded that the policy at issue violated the 
prohibition of discrimination based on nationality in the free move-
ment provisions of the EEC Treaty. In justifying its decision, the court 
stated: 
The criterion of the place of recruitment might make it possible to circum-
vent the prohibition on discrimination based on nationality: in fact work-
ers recruited abroad are normally of foreign nationality and a criterion of 
differentiation based on place of recruitment of the worker would lead sub-
stantially to discrimination against non-national Community workers. Such 
a criterion is contrary to the principle of freedom of movement.80 
The inquiry is not a technical one as to whether the distinction made is 
one of nationality but a question of principle: Does the category at issue, 
whether it can be viewed as a proxy for nationality or not, contravene 
the principle of freedom of movement? 
The court then framed the problem as one of "hidden or indirect 
discrimination," taking a very fact-based, consequentialist, practical 
approach: 
The concepts of discrimination and of nationality must be interpreted on 
the basis of factual criteria. A purely theoretical idea is not sufficient. Rules 
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based on other criteria such as residence abroad, language, place of birth, 
descent or performance of military service in the country may in fact con-
ceal discrimination on the basis of nationality. Such would be the case in par-
ticular if the application of certain criteria of differentiation were to result, 
in all cases or in the vast majority of cases, in foreigners alone being affected 
without any objective justification. 8! 
Here, we can discern the outlines of an indirect discrimination test 
that was given much fuller articulation seven years later in Jenkins v. 
Kingsgate. If a rule or criterion disproportionately affects foreigners, an 
objective justification must be present to avoid a finding of nationality 
discrimination. Further, the court provides some guidance to be applied 
by the national court as to what might or might not constitute an objec-
tive justification: 
The criterion of residence abroad might not appear to be discriminatory in a 
case in which, unlike workers recruited within the country, workers recruited 
abroad receive a separation allowance without having to find a home in 
the country of employment or to remove, and in which they receive the 
allowance at the lower rate for a practically unlimited period throughout of 
the whole of their period of employment. The question whether this scheme 
gives rise to discrimination either in intention or in effect, or whether it is 
only intended to control one particular situation in an objective way, should 
be settled in terms of national.law.82 
If, for example, the employer were to require its own nationals to relo-
cate to the city of employment, thereby paying a larger allowance for a 
shorter period of time, while permitting nonnationals to commute with 
a smaller allowance for an indefinite period, the court suggests that this 
could meet the objective justification test. These arrangements would 
appear to facilitate, rather than undermine, the nonnationals' ability to 
work in a different member state. Ultimately, what matters with regard 
to the objective justification is whether, as the court stated earlier, the 
principle of free movement of workers is contravened. 
The Sotgiu case was decided in 1974, after Griggs. But the indirect dis-
crimination idea that is so robustly articulated in Sotgiu does not cite 
Griggs, and there is no indication that Griggs played any role. The idea of 
indirect discrimination derived from a 1969 free movement case before 
the CJEU. Invoking both the treaty provision prohibiting nationality dis-
crimination as well as the regulations, an Italian citizen who was working 
in Germany challenged the application of a German law, which entitled 
workers who had served in the German armed forces to have their peri-
ods of military service counted as time employed for the purposes of 
wage reguJations and collective contracts.83 Salvatore Ugliola, the Ital-
ian employee of a German company, sought to have his military ser-
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vice for Italy counted for the purpose of calculating his duration of 
employment. Again, the policy did not necessarily treat German nation-
als and nonnationals differently. Germans who did not serve in the Ger-
man military would be treated the same as non-Germ.ans who did not 
serve in the German military. The German government pointed out 
that the law providing for the counting of military service as employ-
ment was part of German military law, not German labor law. Thus, the 
law was presented as a policy enabling the German state to compen-
sate employment disadvantages sustained by persons who had served in 
their military. Germany argued that, therefore, there had been no dis-
crimination based on nationality. 
The CJEU responded to this line of argumentation by focusing on the 
effects of a policy rather than the intent behind it. Thus, the concept of 
"indirect" discrimination emerged: 
A national law which is intended to protect a worker who resumes his 
employment with his former employer from any disadvantages occasioned 
by his absence on military service, by providing in particular that the period 
spent in the armed forces must be taken into account in calculating the 
period of his service with that employer falls within the context of condi-
tions of work and employment. Such a law cannot therefore, on the basis 
of its indirect connexion with national defence, be excluded from the ambit 
of Article 9(1) of EEC Regulation No 38/64 and Article 7 of EEC Regulation 
No 1612/68 on equality of treatment and protection for migrant workers "in 
respect of any conditions of employment and work." 
[A] rticle 48 of the Treaty does not allow Member States to make any excep-
tions to the equality of treatment and protection required by the Treaty for 
all workers within the Community by indirectly introducing discrimination 
in favour of their own nationals alone based upon obligations for military 
service.84 
Here, the concept of ''indirect" discrimination is not the same as "dis-
parate impact" discrimination. The discrimination in this context is 
"indirect" in the sense that the law makes no explicit facial distinction 
between Italian workers and German workers and does not use national-
ity, as such, as a criterion of differentiation. It distinguishes on the basis 
of the government for which one has performed military service. The 
law could benefit a foreign national who performed military service for 
Germany or disadvantage a German who performed military service for 
another nation. This is why the discrimination is characterized as "indi-
rect." 
The CJEU's reasoning as to why the treaty must prohibit these "indi-
rect'' forms of discrimination can be discerned in Advocate General 
Gand's opinion. He points out that "performance of military service in 
the army of the State other than that of which one is a national is a 
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hypothesis which even the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many considers to be somewhat theoretical."85 Advocate General Gand 
identifies the obvious consequences of the law for Germans and non-
Germans: "In fact, the provision in question only benefits German cit-
izens ... "86 But instead of harping on the Italian national's right to equal 
treatment, Gand emphasizes that "the very purpose of the regulation 
on freedom of movement is precisely to abolish such privileges."87 In 
short, what's wrong with German policies that benefit German work-
ers only is that they hamper the integration of the European market. 
The wrong of discrimination is located by reference to one of the four 
fundamental freedoms protected by the European Economic Commu-
nity-specifically, free movement of workers. Finally, Gand points out 
that, while indirect forms of discrimination are prohibited, the possibil-
ity of justifying policies that undermine free movement is articulated 
in the limitations in Article 48, Paragraph 3 of the treaty.88 Section 3 
provides that the freedom of movement for workers is subject to lim-
itations justified on grounds of public policy, public security, or public 
health.89 Applying this standard, AG Gand concludes that there are no 
such grounds that could justify the employment policy of remunerating 
former Gem1an military members at a higher rate.90 In the cases of the 
1970s protecting the free movement of workers, the CJEU did not draw 
a sharp line between direct and indirect discrimination. Rather, national 
rules or employer policies that disadvantaged nationals of one member 
state were generally scrutinized to determine whether the interference 
with workers' free movement and European integration could be toler-
ated.91 
V. Conclusion 
Thus, the European approach to indirect discrimination originated 
before the citations to Griggs, in cases rooting out member state policies 
that had the effect of advantaging workers who were nationals of that 
state. Such policies made sense when markets were national, but they 
were contrary to the goal of a common supranational market. When the 
CJEU invalidated such policies, it was aiming not to eradicate racism or 
national animus but rather to end a prior set of institutional arrange-
ments that supported a different type of market. Thus, the European 
law of indirect discrimination, unlike disparate impact law in the United 
States, did not begin as an evidentiary dragnet for racism, ethnic animus, 
or any other evil that was being repudiated and rooted out by law. 
Rather, indirect discrimination doctrine began because it was acknowl-
edged that the new and collectively shared goal of European economic 
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integration would require the eradication of existing practices that had 
been premised on a different, nation-centered economic model. 
The am algamation of Griggs's disparate impact theory with the indi-
rect discrimination theory in the free movement cases highlights the 
potential and limits of American antidiscrimination law. The free move-
ment line of cases envisions the paradigmatic instance of discrimination 
as a privilege reserved for nationals, not a rights violation stemming 
from animus. That privilege is problematic not because it is morally 
repugnant but because it undermines the fundamental goal articulated 
by the treaties organizing the European Economic Community: the eco-
nomic integration of these national rnarkets. Similarly, the Griggs Court 
characterized the policies that it repudiated as "barriers that have oper-
ated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees."92 Does anything significant happen if we say that the 
target of disparate impact liability-or antidiscrimination law in gen-
eral- is not black disadvantage but white advantage? What is the differ-
ence between characterizing the purpose of Title VII as the eradication 
of white advantage, as contrasted with the eradication of black disad-
vantage? If white advantage is to be eradicated by antidiscrimination 
law, one might argue that this goal can only be achieved by forging a 
new economic and political order after segregation. Yet Title VII did not 
deliver the ar chitecture for one. 
Sociologists have suggested that racial inequalities today are largely 
the result of whites ' ordinary use of available social networks and 
resources to amass opportunities for themselves.93 Most people help 
their friends and family find educational opportunities and jobs, if pos-
sible. (In fact, many people believe this is what it means to be a good par-
ent or friend.) Should civil rights law regard these dynamics as illegiti-
mate "opportunity-hoarding" or desirable m ethods of preserving much-
needed social capital? It would only be possible to render "opportunity-
hoarding" as illegitimate if one developed an account of how these 
behaviors significantly undermined clearly shared social goals, such as 
the eventual and complete racial integration of American civil society. 
The evolution of a robust indirect discrimination doctrine in Europe 
suggests some limits to the concept of discrimination. When the concept 
of discrimination emphasizes effects and consequences rather than 
practices or procedures, those consequences have to be understood in 
relation to a collective goal. It is only because the European Community 
was attempting to create a single market that policies undermining the 
four fundamental freedoms become problematic. Note also that the 
freedoms that are thought to be "fundamental" are not freedoms in a 
universalistic human rights sense. They are freedoms instrumental to 
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the project of European integration. Free movement of workers only 
refers to workers within the European economic community and not to 
an abstract free labor idea. The freedoms are valuable primarily by ref-
erence to their furtherance of the articulated goal of creating a common 
market. Within fifty years, enforcing the norm against nationality dis-
crimination within the European Community enabled a transnational 
integration of labor markets. The EU is now the largest internal market 
in the world, and it exercises enormous regulatory power globally. 
By contrast, the Civil Rights Act in the United States did not aspire to 
the collectively shared purpose of a fully racially integrated workplace. 
Rather, the American ideal of equal opportunity appears consistent with 
the absence of integration. In fact, the framers of the Civil Rights Act 
explicitly avoided defining what the end-state of this body of law should 
be and made clear that the prohibition of discrimination would never 
require employers to achieve racial balance. As Ricci illustrates, the fear 
of encouraging the use of quotas motivates courts to limit the disparate 
impact theory. As we prepare for the next half-century of Title VII in the 
United States, we must confront the difficult question of whether Amer-
ican antidiscrimination law has any collectively shared social goal. Are 
we striving for a total racial integration of the workplace by Title VII's 
centennial? If not, one wonders what the Civil Rights Act is for today. 
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